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SUMMARY 
 
The unique and intimate relationship that exists between a medical practitioner and his/her 
client is possibly one of the most important relationships that can come into being between 
any two people. This relationship is characterised and influenced by the qualities and 
attributes specific to the nature and historical development of medical care, as well as 
medical science in general. The doctor-patient relationship is also influenced by the social 
dynamics of a particular community, environmental factors, technological advances and the 
general social and commercial evolution of the human race. With regard to medical care 
and health service delivery, the doctor-patient relationship is furthermore vital to the 
quality of the care provided, as well as to the outcomes and relative success of the specific 
medical intervention or treatment.   
 
One of the distinct characteristics of the doctor-patient relationship is the power imbalance 
inherent in this relationship. The medical practitioner has expert knowledge and skill, while 
the patient finds himself or herself in an unusually dependent and vulnerable position. It is 
because of this important role that the doctor-patient relationship still plays in health 
service delivery today; the susceptibility of the relationship to a variety of influences , and 
the characteristic power imbalances inherent in this relationship, that a study of the doctor-
patient relationship in South African medical- and health law is necessary. The characteristic 
power imbalances will be considered from a legal perspective in this dissertation.   
 
This study provides a comprehensive source of the doctor-patient relationship from a legal 
perspective. Where relevant, references are made to theories and principles from other 
disciplines, including sociology, economy and medical ethnomethodology. The prevalence 
and consequences of power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship are identified and 
discussed with the aim of bringing these to the attention of both the legal fraternity, and 
medical practitioners.   
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Specific problem areas are identified and solutions are offered, including the following: 
 
•  The adverse consequences of power imbalances inherent in the doctor-patient 
relationship on the medical decision-making process are considered from various 
perspectives. With regard to these adverse consequences, the doctrine of 
informed consent is analysed and evaluated in great detail.   
 
•  The influence of paternalistic notions in health service delivery; the business 
model of health service delivery and the effects of managed care and consumer-
directed health care on the doctor-patient relationship and health service delivery 
in general are also analysed from a legal perspective, and specifically with regard 
to the power imbalances inherent in this relationship.  
 
•  The role of autonomy, self-determination and dignity, as well as the principles of 
beneficence in medical practice, are reconsidered in an attempt to provide a 
solution for redressing the power imbalances inherent in the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
 
•  The fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the special role of 
trust in the relationship are emphasised throughout the dissertation as the focal 
point of departure in the doctor-patient relationship and the main constituent in 
any legal endeavor to redress the power imbalances inherent in it.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Die unieke en intieme verhouding wat bestaan tussen ‘n mediese praktisyn en ‘n pasiënt is 
wêreldwyd waarskynlik een van die belangrikste verhoudings wat tussen twee persone tot 
stand kan kom. Hierdie verhouding word gekenmerk en beïnvloed deur kwaliteite en 
eienskappe eie aan die besonderse aard en historiese ontwikkeling van gesondheidsorg, 
sowel as die mediese wetenskap in die algemeen. Die dokter-pasiënt verhouding word 
verder beïnvloed deur die sosiale dinamika van ‘n bepaalde gemeenskap, 
omgewingsfaktore, tegnologiese vooruitgang en die algemene sosiale en kommersiële 
ontwikkeling van die mensdom. Op die terrein van gesondheidsorg en mediese 
dienslewering is die dokter-pasiënt verhouding voorts ook sentraal tot die kwaliteit van die 
mediese sorg wat verskaf word, sowel as die uitkomste en relatiewe sukses van die 
spesifieke mediese behandeling.  
 
Een van die kenmerkende eienskappe van die dokter-pasiënt verhouding is die 
magswanbalans wat daar tussen dokter en pasiënt bestaan. Die mediese praktisyn beskik 
oor deskundige kennis en vaardighede, terwyl die pasiënt hom- of haarself in ‘n ongewone, 
afhanklike en kwesbare posisie bevind. Dit is dan veral weens die besondere rol wat hierdie 
verhouding steeds in hedendaagse gesondheidsorg speel, die beïnvloedbaarheid van hierdie 
verhouding deur ‘n verskeidenheid faktore, sowel as die kenmerkende magswanbalans 
inherent in die verhouding, dat ‘n ondersoek na die dokter-pasiënt verhouding in die Suid-
Afrikaanse mediese reg noodsaaklik is. Hierdie kenmerkende magswanbalans sal vanuit ‘n 
regsperspektief verder in hierdie proefskrif ondersoek word.  
 
Hierdie studie bied ‘n omvattende bron van die dokter-pasiënt verhouding benader vanuit 
‘n regsperspektief, terwyl verwysings na teorieë en beginsels van ander dissiplines soos die 
sosiologie, ekonomie en mediese etnometodologie ook waar nodig ingesluit word.  Die 
voorkoms en gevolge van ‘n magswanbalans in die dokter-pasiënt verhouding word verder 
geïdentifiseer en bespreek ten einde dit onder die aandag te bring van beide regslui en 
medici.  
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Spesifieke probleemareas wat geïdentifiseer is en die oplossings wat daarvoor aan die hand 
gedoen is sluit die volgende in: 
 
•  Die nadelige gevolge van die bestaan van ‘n magswanbalans in die dokter-pasiënt 
verhouding op die mediese-besluitnemingsproses word bespreek vanuit 
verskillende persepktiewe. Met betrekking tot hierdie nadelige gevolge, word die 
leerstuk van  ingeligte toestemming in besonder geanaliseer en geëvalueer.   
 
•  Die invloed van ‘n paternalistiese benadering tot gesondheidsorg, die besigheids -
model van gesondheidsorg, en die effek van bestuurde- en verbruikersgedrewe 
gesondheidsorg inisiatiewe op die dokter-pasiënt verhouding en die verskaffing 
van gesondheidsdienste in die algemeen word ook vanuit ‘n regsperspektief ge-
analiseer. Spesifieke aandag word in dié verband gegee aan die invloede van 
hierdie benaderings en perspektiewe op die magswanbalans inherent aan die 
dokter-pasiënt verhouding.  
 
•  Die besondere rol van autonomie, selfbeskikking en menswaardigheid, asook die 
beginsels van weldadigheid in gesondheidsorg, word heroorweeg in ‘n poging om 
‘n meer gelyke distribusie van mag in die dokter-pasiënt verhouding te verseker.  
 
•  Die fidusiêre aard van die dokter-pasiënt verhouding en die besondere rol wat 
vertroue in hierdie verhouding speel, word in hierdie proefskrif beklemtoon en 
word voorts as die basis van die dokter-pasiënt verhouding beskou. Vertroue, as 
‘n kenmerk van die dokter-pasiënt verhouding, behoort ook die fokuspunt te 
wees van enige poging om die magswanbalans in die dokter-pasiënt verhouding 
aan te spreek.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Good health is universally valued, and variations of the saying “as long as you have your 
health” exist in almost every language and culture. 1 When illness strikes, anxiety, 
desperation and fear are experienced by both the weakest and strongest in society.2 For this 
reason the medical profession is one of the most important vocations, elevated to a special 
status, and with corresponding privileges and rights.  The unique interaction between 
members of a profession as reputable as the medical one, and vulnerable patients with 
essential health needs makes the doctor-patient relationship complicated. It is not only one 
of the most important, but also one of the most unequal social relationships. 
 
“Power in the doctor-patient relationship is distributed unequally. This structural 
inequality affects all transactions within the relationship, including decision-making by 
                                                 
1
 Yamin, Alicia Ely “Defining Questions: Situating issues of power in the formulation of a right to health under 
international law” Human Rights Quaterly 18.2 (1996) 398 – 438. 
2
 Mahlati, Malixole Percival The Medical Profession in  a Transforming South African Society; Ideals, Values and 
Role Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree M Phil (Applied Ethics) at 
Stellenbosch University March 2000 (Supervisor: Prof AA van Niekerk) , 18. 
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the doctor and the patient, the construction of knowledge, and the doctor’s 
performance of legal obligations to the patient.”3  
 
The historical and social context of the distribution of power and inequality affects the 
nature of power in the doctor-patient relationship. However, this maldistribution of power 
and the inequality inherent in the doctor-patient relationship are rarely considered in 
judgements concerning medical law as well as health law.4 Such a narrow approach to 
health law in general, and the doctor-patient relationship in particular, is regrettable for the 
following reasons: 
• An unequal distribution of power in the doctor-patient relationship undermines 
the vulnerable patient’s effective participation in and control over decision-
making.  The constitutional rights to life,5 to bodily and psychological integrity,6 
privacy,7 freedom of religion, belief and opinion, 8 and freedom of movement9 are 
consequently not recognised or encouraged. In addition, sections 6 – 12 of the 
National Health Act 61 of 2003 are also not duly adhered to in such situations. 
•  Without power, patients have difficulty giving effect to their own values, whether 
founded on personal, cultural, religious or any other group-defined basis. The 
constitutional rights to freedom of religion, freedom of belief and opinion, 10 as 
well as the right to freedom of association11 in the Bill of Rights are thereby also 
not honoured. 
• Patients’ sense of self and dignity, as envisioned in the constitutional rights to 
human dignity,12 freedom and security of the person13 and the right to privacy14 
are undermined. 
                                                 
3
 Peppin, Patricia Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships Texas Journal of Women and Law  Vol 3 
(Spring 1994) 221 – 263, 221. 
4
 Peppin, Patricia Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships Texas Journal of Women and Law  Vol 3 
(Spring 1994) 221 – 263, 221; See below for a discussion on the concepts “medical law”and “health law”.  
5
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 11. 
6
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 12(2). 
7
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 14. 
8
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 15(1). 
9
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 21(1). 
10
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s ection 15. 
11
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 18. 
12
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 10. 
13
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 12. 
14
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 14. 
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• Personal effectiveness and an authentic representation of the self, as described in 
the right to freedom of expression15 in the Bill of Rights, is undermined.  
•  The inability to control medical decision-making increases the likelihood that 
unwanted risks will fall on patients.16  
In this dissertation, the ordinary doctor-patient relationship, as opposed to other specialist 
relationships like the relationship between a psychologist and a patient, will be examined.17 
The collective concepts of power and equality as well as an affirmation of difference will be 
considered in terms of the ordinary, universally accepted notion of the relationship between 
doctor and patient and the dynamics unique to doctor-patient interaction.  
 
In addition, reference will be made to both medical law and health law. To date there has 
been no agreement on a clear and universally accepted definition and distinction of these 
two concepts.18 While medical law was, at the outset, primarily engaged with aspects of 
medical malpractice and negligence, its scope has now been enlarged to cut across the 
traditional compartments of law (such as delict-, contract-, criminal-, family- and public law) 
with which most lawyers have become familiar.19 The term “health law,”on the other hand, 
overlaps with the term “medical law”and has a wider meaning than the latter concept. 
Health law concerns a complex group of professions, applies to a wide range of 
professionals and extends beyond the established medical and nursing practices and 
communities.20 As the primary focus of this dissertation will be on the historical and social 
context of the distribution of power and inequality, as well as on the nature of power in the 
doctor-patient relationship, it will be necessary to consider relevant areas of both medical 
law and health law. Note, however, that were the term “medical law” is used in this 
                                                 
15
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s ection 16. 
16
 Peppin, Patricia Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships Texas Journal of Women and Law  Vol 3 
(Spring 1994) 221 – 263, 223 - 224. 
17
 See the discussion in 1.2. below.  
18
 Cartens, P & Pearmain, D Foundational principles of South African Medical Law LexisNexis Durban 2007 3 – 
5; Strauss, SA Medical Law – South Africa in International Encyclopaedia of Laws (eds Blanpain R and Nys H) 
(2006) para 42.  
19
 Cartens, P & Pearmain, D Foundational principles of South African Medical Law LexisNexis Durban 2007 3 – 
5; Strauss, SA Medical Law – South Africa in International Encyclopaedia of Laws (eds Blanpain R and Nys H) 
(2006) para 42; Van Oosten FFW Medical Law – South Africa in International Encyclopaedia of Laws (eds 
Blanpain R and Nys H) (1996) 26 – 27. 
20
 Cartens, P & Pearmain, D Foundational principles of South African Medical Law LexisNexis Durban 2007 4.  
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dissertation, it is not meant to refer to or to be limited by the traditional  subdivisions of law 
(especially the law of obligations) with which this term had historically been associated.  
 
The question of power in the doctor-patient relationship will be the focal point of this 
dissertation. Power in any relationship is essentially about control and authority, and due 
analysis of power relations and interests is consequently called for. The research question is: 
How can the doctor-patient relationship be conceptualised, from a legal perspective, to 
redress power imbalances in this relationship? The inherent inequality in the doctor-patient 
relationship is therefore central to the legal analysis that follows, and not the traditional 
subdivisions of the law on which medical- and health law have historically been founded. It 
is submitted that a true analysis of power relations in the doctor-patient relationship cannot 
sensibly be confined to the traditional juridical model on which medical law is traditionally 
founded.21 A socio-legal perspective is called for instead, conceiving of the law as 
inseparable from, and indeed imbedded in, the social dynamic that informs the doctor–
patient relationship. 
 
In the South African context, it is also particularly important to investigate how this 
relationship between doctor and patient developed from a relationship governed by 
common law principles to a relationship now informed and shaped by the Constitution and, 
more specifically, the Bill of Rights. The new legal environment, fundamentally (re)-shaped 
by the advent of two successive, justiciable, supreme constitutions since 1994, calls for a 
multilayered approach to health law, taking into account relevant legislation, case law, 
medical ethics and common law principles while incorporating relevant constitutional 
values, principles and rights.22 However, a mainstream human rights analysis with a special 
focus on social and economic rights will also not fully appreciate how “…social relations 
constitute structures of choices within which people perceive, evalute and act.”23  
 
                                                 
21
 London, Leslie What is a Human-Rights-based Approach to Health and does i t matter? Health and Human 
Rights Vol 10, No 1 65 – 80, 67. 
22
 Cartens, P & Pearmain, D Foundational principles of South African Medical Law  LexisNexis Durban 2007 25 – 
26. 
23
 Yamin, Alicia Ely Suffering and Powerlessness: The Significance of Promoting Participation in Rights -based 
Approaches to Health Health and Human Rights Vol 11, No 1, 5 – 22, 17. 
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The topic of this study is vast and its scope will therefore be limited for the purposes of this 
dissertation. The ordinary relationship between doctor and patient in the private health 
care sector will serve as the point of departure, while the additional power imbalances that 
exists between a doctor and patient in the context of public health care (especially in the 
South African context) will also be referred to where applicable. An in-depth constitutional 
investigation of socio-economic rights will not be undertaken, nor will the question whether 
or not the South African Constitution provides for a right to health care (and the effect of 
the Constitution on health service delivery in general) be addressed, as this dissertation is 
primarily concerned with the power-imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship and how 
such disparities influence the nature and consequences of doctor-patient interactions in 
practice. However, a conceptualisation of what power in the doctor-patient relationship 
means and how power imbalances in the relationship influence health service delivery and 
its outcomes, as is envisaged in this dissertation, can inevitably lead to a better 
understanding of health rights in general.  The focus will consequently be the doctor-patient 
relationship and how the Constitution could possibly inform it.  
 
1.2. Identifying the doctor and the patient in health service delivery 
Since this dissertation will comprehensively analyse the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship, it is important to determine when exactly a doctor-patient relationship 
comes into existence. First, however, it is necessary to identify the two main protagonists in 
this relationship. A health practitioner, in terms of the Health Professions Act,24 is any 
person, including a student, registered with the council in a profession registrable in terms 
of this particular Act, while a medical practitioner is any person registered in terms of the 
Health Professions Act. The National Health Act,25 on the other hand, refers to health care 
providers rather than health practitioners and describes a health care provider as any 
person providing health services in terms of law, and “law” includes the Health Professions 
Act,26 the Allied Health Professions Act,27 the Nursing Act,28 the Pharmacy Act29 and the 
Dental Technicians Act.30  
                                                 
24
 56 of 1973.  
25
 61 of 2003.  
26
 56 of 1973.  
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A health care user, according to the definition in section 1 of the National Health Act,31 
refers to a person receiving treatment in a health establishment, including receiving blood 
or blood products, or using a health service, and if the person receiving treatment or using a 
health service is below the age contemplated in section 39 (4) of the Child Care Act,32 then 
the 'user' includes the person's parent or guardian or another person authorised by law to 
act on the firstmentioned person's behalf. Further, if the health care user is incapable of 
taking decisions, 'user' also includes the person's spouse or partner or, in the absence of 
such spouse or partner, the person's parent, grandparent, adult child or brother or sister, or 
another person authorised by law to act on the firstmentioned person's behalf . 
 
Noteworthy in the South African context are also the definitions relating to the 
understanding of who a doctor is and who a patient is in traditional health practice,33 and in 
terms of the Traditional Health Practitioners ’ Act.34 This Act defines a traditional health 
practitioner as a person registered under this particular Act in one or more of the categories 
of traditional health practitioners. The categories of traditional health practitioners, as 
identified in the act, are based on thetraditional health care practice and philosophy,35 as 
well as on the particular functions, activities, processes and/or services, traditionally 
associated with what health practitioners may do. These functions, activities, processes 
and/or services must furthermore have the following as their objects:  
•  the maintenance or restoration of physical or mental health or function; or  
•   the diagnosis, treatment or prevention of a physical or mental illness; or 
                                                                                                                                                        
27
 63 of 1982; This includes practitioners of the profession of ayurveda, Chinese medicine and acupuncture, 
chiropractic, homeopathy, naturopathy, osteopathy, phytotherapy, therapeutic aromatherapy, therapeutic 
massage therapy or therapeutic reflexology, or any other profession contemplated in section 16 (1) of the Act. 
28
 50 of 1978. 
29
 53 of 1974. 
30
 19 of 1979. 
31
 61 of 2003.  
32
 Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
33
 Traditional medicine refers  to  an object or substance used in traditional health practice for the diagnosis, 
treatment or prevention of a physical or mental illness; or any curative or therapeutic purpose, including the 
maintenance or restoration of physical or mental health or well -being in human beings. 
34
 35 of 2003.  
35
 According to the act, traditional philosophy means indigenous African techniques, principles, theories, 
ideologies, beliefs, opinions and customs and uses of traditional medicines communicated from ancestors to 
descendants or from generations to generations, with or without written documentation, whether supported 
by science or not, and which are generally used in traditional health practice. 
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•   the rehabilitation of a person to enable that person to resume normal  
functioning within the family or community; or 
•  the physical or mental preparation of an individual for puberty, adulthood,  
pregnancy, childbirth and death,  
but excludes the professional activities of a person practising any of the professions 
contemplated in the Pharmacy Act, 36 the Health Professions Act,37 the Nursing Act,38 the 
Allied Health Professions Act,39 or the Dental Technicians Act,40 and any other activity not 
based on traditional philosophy. 
 
Just as the scope of traditional medical practice, as referred to above, determines the 
nature of the relationship between traditional health practitioners and their patients, the 
scope of the profession of medicine, as understood in terms of the Health Professions Act 
and the Health Professions Council of South Africa, also influences the doctor-patient 
relationship and the understanding of who the doctor is and who the patient is in health 
service delivery. The following acts have been identified as acts, which shall for the purposes 
of the Health Professions Act,41 be deemed to be acts pertaining to the medical profession: 
•  the physical medical and/or clinical examination of any person;  
•  performing medical and/or clinical procedures and/or prescribing medicines and 
managing the health of a patient (prevention, treatment and rehabilitation);  
•  advising any person on his or her physical health status; 
•  on the basis of information provided by any person or obtained from him or her in 
any manner whatsoever— 
- diagnosing such person's physical health status; 
- advising such person on his or her physical health status; 
- administering or selling to or prescribing for such person any medicine or 
medical treatment; 
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 Health Professions Act 56 of 1974.  
38
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•  prescribing, administering or providing any medicine, substance or medical device 
as defined in the Medicines and Related Substances Act, 1965 (Act No. 101 of 
1965); 
•  any other act specifically pertaining to the medical profession based on the 
education and training of medical practitioners as  approved by the board from 
time to time.42 
 
These actions will, however, not be construed as prohibiting other actions, authorised by 
and regulated in terms of the Health Professions Act43 and the Health Professions Council. 
Such actions, which may also be deemed necessary and relevant actions in the practice of 
medicine, include: 
•  the performance of any act specified in any legislation regulating health care 
providers and in accordance with the provisions of such legislation and regulation, 
by a person registered under that legislation; 
•  actions by interns working at an institution recognised by the council performing 
any function or issuing any certificate or other document which in terms of any 
law, other than this Act, that may be or is required to be performed or issued by a 
medical practitioner, whether described in such law as a medical practitioner or 
by any other name or designation, or describing himself or herself as a medical 
practitioner in connection with the performance of any such function or the 
issuing of any such certificate or document;  
•  actions by student interns performing any act specified in a specific regulation 
under the supervision of a medical practitioner in the course of his or her training;  
•  the performance of any act by a dentist as specified in a specific regulation in the 
course of performing any act falling within the scope of dentistry, including the 
prohibition of using any name, title, description or symbol normally associated 
with his or her profession; or 
•  actions by any person specified in a specific regulation in the course of bona fide 
research at any institution approved for that purpose by the Minister.  
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 Section 2, Regulations defining the scope of the profession of medicine GN R237 in Government Gazette 
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 Health Professions Act 56 of 1974. 
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 It is evident from these definitions provided for in legislation, as well as  the legislative 
demarcation of the scope of the profession of medicine (as it is referred to in the relevant 
notice published in the Government Gazette) that the two main role players in any health 
service relationship will depend on the type of health service involved, as well as the scope 
of that particular medical discipline’s actions. This will, in turn, also influence the dynamics 
of the said relationship as well as the power-imbalances in that relationship. As, due to the 
practical limitations of this study, it is impossible to discuss the nuances and power-
imbalances in all health service relationships, the doctor in the doctor-patient relationship 
as referred to in this dissertation, will be limited to any person providing health services in 
terms of law, including in terms of the Health Professions Act,44 the Allied Health 
Professions Act,45 the Nursing Act,46 the Pharmacy Act47 and the Dental Technicians Act.48 
The context of the doctor-patient relationship, as herein further referred to, will moreover 
be limited to the general and universal characteristics unique to the relationship between a 
healthcare practitioner and a patient. Particular nuances and power dynamics attributed to 
specific medical diciplines and specialist areas of practice will not be discussed. Similarly, the 
patient in the doctor-patient relationship, as considered and referred to in this dissertation, 
will be limited to the ordinary, reasonable and competent patient. Patients with special and 
additional vulnerabilities and needs, including legally incompetent patients, will not be 
discussed.  
 
1.3. When does a doctor-patient relationship come into being? 
The discussion will now focus on the doctor-patient relationship and the question when this 
relationship can be regarded to come into existence. Generally speaking, it is assumed that 
this happens when a doctor and a prospective patient have come to an agreement (usually 
implicit and after a consultation) that the doctor will accept the said person as his/her 
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 56 of 1973.  
45
 63 of 1982; This includes practitioners of the profession of ayurveda, Chinese medicine and acupuncture, 
chiropractic, homeopathy, naturopathy, osteopathy, phytotherapy, therapeutic aromatherapy, therapeutic 
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patient and will treat this patient.49 There is no implicit agreement to cure the patient, 
though, unless the practitioner committed himself or herself to this explicitly.50 Although 
the legal basis of the relationship between a doctor and a patient have been discussed in 
South African medical law sources and related case law, the exact moment when such a 
relationship commences has not been intensively discussed in the South African context.51 
There are, however, a few cases from the United States of America dealing specifically with 
the establishment of the doctor-patient relationship in circumstances relevant to the 
present discussion.  
 
In Clanton v Von Haam 52 Eldrige J ruled that when a physician who previously treated a 
patient for a different ailment returns this patient’s phone calls about another condition and 
listens to the patient’s account of symptoms, a (new) doctor-patient relationship is not 
created. The court based its decision on the fact that the patient herself in this particular 
case interpreted the conversation with the specific medical practitioner as a refusal of 
medical services. However, not all patients would interpret such a telephone conversation 
as a refusal of medical treatment and it is clear from the judgement that the question 
whether a doctor-patient relationship was established as a result of such a telephonic 
enquiry would largely depend on the particular circumstances in each case. Another 
example is the case of Bienz v Central Suffolk Hospital 53 where the court had to decide 
“…whether a telephone call to a physician’s office for the purpose of initiating treatment is 
                                                 
49
 Le Roux, Andra Telemedicine: A South African Legal Perspective Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2008) 1, 99 
– 114, 111.  
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 Le Roux, Andra Telemedicine: A South African Legal Perspective Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2008) 1, 99 
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842 (A) 848 – 849; Friedman v Glickman 1996 (1) SA 1134 (W); Clinton-Parker v Administrator Transvaal 1996 
(2) SA 37 (W) 58, 68. Le Roux, Andra Telemedicine: A South African Legal Perspective Tydskrif vir Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (2008) 1, 99 – 114, 111. 
52
 Clanton et al v Von Haam 70991 (177 Ga App 694) (340 SE2d 627) 1986. 
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sufficient to create a physician-client relationship”.54 In this case, the court held that it is 
important to know what advice or information the physician gave the patient during the 
telephone conversation and what reliance the patient placed on the conversation.55  Thus, 
from the judgements in these two cases, it can be concluded that whether or not a 
telephone conversation between a doctor and a patient will establish a relationship 
between them will depend on the particular circumstances in each case.56 
 
The case of Dougherty v Gifford57 is also important as it deals with the establishment of a 
doctor-patient relationship where there is no personal contact between the doctor and the 
particular patient. The patient, Gifford, developed a hernia of the oesophagus that 
worsened to the point that his family practitioner referred him to a specialist, Dr Williams. 
The specialist took a biopsy of the hernia and sent it to the regional pathology department 
directed by the appellant. (The appellant’s department had a contract to perform all the 
pathology work for the medical centre where the specialist had his practice.) The actual 
pathology work in this particular case, however, was not performed by the appellant himself 
but by a pathologist who worked under an arrangement with the relevant department 
directed by the appellant. The pathologist diagnosed cancer and as a result, Gifford was 
ordered to undergo radiation and chemotherapy. After six weeks of treatment, a second 
biopsy was taken and this time it revealed that no malignancy was present. The original 
biopsy slides were then re-evaluated and it was established that these original slides also 
showed no sign of cancer. On learning of this misdiagnosis, the patient and his spouse 
brought an action for negligence against the treating specialist, the laboratory of the 
appellant as well as the pathologist who examined the tissue. The appellant and the 
pathologist argued that they had no doctor-patient relationship with the patient, as they 
conducted the pathology work exclusively for other doctors, did not see the patient 
themselves and the patient had not personally opted for their services. The court in this 
case, however, ruled that the absence of personal contact between a patient and medical 
practitioner does not preclude the formation of a doctor-patient relationship. A doctor-
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patient relationship was said to exist in this particular case between the patient, Gifford, 
and the pathologist who examined the tissue, because the pathologist performed the 
services for the patient’s benefit, and with both the treating physician’s and the patient’s 
implied consent.58 In this decision, special emphasis was placed on the fact that the services 
performed by the pathologist were to the benefit of the patient.  
 
A different point of view was espoused in the case of Lotspeich v Chance Vought Aircraft.59 
Lotspeich worked for Chance Vought Aircraft on two occasions and, according to company 
policy, had to undergo a physical examination by company doctors on company premises 
for each term of employment. These examinations included X-rays of the torso. Three years 
after the appellant’s last employment term with the defendants, X-rays of her chest 
revealed active tuberculosis. Re-examination of the previous X-rays showed that this was 
actually already visible on the chest X-rays taken three years earlier. The appellant 
submitted that the defendants and the company doctors employe d by the defendants had a 
duty to disclose this information to her. The court, however, found that there was no 
doctor-patient relationship between the appellant and the company doctors and that the 
company doctors consequently had no duty to disclose or to diagnose the appellant, since 
they had only acted on orders of and for the benefit of the defendant. 60  But in the Canadian 
case of Parslow v Masters,61 with similar facts, the court held that such a medical 
examination was for both the patient and the company’s benefit. In addition, although the 
company paid for the medical examination, the patient had disclosed personal information 
during the examination process so that the medical practitioner could compile a complete 
medical report. This, according to the court, created a doctor-patient relationship. 
 
In German law, it is said that a separate doctor-patient relationship is formed between a 
patient and a third party if the primary medical practitioner asks a third party for advice or 
                                                 
58
 Le Roux, Andra Telemedicine: A South African Legal Perspective Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2008) 1, 99 
– 114, 112. 
59
 Lotspeich v Chance Vought Aircraft 369 SW 2d 705 (1963). 
60
 Le Roux, Andra Telemedicine: A South African Legal Perspective Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2008) 1, 99 
– 114, 112. 
61
 Parslow v Masters [1993] 6.W.W.R. 273, 15 C.C.L.I. (2d) 13, 110 Sask. R. 253. 
13 
 
assistance in the patient’s specific case.62 And even in situations where the particular 
patient does not know about, or did not directly consent to the third party being involved or 
providing assistance, it is generally acknowledged that a doctor-patient relationship is also 
formed.63 Generally speaking, when a particular patient’s case is referred to another 
medical practitioner for an opinion, it does not matter who contracted for the service, but 
rather whether it was contracted for with the express or implied consent of the patient 
and/or for the patient’s benefit.64 
 
This foregoing, brief analysis of foreign case law confirms that a doctor-patient relationship 
comes into existence once a person and a doctor have come to an agreement (also an 
implicit agreement after a consultation) that the doctor will accept and treat that person as 
a patient. However, much depends on the particular circumstances of each case.  Personal 
contact between doctor and patient is not necessarily a prerequisite for the establishment 
of a doctor-patient relationship.  Instead, the fact that a particular medical practitioner 
performs medical services to the benefit of a patient is significant.  
 
In this dissertation, the finding of the court in the case of Lopez v Aziz65 with regard to the 
formation of a doctor-patient relationship will be adhered to. In the Lopez case the 
following three requirements for the formation of a doctor-patient relationship were laid 
down: 
•  the physician should agree directly or indirectly to counsel the patient;  
•  there should be a medical evaluation of the symptoms; and 
•  the patient should rely on the physician’s opinion. 66 
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1.4. Aim and methodology 
This research project is significant in that it aims to make a contribution to South African 
medical law and health law.67 The main objective is to reconsider the doctor-patient 
relationship with due regard to the context in which this relationship operates, the variety 
of influences affecting it, and the inherent power imbalances in this relationship. In order to 
identify and discuss these power imbalances from a legal perspective it will be necessary to 
look at different approaches to or styles of health service delivery.68  The approaches or 
styles thus identified will provide a thematic structure and framework for the discussion. 
The approaches to health service delivery that will be discussed can not be regarded as 
theoretical constructs or models per se, but rather as general approaches to health service 
delivery, based on the particular social context and the situation of medical science and 
available medical knowledge and technology. These approaches are important for another 
reason too.  The language used to describe the practice of medicine in each approach, and 
the metaphors employed to describe the relationship between patients and physicians, not 
only establish conceptual boundaries for this discussion, but it will become evident that they 
also affect the practice of medicine itself.69  
 
The doctor-patient relationship is complex and can be approached from various points of 
view, resulting in different theoretical approaches to health service delivery. 70 Starting from 
the actual meeting between a doctor and a patient, their relationship can be considered as a 
continuous exchange of information.71 But doctors and patients do not meet each other in a 
vacuum, and it will become evident from the discussion and the structural framework of this 
dissertation that the suggested approaches to health service delivery do not exclude each 
other but rather permit elaboration on different aspects of the complex structure of the 
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doctor-patient relationship.72 In Chapter Three the doctor-patient relationship in the 
context of medical paternalism will be considered. The business model of health service 
delivery will be considered in Chapter Four and the rhetoric of this approach (which includes 
autonomy, freedom, liberty and patient sovereignty) will become evident from the analysis 
and discussion. In Chapter Five the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship will be 
dealt with and in Chapter Six, both the doctor-patient relationship, as well as the institution-
patient relationship in an era of managed care will be discussed. Chapter Seven, the final 
thematic chapter of this dissertation, will consider the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship in the context of consumer-directed health care. 
 
The aim of the analyses in Chapters Three to Seven is to identify and evaluate the power 
imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship from a legal perspective. The power 
imbalances identified in this dissertation are omni-present in doctor-patient relationships. 
Some of the power imbalances identified in a particular chapter may also feature again in 
other chapters.  This may be necessary since the specific power imbalance may present 
different perspectives, relevant to this research, with reference to each approach. In 
Chapter Eight the dissertation will be concluded with recommendations that the potentially 
precarious consequences of extreme power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship 
be addressed from a legal point of view to ensure greater protection of the interests of both 
parties and also to ensure that the applicable constitutional rights of the parties are upheld. 
Most importantly, it will be shown that by addressing the said power imbalances, the 
interests of the patient can best be protected, ultimately resulting in a new, enriched 
understanding of the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
This dissertation will include a legal comparison of the medical law and health law of South 
Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with occasional references to 
other jurisdictions where relevant. The United Kingdom was specifically selected for the 
purposes of legal comparison in this dissertation, since the medical law and health law of 
South Africa and the United Kingdom share, in many respects, the same historical, 
substantial and procedural foundation. The medical case law and general jurisprudence of 
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the United States of America will also be relied on, since social justice,73 and economic and 
health problems, transcend distance and borders, even the vast geo-political disparities 
between South African and the USA.74 United States case law offers interesting comparative 
examples of dealing  with the themes and issues discussed in this dissertation and serves as 
a catalyst for further critical analysis. The USA is a wealthy country with a well developed 
health care system and much litigation on the themes and issues aforesaid yielding 
informative and helpful case law in the field. 
 
1.5. Research question and underlying assumptions 
The research question guiding the discussion in this dissertation is the following: How can 
the doctor-patient relationship be conceptualised, from a legal perspective, to redress the 
power imbalances in this relationship?  
 
Assumptions underlying this research question include the following: 
• There are power imbalances inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. 
• The doctor-patient relationship is influenced by the social and legal context in 
which it functions. 
• The general spirit and letter of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 have influenced this relationship and have resulted in considerable(actual 
and potential) development of the common law applicable to medical- and health 
law. 
• There is a tendency to move from a paternalistic approach to health service 
delivery towards a more individualistic approach. 
• South African medical- and health law and specifically the doctor-patient 
relationship are usually regarded in isolation from external influences and 
dynamics, which does not allow for a complete understanding of doctor-patient 
relations in South African legal discourse. 
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I am convinced that there is a viable, alternative characterisation and conceptualisation of 
the doctor-patient relationship which will allow for a better understanding of the 
uniqueness of this relationship, address the power imbalances inherent in it, and which will 
ensure that the constitutional principles and values are realised, promoted and developed in 
health service delivery.   
 
1.6. Outline of study 
 1.6.1. Chapter 2 
The historical and social context of the doctor-patient relationship and society’s perceptions 
and attitudes towards the medical profession, as well as the valuation of health and illness, 
will form the foundation of the discussion in this chapter. It will become evident from the 
discussion that human interaction, such as that between doctor and patient, is determined 
by prevailing cultural standards and influenced by historical factors. The culture of medical 
care, which refers to the general nature of the medical profession and practice, as well as 
the distinguishing characteristics of health care delivery, will also be discussed. An analysis 
of these distinguishing features will provide a better understanding of the doctor-patient 
relationship.  
 
The following aspects will receive special attention in this chapter: professionalism and the 
regulation of medical practice as well as the ensuing power associated with professionalism; 
the medical anthropological theories on the institutionalisation of various role relationships 
between the medical profession in itself and other parts of society; and the notions of 
power and authority as natural consequences of professionalism.  
 
 1.6.2. Chapter 3 
Medical paternalism is rooted in the historical development of the medical profession, the 
unique characteristics and special status associated with the medical profession and the 
power and authority consequently attributed to it. Despite critique, changing social and 
cultural dynamics and centuries ’ long developments in the practice of medicine, medical 
paternalism has continued to remain the template frame of mind of many a physician. 
Medical paternalism as the dominant approach in health service delivery will form the 
foundation of the discussion in Chapter Three.   
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In Chapter Three, the first power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship will be 
identified and discussed. In a medical paternalistic practice, medical practitioners are 
assumed to have internalised the interests of their patients and patients are consequently 
not active participants in the medical decision-making process. Physicians are regarded as 
custodians of abstruse knowledge, not communicable to the lay person and, as a result, the 
responsibility of decision-making is assigned solely to medical practitioners, given their 
expert skill and knowledge.  
 
The use and value of the available legal instruments to address this power imbalance will 
also be considered in this chapter, more specifically informed consent. Sections 3.4. and 3.5. 
will deal comprehensively with the origin, development and current practice of informed 
consent in the three jurisdictions identified for legal comparative purposes. Reference will 
be made to other jurisdictions where applicable. The discussion will include an evaluation of 
medical decision-making and informed consent.  
 
The vital role of autonomy and self-determination in modern medical practice, as well as 
beneficence and the historic service and altruistic motivation generally associated with the 
medical profession, will be detailed in section 3.3. The concepts of autonomy, self-
determination and beneficence will be discussed in the context of the rights and values 
contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, especially the Bill of 
Rights, as well as in the National Health Act 61 of 2003. The theories of Beauchamp on 
autonomy and beneficence in medical practice and the Pellegrino-Thomasma beneficence 
model will also be discussed in this section.  
 
 1.6.3. Chapter 4 
Today, health care is increasingly seen as an ordinary commodity to be bought and sold in 
the medical marketplace and the doctor-patient relationship as an ordinary business 
relationship based on contract. This business model will be discussed in Chapter Four.  The 
discussion will focus on whether this perspective on health service delivery — which is in 
stark contrast to the paternalistic approach to medical practice described in Chapter Three 
— can assist in ensuring a more equal distribution of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
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The importance of trust in the doctor-patient relationship will also be considered with 
regard to the power imbalances identified in the relationship and in preparation for the 
discussion and analysis in Chapter Five, dealing with the fiduciary nature of the doctor-
patient relationship. In this chapter, it will also be considered whether or not the business 
ethic in health service delivery has transformed the underlying reality of the traditional 
doctor-patient relationship.  
 
 1.6.4. Chapter 5 
The unique qualities and dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship, as identified and 
discussed in Chapter 4, will be the point of departure in Chapter 5 which will deal with the 
distinctive fiduciary nature of this relationship. The doctor-patient relationship will first be 
analysed in terms of fiduciary principles and values, since it will be evident from the 
analyses of and references to case law that this relationship displays many hallmarks of a 
fiduciary relationship. In section 5.2. the legal content of the doctor-patient relationship as a 
fiduciary relationship will be considered. The concepts of trust, altruism, morality and justice 
will receive special attention, as well as the theories of Rainbolt and Dworkin. In section 5.3. 
the duties of the physician as the fiduciary and the patient as beneficiary will be considered. 
The chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary 
relationship.  
 
 1.6.5. Chapter 6 
The continuing commercialisation of health service delivery, now organised and controlled 
in a manner similar to the corporate environment, necessitates that the institution-patient 
relationship be considered in addition to the traditional doctor-patient relationship. Section 
6.1. will provide a limited account of the history and development of managed care  
initiatives in health care, including the development of medical schemes and health 
insurance plans, as well as definitions and clarifications of the most important terms and 
practices. Section 6.2. will provide an introduction to the most important managed health 
care organisations to illustrate how the delivery of health care services has evolved. An 
analysis of how these developments in health service delivery have influenced the doctor-
patient relationship, specifically with regard to the distribution of power, will be given. 
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Trust in the doctor-patient relationship in a managed care era of health service delivery will 
also be considered in this chapter. The notion that managed care practices create a conflict 
of interest for medical practitioners in the doctor-patient relationship and may lead to an 
erosion of trust in that relationship will be investigated. It will be concluded that health care 
delivery is a moral endeavour, whether undertaken by an individual medical practitioner or 
an institution.  
 
 1.6.6. Chapter 7 
While the main objective of managed care practices has been to contain and lower the 
escalating cost of health care, this has again risen rapidly in recent years. In this post-
managed care era, market advocates are now endorsing consumer-directed health care 
which has at its aim to better inform patients (consumers) about health care spending in 
order to curb the escalating cost of health care services. It also provides consumers with 
more control and responsibility in medical decision-making by giving them incentives to 
consider both the cost and quality considerations when making a health care decision.  
 
This chapter will focus on the critical role that patients, as consumers of health care 
services, can play in ensuring a more equal balance of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship. Another fundamental concern addressed in this chapter is whether or not it is 
appropriate to view patients as consumers in the medical marketplace. This question is 
closely linked to the distinctive characteristics of the doctor-patient relationship and the 
unique nature of medical practice described and commented on in the preceding chapters.  
 
The chapter will conclude with commentary on and some recommendations for consumer 
protection and empowerment in the new era of health care delivery. The pivotal role of the 
medical practitioner in the doctor-patient relationship with regard to both consumer 
protection and empowerment will be emphasised. 
 
1.6.7. Chapter 8 
The objective of the final chapter is to concentrate on and answer the research question 
presented in section 1.3. The discussion will refer to selected arguments and analyses of 
previous chapters and a proposed re-conceptualisation of the doctor-patient relationship, 
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from a legal perspective, will be recommended to redress the power imbalances in the 
doctor-patient relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this part, the historical and social context of the doctor-patient relationship will 
serve as the foundation and framework of the discussion. Medical paternalism as an 
approach to health service delivery in general is also rooted in the historical 
development of medical practice and will therefore also form part of this particular 
part.  
 
Chapter 2: The historical development of the doctor-patient relationship and the 
culture of medical care 
 
Chapter 3: Medical decision-making and the doctor-patient relationship in a 
paternalistic setting 
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CHAPTER TWO: The historical development of the doctor-patient relationship 
and the culture of medical care 
 
 
 
The history of medicine is a complex and multi-layered narrative; the result of various 
influences and perspectives. The commonly known history of the medical profession and 
science of medicine is founded in paleopathology, which is the study of human disease and 
ailments from the earliest civilisations to date.75 Medical science has consequently always 
been concerned with disease and is mostly written from this point of view. Based on 
paleopathology, the history of medicine may be divided into three periods: the mythological 
period which refers to the period from the earliest times to about 400 BC; the dogmatic 
period or empirical age which dates from the Hippocratic period (around 400 BC) to the end 
of the eighteenth century; and the final period, the rational age in medicine, which refers to 
the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.76  In this dissertation the paleopathological point of view on the history of medicine 
will not form the foundation of the discussion. Rather, the historical and social context of 
the doctor-patient relationship and societies’ perceptions and attitudes towards the medical 
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profession will form the basis of this research.  However, the history of medicine and the 
medical profession is also shaped by the perceptions and attitudes of societies towards the 
human body and the valuation of health and disease.77 In addition to the various historical 
perspectives, one should therefore also take into account that most professions promote 
their historical development and formation, creating a legendary past which is usually not 
true to the authentic historical reality.78 And for the medical profession, with its distinctly 
complex and multi-layered historical narrative, the authentic historical reality will depend 
on the particular point of view one chooses to adopt. The end result is therefore a 
composite of perspectives which, while mostly written from a medical point of view, clearly 
cannot be separated from its historical and particular social context.  
 
The aim of this chapter will not only be to provide the necessary background to the 
historical development of the doctor-patient relationship, but also to highlight and 
elaborate on some distinguishing characteristics of the medical profession and the doctor-
patient relationship. Important questions which this chapter will address include: Was the 
medical practitioner always regarded as a reputable physician? Has this profession always 
enjoyed a good standing amongst the general public? What is the status of this profession 
today?  How has the relationship between doctor and patient changed? And fundamental 
for the purposes of this dissertation: what is the importance of this historical development 
of the doctor-patient relationship for the present culture of medical care?  
 
2.1. The historical development of the doctor-patient relationship 
Most sources on the history of the medical profession deal primarily with the science of 
medicine itself or approach the subject from a medical point of view.79 Very few sources 
investigate and report on the historical development of this profession and the social 
dynamics between doctors and patients across time and civilisations. However, studies on 
the conditions of health and disease in any particular time and geographical area may 
provide some information on the historical development of the doctor-patient relationship 
and the medical profession. Everybody experiences disease and each society develops social 
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practices to respond to sickness and injury in ways that promote healing. Societies also 
construct disease and injury eventuations as socially meaningful phenomena, like illness, 
which refers to the individual’s perception of a medical problem. 80 Not only is it necessary 
to understand the physician as a practitioner and decision maker in his/her historical and 
social context, but also what the position of the sick person was in that particular 
community and how disease was generally perceived.81  
 
In the exposition that follows I will sketch the historical development of the doctor-patient 
relationship by looking at the general evolution of civilisations with regard to the diseases 
they were confronted with, whether and how they reacted against these and also the role 
of the sick person and the medical practitioner in that particular context.  Reference is 
specifically made to “civilisations” thereby to indicate that I will be dealing only with the 
concept of modern, western medicine throughout this dissertation and will not discuss 
other cultures with their alternative medical practices – for there are many. Only the 
general practice of medicine will furthermore be discussed, and not the historical 
development of specialisation areas in medicine, like psychiatry and surgery. Lastly, 
exceptional doctor-patient relationships, such as the relationship between specialist medical 
practitioners and the mentally ill, will also not be discussed. The exposition will be limited to 
serve the aim and objectives of this dissertation and it is not an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive account of how medicine has evolved and changed across pre- and recorded 
history. 
 
2.1.1. Primitive societies82 
Sickness and healing was initially family- and small-group oriented and medical knowledge 
was not systematized. During the Paleolithic period any form of social organization was 
extremely limited. Only one household lived and worked together to gather food and 
complete other tasks necessary for daily survival. The eldest member of such a family was 
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trusted and respected and acted as advisor, priest, magician and physician. Any illnesses 
were dealt with according to the directions of this family member and with the limited and 
primitive resources available. However, despite this important medical role which the eldest 
of a family played in the family’s survival, he/she did not have any special position in the 
family structure. Furthermore, the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment were solely based on 
the transcendental beliefs of the household as well as their general expertise with diseases 
and treatment thereof. 
 
The Neolithic period that followed was probably one of the most important evolutions of 
civilization as we know it today. Communities developed with more families living together 
or in closer proximity to one another, compared to the Palaeolithic period. The social life of 
communities became more complex: a food-producing economy rather than a food-
gathering mindset developed, improved tools and housing emerged, and domestic arts and 
crafts developed. The communities were able to protect themselves more efficiently from 
dangers and forces of nature and the supply of food also improved. The Neolithic civilization 
was also confronted with disease and other ailments and due to its communal nature, also 
contagious diseases. Communities’ perception of disease, where it came from and how to 
treat it was also very primitive and based on their particular beliefs, transcendental ideas as 
well as their general expertise with illnesses and treatment thereof. Although this 
knowledge was more specialised, medicine was still not regarded as a profession and the 
knowledge remained unsystemised. It is interesting to note that serious illnesses in this 
period were usually explained in terms of the magical or religious beliefs of the group or 
regarded as a consequence of the individual’s or his/her family’s behaviour. This contributed 
to the notion of disease as a social sanction. The physician was usually a wise and elderly 
person from the particular community or surroundings and there were more possible agents 
with the required knowledge to diagnose and treat illnesses than in the Paleolithic period. 
Such wise men also acted as priests, magicians and advisors of the community. They were 
paid according to the success of the treatment but were still not elevated to any special 
position. 
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The sick also had no special position in this society. They were treated with domestic 
remedies, without isolating them from the community.83 In the case of serious illnesses 
however, the sick role was expanded.  The sick person received a special position in society 
based on his/her condition and the society’s attitude towards the particular disease.84 Such 
a seriously ill person could not contribute to the normal day to day activities and tasks, 
which were of great importance and necessary for the group’s day to day survival. Such a 
patient found him- or herself isolated from the community and a burden on the immediate 
family. Literature suggests that the sick person in this civilization was usually eliminated if 
the social economy of the particular community could not sustain him/her any longer or if 
the fear of the particular disease and the patient’s condition warranted the action. In some 
cultures the sick, aged and crippled were killed in the name of respect and compassion – 
mercy killings. 
 
Pre-state and state societies had a higher level of social organisation and systemised 
knowledge, the number of physicians increased and so did the level of competition among 
them. Although it is impossible to indicate when the practice of medicine ceased to be 
primitive, it was the systemisation of knowledge which was largely responsible for the 
advancement of the practice as a profession.85 The recorded history of medicine can be 
traced back to about 3200 BC, when Egyptian physicians assembled medicine compounds 
from written instructions.86 The Code of Hammurabi from 2000 BC in Babylon is an example 
of the early systemisation of the practice of medicine and is regarded as the oldest rule 
book of the profession. It is interesting to note that this code was the first to define the civil 
and criminal liability of members of the medical profession.87  
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 2.1.2. The Greek medical tradition (±600 – 100 BC) 
When considering the historical development of the medical profession, most medical 
practitioners look back to the Greek medical tradition and the era of Hippocrates as the 
legendary foundation and origin of a humble profession. But, it seems as though “we tend to 
look back at Greek medicine through the distorting lens of legend.”88 The Greek physician 
can be described as a craftsman, wandering from door to door and offering his  services.89 
Only the large cities had their own doctor(s) employed in the city service. Wandering 
physicians had to win a community’s trust with their appearance and their ability to make a 
correct diagnosis without even asking the patient any questions or physically examining him 
or her. Patients came or were brought to a central spot in the town or city and there was 
relatively little privacy and confidentiality between doctor and patient. Although the Greek 
physician did not have any important status — since the Greeks despised people who 
worked for money — the physician was highly esteemed, mainly because of the attitude of 
the Greeks towards the human body and the importance which was placed on good 
health.90 Although the empirico-rational approach, which relies more on naturalistic 
observations enhanced by a practical trial and error experience, gained acceptance during 
this period, most Greek physicians, like their predecessors, also had a superstitious 
approach to healing.91 Asclepius was the Greek god of healing.92 Asclepius had two 
daughters: Panacea, who was the goddess of healing (today referred to as clinical medicine) 
and Hygeia, (health or hygiene) who was the goddess of good health and preventive 
medicine.93 According to literature Hygeia’s teaching required people to eat less, drink less, 
smoke less, fornicate less, avoid excess and exercise prudently or they would fall into the 
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hands of Panacea, Hygeia’s sister, and her physicians. Hygeia’s teaching is very similar to 
notions of preventive medicine which is a main focus of current day health care services .94  
Hippocrates, who is said to have lived from 460 to 361 BC, was by far the most important 
figure in Greek medicine. It is believed that Hippocrates was responsible for the eradication 
of medical beliefs based on magic or religious philosophies, for establishing the first 
systematic differentiation of diseases and for setting up standards for doctors, later referred 
to as the Hippocratic Oath.95 However, very little is known of Hippocrates and it is doubted 
whether all the writings attributed to him were actually his own work. But he remains an 
important figure in medical history and the writings (a collection of about 50 – 70 essays and 
texts) have made a tremendous contribution to the development of western medical 
science, especially with regard to the doctor-patient relationship.96 Dignity in medicine and 
respect for patients were, for example, advocated in these texts and the greatest objective 
for the physician was also described as the benefit his/her actions would have for the 
patient.97  
  
The wandering Greek physicians were also present and sought-after in Rome, where the 
first physicians were slaves with a very primitive conception of medical science. In Rome, as 
in Greece, the profession of a physician was also not very highly regarded.98 However, it was 
in Rome that the physicians were in time afforded extensive privileges. In 46 BC Julius 
Caesar granted all free-born Greek physicians on Roman soil the right to Roman citizenship. 
Physicians were exempt from taxes, compulsory military service and from taking in lodgers. 
Systems were also put in place to regulate these physicians and, depending on its size, only 
a limited number of physicians were granted these privileges in each city. To attain this 
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status, physicians had to prove that they possessed the required medical knowledge.99 In 
addition to this first version of a licence system for physicians and state control of this 
profession, the first medical societies were also established in Rome, and at the end of the 
empire, medical specialists were recognised.100 Galen of Perganum (130 A.C. – 200 AC), a 
follower of Hippocrates, is regarded as the most important Roman physician.101 By the time 
of the fall of the Roman Empire medical knowledge was more elaborate, specific, 
conceptually organized and systematized than ever before. Physicians also had more 
prestige and power.102 
 
 2.1.3. Classical, medieval and early modern societies (1200 – 1600 AD)  
The following general developments during the period between 1200 – 1600 AD are 
noteworthy for the purposes of this limited exposition of the historical development of the 
medical profession: improved literacy, the further systematisation and standardis ation of 
social practices, more economic activity, the production of knowledge, the spread of new 
diseases from other parts of the world, plagues,103 an increased lifespan and the growth of 
science and technology.104 However, after the demise of the Roman Empire religious and 
mystical approaches to the practice of medicine were again the order of the day. During the 
Middle Ages the principles of Greek medicine were still applied but the element of religion 
was stronger than before.105 In the early Middle Ages most physicians were monks and all 
physicians were directed by the church.106 The profession of the physician was regarded as a 
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vocation, a divine mission with definite duties towards God and fellowmen. 107 The position 
of the sick person and the physician was profoundly changed by Christianity.108 Christianity 
appealed to the sick and promised healing, both spiritually and physically.109 Hospitals were 
built, like the hospital in Asia Minor by St Basil in Caesarea 362 AC, and convents and 
monasteries were devoted to caring for the sick.110 Healing was grace, science was 
subordinate to theology and the experience of cure became spiritual for both the sick 
person and the physician. Women also started to play an increasingly important role by 
assisting in hospitals and other institutions devoted to health care.111 (It was only much 
later, during the nineteenth century, that nursing was transformed from a religious to a 
secular vocation, especially due to the influence of Florence Nightingale who lived from 
1820 to 1910 and who raised public awareness for the importance of nursing as a 
vocation.)112 
 
Furing the late tenth century the first medical faculty in the occidental world was 
established in Salerno, Italy, followed by the institution of universities all over Europe and 
the establishment of an elitist academic tradition of medicine and the early 
professionalization of medicine. 113 From here on, the physician was a scholar and a doctor 
and has been so ever since.114 Physicians had a shared social identity and started to form 
distinctive groups differentiated as to their mode of training.115 The profession was also 
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commercialized to a certain extent and subjected to even more state regulation.116 The 
nature of medical knowledge and the economic contingencies of healing created a culture 
and society in which sickness and healing were more prominent. 117 Medical licensure also 
became a permanent institution at the beginning of the Middle Ages and the establishment 
of universities and medical faculties.118 The writings of Henri de Mondeville (ca 1260 – 
1325), a medieval surgeon and teacher of anatomy, can here be singled out as significant. 
Mondeville overtly embraced the beneficence model in fully accepting traditional 
Hippocratic authoritarianism.119 He also believed that patients should obey their physicians 
at all times and that the deception of a patient was justified if it was for the benefit of the 
patient’s health.  
 
Although the Renaissance and seventeenth century is characterised by enlightenment and 
scientific curiosity, it was relatively uneventful with regard to the development of the 
medical profession, and magical and religious beliefs again influenced medical techniques 
and thoughts. However, dissatisfaction with traditional theories paved the way for new 
insights and development.120  The eighteenth century saw great advancements in the area 
of preventative medicine (inoculations) as well as mental health.121 
 
 2.1.4. Modern western societies (1700 – 1900 AD) 
During the rise of capitalism and with an increased emphasis on economics, which started 
already during the late 16th century, the medical profession became a means to earn a 
living. This, together with the rise of democracy at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the great advances in medical research and technology during the nineteenth century 
revolutionised medical service. The nineteenth century saw the development of the germ 
theory of disease and the discovery of anaesthesia. Improved sanitation curbed the horrors 
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of the infectious diseases of the Middle Ages.122 Chronic diseases of affluence, like obesity 
and heart disease, started to emerge. Advances in medical technology and changes in the 
prevailing diseases of the time are very important since the relationship between doctor 
and patient is very closely related to the model of illness that dominates at any given period 
in history.123 By this stage, medical service had changed to such an extent that the humble 
beginning of this profession in the Paleolithic period was hardly recognisable, although 
some characteristics of primitive society’s concept of medicine remained in our modern 
society as superstitions.124    
 
Medical concepts were universalised and secularised during this period and cultural, 
political and economic advances as well as social developments influenced the development 
of medical science. The medical profession emerged as the dominant profession and was 
accorded great social prestige. The profession was also unified, formalized and organised 
with appropriate regulations enforced. Medical knowledge was controlled by the physician 
and sponsored by the state. The doctor-patient relationship during this period can be 
described as socially and emotionally distant, impersonal with the physician as an 
authoritarian and the patient in a sub-ordinate position.125 During this period, health was 
still regarded only as the absence of disease; the focus on preventative medicine only 
emerged in postmodern society. 
 
  2.1.5. Postmodern societies 
Medical service in the postmodern society of today is characterized by esca lating cost, 
pervasive medicalisation, increased abilities and knowledge, the expansion of sickness 
definitions to include morale, stress, appearance and various psychological states, 
prolonged life, commercialisation, more personal responsibility for both the physician and 
the patient, commoditisation, the vulnerability of both the physician and patient in the 
medical marketplace, consumerism, distrust, increased state regulation and also managed 
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care.126 Health in the postmodern society is actively sought, with the main focus on 
prevention while death is regarded as a manageable eventuation. The doctor-patient 
relationship can be described as a partnership. Medical intervention in the absence of 
disease is also common.127  
 
It is clear from this short exposition that although the physician’s primary task has remained 
the same throughout history – i.e. to treat and prevent illness and disease – the physician’s 
position in society is always determined by society itself and by the economic and social 
structure as well as the available technical and scientific means of that time.128 The 
physician’s success or failure depends on the response of society, and the responsiveness of 
society depends on social, economic, religious, philosophical and political factors. 129 It can 
be concluded that medicine is a social institution constructed around sickness and 
healing.130 And at all times through the evolution of civilisations the physician’s profession 
provided him or her with power.131 It has therefore always been necessary to regulate the 
medical profession and prevent and manage the potential misuse of this power by setting 
definite standards. 
 
But of what importance is the historical development of the medical profession and the 
tremendous strides medical science has made for the present culture of medical care? How 
can it help one to better understand the unique relationship between doctor and patient? In 
section 2.2. I will discuss particular concepts noted in this section in order to better describe 
and define the doctor-patient relationship, to comment on the roles of the parties involved 
and to identify the most important characteristics of this relationship. This section is 
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important since the concepts identified here will be discussed in all the approaches of 
health service delivery which will be introduced in the chapters to follow.   
 
2.2. The culture of medical care 
The culture of medical care refers to the general nature of the medical profession and 
practice, as well as those unique and distinguishing characteristics of health care service 
which form the foundation of the doctor-patient relationship. The aim of the discussion in 
this section is to identify and discuss these distinguishing features in order to provide a 
better understanding of this unique doctor-patient relationship and also to establish a 
foundation for further discussion in Chapters Three to Seven.  
 
The first concept to be discussed is professionalism and the regulation of medical practice. It 
is important to understand how a profession differs from any other occupation and how the 
distinguishing feature of professionalism in medical practice and the ensuing power of 
members of this profession influence the doctor-patient relationship. The roles of the 
physician and patient in the doctor-patient relationship will be examined in section 2.2.2. 
The medical anthropological theories of the physician’s role and the sick role illustrate how 
each of these role players is perceived and what functions and behaviour is attributed to 
each. These roles form the foundation of the doctor-patient relationship. Section 2.2.4. will 
provide an in-depth investigation of the influences of professionalism and autonomy on the 
doctor-patient relationship and in section 2.2.4, the concepts “power” and “authority”, as 
natural consequences of professionalism and self-regulation, will be discussed in the context 
of the doctor-patient relationship. The chapter will conclude with a clarification of the 
importance of the historical development of medical practice and the culture of medical 
care.  
 
2.2.1. Professionalism and the regulation of the medical profession 
Professionalism has not always been a distinguishing feature of the medical fraternity, but 
dates back to medieval times.132 It was in the medieval university where the title of doctor 
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was created.133 During the twelfth century provision was made for regulations on curricula, 
state examinations, licenses, fee structures etc.134 With the title and state of professionalism 
came status in society, education and important affiliations in organisations. The 
professionalisation of medicine has, however, also been described in terms of the 
dominance members of this profession have over the health care system, also referred to as 
a strategy of occupational control and limitation over its members and the occupation’s 
resources, knowledge and skill.135 The unequal relationship between doctor and patient is 
another source of power or dominance for this profession: The patient needs assistance 
with the most valued attribute in life, namely health, while the doctor is regarded as the 
most important and knowledgeable provider to assist with this particular need. The 
professionalisation of medicine, the ensuing power of the profession and the needs of 
vulnerable patients, together with the subject matter – the universally valued quality of 
health - therefore necessitates some form of state regulation in addition to the profession’s 
self-regulation.  
 
It is necessary to understand what is meant by the distinctive category called professions. 
The word “trade” is etymologically derived from Germanic and Anglo-Saxon noun roots, 
“footstep” or “track”, derivatively meaning the course, manner or way of life; a regular 
habitual course of action. The word “profession”, on the other hand, can be traced to an act 
of self-conscious and public – even confessional – speech.136 A profession would therefore 
be an activity or occupation to which its practitioner publicly professes his /her devotion. 
Since the 1970s historians have defined a so-called profession as either a highly ethical 
agent of the community or as a vehicle of monopoly and self-interest.137 This has resulted in 
three approaches to professionalism. The normative approach suggests that the high ethical 
standards associated with such a group and their highly developed ethical code are 
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indicators that a particular occupation can be classified as a profession.138 However, there 
are two objections against the identification of professions according to this approach: Not 
only does it make the profession’s evaluation of itself definitive, but it also fails to provide 
for a very good solution to differentiate between professions and other occupations, since 
most occupations already have some sort of ethical code or code of conduct. 139 The trait 
approach provides an alternative to this narrow focus by submitting that a unique 
combination of a range of characteristics makes an occupation a profession.140 But what 
should these characteristics or traits be? Can consensus be reached? Even in the area of 
health service delivery numerous occupations, among them nursing, chiropody and 
homeopathology claim to be professions. This alone is a clear indication that uncertainty 
within the profession itself with regard to the particular traits and characteristics necessary 
to establish a profession will be conclusive in an investigation of professionalism in medical 
practice. The third approach, the occupational approach, is closely related to the above 
submission. This approach focusses on the highly desired status of professionalism. Many 
occupations claim to be professions or try to attain this status. This status will not only raise 
the standing of the members of the profession in the eyes of the public and other 
occupations, but will also provide the particular occupation with more control and power. 
For example, control over the medical marketplace, power over their clients and control 
over their rewards as well as the entry and exit regulations of their occupation. According to 
the occupational approach, professionalism is a mode of occupational control “A profession 
is not, then an occupation but a means of controlling an occupation”.141  
 
Based on these three approaches I believe one can conclude that the practice of medicine is 
a profession. Medical practitioners do not only have high ethical standards and a code of 
conduct dating back to the Hippocratic Oath, but their occupation also displays a unique 
range of characteristics which certainly makes it distinguishable from others. One of the 
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core characteristics of a profession is the required extended formal training of its members. 
This is regarded as the cornerstone of professionalism: professions are occupations which 
have a monopoly on an esoteric and difficult body of knowledge.142 This body of technical 
knowledge is not accessible to lay persons and can not be applied mechanically.143 A second 
characteristic is the occupation’s orientation of service towards the community and the 
functional specificity of its members. Altruism is central to the ideology of professionalism 
and specifically to the medical profession.144 The concept of altruism in the medical 
profession is safeguarded by the ancient command of primum non nocere – above all, do no 
harm.145  The members of this profession also form a distinct social group based on their 
professional activity and the social group is then organised into an association with formal 
rules and informal practices. The association disciplines its own members, thereby securing 
their independence, and also determines its own standards of education, ethical codes, 
licensing, admission, norms of practice and other matters of control and regulation. Every 
physician is not only trained in the skills and knowledge of his/her profession but also in its 
values and attitudes. This is also referred to as the socialisation of the medical student in the 
particular culture of the medical profession. There is a high degree of integration of the 
doctor into his/her profession and the physician is consequently extremely dependent on 
the professional group.146  The members are relatively free from lay evaluation and control 
and due to the profession’s high income, power and prestige ranking, it can demand a 
higher caliber of students for training. 147 Finally, as regards the occupational approach, the 
medical profession is certainly an excellent example of a profession with extensive self-
regulatory powers. Some of these powers are licensing that allows the profession to 
maintain a virtual monopoly on the right to provide health care services; practice etiquette 
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and rules that discourage overt or public criticism limits competition between practitioners, 
and the profession’s own disciplinary guidelines and procedures.  
 
The particular nature of medicine as an occupation makes the status of professionalism a 
necessity. Medical practitioners are entrusted with very personal information about their 
patients. In many cases they are entrusted with the patients’ life. Patients on the other hand 
are vulnerable and in need of assistance with the most important aspect of their life, their 
health. Medicine is an intrusive and intimate business, a unique and private affair between 
doctor and patient, the nature of professionalism assists in the justification of the nature of 
the profession’s functional specificity.148 
 
As a result of this professionalisation of medicine and the ensuing power and control, as 
well as the comprehensive methods of self-regulation which the profession exhibits, 
external regulation of the profession’s extensive authority is also necessary and important. 
The exposition on the historical development of the doctor-patient relationship in section 
2.1 clearly showed how dependent the profession’s external regulation is on the historical 
and social context of a particular state and that history, political institutions, assumptions 
about the role of medicine and the significance of medicine itself in any particular society all 
reflect distinct national/state experiences. Thus, although the scientific heritage of medicine 
is shared across all boundaries, the role of the medical profession and its regulation has a 
national character. External attempts to regulate a profession are significant since such 
warranted attempts to intervene will only be found in professions whose functional 
specificity is such that it is vitally important for society to ensure that self-regulation is 
complemented by external regulation.  
 
State regulation of the profession usually deals with the remuneration of the profession’s 
members, market entry and exit control, the control of competitive practices and also 
market organization.149 Although such regulations may be viewed as a restriction on the 
profession and as patient centered, they actually provide opportunities of control for the 
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profession.  For instance, controlling competitors and organizing the labour market may 
serve the doctors’ interests rather than the patients’. The medical profession also acquires 
much of its power and authority from the state and through state regulation. The state 
establishes and maintains the profession’s dominance and professionalism. This self-
regulation is achieved with the agreement of the state because it is argued that models of 
comprehensive external regulation, like state regulation, are not suitable for a profession 
since the discretion such professional judgement requires falls beyond the understanding of 
those outside the profession.150 Another argument in favour of extensive self-regulation is 
that it will ensure accountability to peers and that such peer pressure will result in higher 
standards.151 These arguments are based on three premises:  
• medical practice is based on a body of technical knowledge which is not readily 
accessible to lay persons;  
• this knowledge cannot be applied mechanically because every patient is different; 
and finally  
• due to the first two claims medicine is an indeterminate process and it is 
impossible to lay down rigid rules to govern its application and that special skills of 
interpretation are therefore needed.152  
Although a degree of self-regulation is certainly warranted for professions it is doubtful 
whether self-regulatory methods are really effective. Freidson submitted that it is actually 
due the profession’s comprehensive autonomy  that the self-regulatory methods of the 
profession is failing, since autonomy results in a self-deceiving vision of the objectivity and 
reliability of the profession’s knowledge and the virtues of its members.153  
 
Even in the sphere of the law the medical profession has succeeded in having its own 
standards accepted and its self-regulatory attempt at disciplinary action extended. In South 
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African154 and English law155, as well as the law of the United States of America156, (in this 
dissertation these three jurisdictions will primarily be considered, with reference to other 
jurisdictions where relevant) it is generally accepted that the primary test in judging 
whether a medical practitioner has been negligent is one which measures a doctor’s actions 
against the standards of his/her peers. A doctor will only be found guilty of negligence if it 
can be proved that he/she did not act in accordance with the accepted standards of 
practice. These standards against which all action is measured are determined by members 
of the medical profession – doctors, in other words, set the legal standard of care.  
 
Whether comprehensive self-regulation and sanctioned state regulation are regarded as 
justified and an ordinary characteristic of professionalism or as an enforcement of the 
profession’s monopoly over health services and as a source of unwarranted power, it seems 
clear that the root of the profession’s power certainly lies in its status and the ensuing 
occupational control.157 Another source of power for the medical profession is the unique 
doctor-patient relationship itself. As stated previously, the patient is in need of assistance 
with the most valued attribute in life, health, while the doctor is regarded as the most 
important and knowledgeable provider to meet this particular need. The patient is a 
vulnerable and dependent agent in this relationship.    
 
The distinguishing features of the medical profession and the doctor-patient relationship 
discussed in this section clearly show that a profession embodies the institutionalisation of 
various role relationships between itself and other sections of society.158 The medical 
profession can therefore be described as a type of social institution, teaching and regulating 
the norms – patterns of prescribed behaviour - which are conveyed through medical 
faculties, hospitals and the profession itself. A discussion of these role relationships 
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between the profession and the society, more specifically the physician’s as well as the sick 
role will now follow. 
 
 2.2.2. Social roles and the doctor-patient relationship 
The application of the social role system in medical practice was first introduced by 
sociologist, Talcott Parsons. His functionalist, role-based approach defines the doctor and 
patient in the doctor-patient relationship in terms of the social context of sickness and 
health.159 A social role is a pattern of expected behaviour which is regulated by cultural 
norms or rules of behaviour and organized into rights and obligations which have general 
acceptance within a group.160 The professionalisation of medicine also provides the 
physician and patient with very specific social roles, referred to as the physician’s role and 
the sick role respectively. The physician’s role refers to society’s perceptions and beliefs 
regarding physicians.161 An example of an attribute society usually associates with the 
physician’s role is the high regard for the physician’s education as intellectually exacting and 
demanding of skill. An example of the obligations and privileges attached to the physician’s 
role is the privilege of physicians to examine patients  - a highly intimate and confidential 
practice. A corresponding obligation of the physician would be to treat all information about 
the patient as confidential and private. Similarly the patient, in the sick role, also has what 
society normally perceives as privileges and obligations in this unique doctor-patient 
relationship.  
 
These role descriptions are internalised and incorporated in our behaviour, since medicine is 
a social and cultural configuration of societies, as was established in section 2.1.162 These 
general conceptions of the roles also influence the profession’s policies, patients’ 
expectations and the actions of physicians. They form the foundation of the doctor-patient 
relationship and are especially important in the context of this dissertation since these roles 
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are also associated with status and power. This association with power and status is 
maintained because in order to function, society organises behaviour into reciprocal 
patterns, and behaviour is always conceived with reference to the behaviour of another.163 
This assigned status is a source of power in the doctor-patient relationship and presupposes 
a set of rights and duties associated with this status.  
 
  2.2.2.1. The physician’s role 
The doctor’s role or pattern of behavior in our society entails a stable set of general 
obligations and privileges. The doctor achieves his/her status through elaborate education. 
Society has specific expectations of the doctor and grants the doctor unusual rights and 
privileges to enable the doctor to be effective in his/her occupation. This, however, also 
provides the doctor with obligations towards society and his/her patients. Since these are 
normative patterns of behaviour in society the doctor does not need to explain the 
physician’s privileges and obligations  to every patient. Society has already learned about the 
physician’s social role through an internalisation of society’s cultural norms.164 Talcott 
Parsons found that society has a tendency to characterise professional behaviour as atypical 
in terms of its motivation; society believes that the service aspect of professional behaviour 
should be stronger than self-interest. 165 Society therefore attributes a service motive to 
professions while a profit motive is allowed for other industries and sections of the 
community. It is for this reason that society tends to criticise the medical profession for 
excessive financial self-interest.166 Are similar charges made against other occupations, like 
manufacturers or officials working in commerce and can the medical profession really be 
expected to be so unusually altruistic? Parsons believes that it should be, since altruism 
legitimates the protectionist attitudes which the law and the state display towards the 
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medical profession. Without this protection the medical profession would be put at the 
mercy of the free market.167  
 
Parsons identified four important attributes of the physician’s role. He indicated that this 
role is functionally specific. Within this specific role the physician is given unusual privileges 
based on his/her specific functions; privileges necessary for the physician to be effective in 
his occupation, such as having access to private and intimate information about the patient  
and the right to examine the patient. The physician’s specialisation or technical competence 
is consequently linked to his/her unique status. This attribute is referred to as the functional 
specificity attribute.168 The second attribute, affective-neutrality refers to the expectation 
that physicians should remain scientifically objective about the particular medical problem 
and emotionally detached from the patient. This requires a very fine balance between 
empathy and affective-neutrality, as well as between objectivity and self-interest, which 
includes ideals of commercial gain.169 The third attribute is called the orientation to the 
collectivity as opposed to self-orientation. This attribute dictates that the welfare of the 
patient should dominate the doctor-patient relationship and not self-interest. The fourth 
and final attribute is that the physician is subject to the universal rules of this profession and 
not the requirements of the particular relationship with the patient.170 Jeffrey Berlant 
explained the physician’s role as follows: “Fundamentally, the physician gains access to the 
patient’s private life by maximising trust, emphasising competence, asking health related 
questions and segregating the context of professional practice from other contexts”.171 
 
The physician experiences strain and frustration in the performance of his specific function 
due to the limits of medical science at the time and his/her own assimilation of it, but also 
due to the elements of uncertainty and impossibility which may lead to unpredictable 
results. This places immense strain on the balance of need, skill, effort and expectations of 
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result. The primary definition of the physician’s responsibility is to do everything possible 
and this is also institutionalised in terms of society’s expectations.172  
 
  2.2.2.2. The sick role 
The existence of a specific social role depends on the existence of a set of institutionalised 
expectations and corresponding sentiments and sanctions. According to this test the patient 
in the doctor-patient relationship also has a specific social role.173 The following 
institutionalised expectations are associated with the patient/sick role: the first is the 
patient’s exemption of normal social role responsibilities. This usually requires legitimation 
from a physician. The second is that the sick person cannot be expected to get well by an act 
of decision or will. Here, the patient is clearly also exempt from responsibility and must seek 
the assistance of another, like a physician. The third is concerned with the state of being ill, 
which is an undesirable state with its corresponding obligation to do what is necessary to 
get well. Finally, the patient is obligated, depending on the severity of the condition, to seek 
assistance from a legitimate source such as a physician.174 
 
The sick role can be described as a contingent, temporary role in which anyone in society, 
regardless of their status, may find himself or herself.175 It is also an inherently universal 
role, since generalised scientifically objective criteria determine whether one is sick, how 
sick and with what kind of illness. Functional specificity is also a characteristic of the sick role 
because the sick role is confined to the sphere of health and in this role one aspires to be 
healthy or get well. As in the physician’s role, affective neutrality is also a factor here since 
the expected behaviour patterns are focused on an objective problem, the illness. One 
should bear in mind that physicians, too, have these expectations and an internalised idea 
of the patient / sick role in general. They are therefore also influenced by these role 
expectations and this may influence the way in which they deal with their patients.  
 
According to Parsons, the institutional definition of the sick role is that the sick person is 
helpless and in need of assistance. With regard to the different illnesses and their degree of 
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seriousness one can generally say that the patient will also be anxious about his/her health. 
This need for assistance is therefore very different from most other needs. Situations of 
illness also require patients and those close to them to deal with complex problems and 
emotional adjustments. Sickness creates a situation of strain and frustration. This 
combination of helplessness, lack of technical competence and emotional strain make 
patients extremely vulnerable. The situation furthermore makes it very difficult for patients 
to behave rationally when making decisions about their health.176 However, sick role 
performance – the way in which the patient actually behaves — may differ from person to 
person since it is influenced by socio-economic and ethnic/cultural factors, personal 
experiences and how the particular illness is viewed in society. The patient’s personality also 
largely determines how he/she reacts to illness and the willingness with which such a 
patient will assumes the sick role.177  
 
Unfortunately, Parsons’s theory neglects to look at the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship. It also ignores those who are patients, but who are not sick, like plastic 
surgery patients and pregnant women. There is no reference to patients who cause their 
own illnesses, like lung cancer patients who continue to smoke. Parsons’s patrician model of 
health care, is also out of date with present day concepts of consumer-driven health care 
which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, the social role theory does provide 
one with a better understanding of the social dynamics between doctor and patient. The 
discussion on the physician’s role and the sick role illustrate that the doctor-patient 
relationship is built on mutual trust and the technical competence of the physician. The 
physician is doing everything he/she can, while the patient is cooperating because he/she 
has  the will to get well. This results in privileges and obligations for both the patient and the 
physician and acts as a mechanism of social control.178  
 
2.2.3. Professionalism, authority and the doctor-patient relationship 
Throughout the discussion in sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2., the theme of power and authority in 
both the profession as well as the doctor-patient relationship was central. It was established 
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that the status of professionalism confers power and authority on the members of a 
profession, and that the social roles of the doctor and the patient, as well as the consequent 
expected behaviour patterns, result in privileges and obligations for both parties. These 
privileges and obligations are inherent to professional authority and power and also relate 
to mutual trust between doctor and patient. In this section the investigation of power and 
authority in the doctor-patient relationship will be continued.  
 
First, it is necessary to understand what is meant by authority in the medical profession as 
well as in the doctor-patient relationship.  Authority is a source of power but power is 
essential to exercise authority.179 Authority generally refers to the control of the behaviour 
of others for the promotion of collective goals, based on some form of knowledge or 
consent.180 Authority can also be described as the possession of some status, quality or 
claim that compels voluntary trust and obedience.181 Two sources of effective control 
ensure and maintain authority: legitimacy and dependence.182 In the doctor-patient 
relationship patients generally accept their physicians’ superior competence and obey them.  
 
This authority the physician has over the patient is called the Asclepian authority. Asclepian 
authority can be sapiential, moral or charismatic.183 Sapiental authority refers to the right to 
be heard based on knowledge and expertise. This type of authority resides in the person 
and not in the position which that person may occupy. Someone with this type of authority 
may advise, inform or instruct, but may not order. The moral authority of doctors, which is 
expressed in the Hippocratic Oath, stems from the service motive attributed to the medical 
profession and the expectation that doctors do what is expected of them for the benefit of 
the particular patient as well as society. Moral authority provides the physician with the 
right to control and direct. Charismatic authority refers to the right to control and direct as a 
God-given grace and stems from the original unity of religion and medicine, described in 
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section 2.1. The charismatic element of authority is also connected to the possibility of 
death and the universal value of good health and physicians are therefore accorded the 
authority to not always act reasonably; a degree of arbitrariness is allowed since life and 
death is also arbitrary and medicine may not always be amenable to reason. Based on this 
Aesclepian idea of authority, the patient entrusts certain of his/her freedoms to the 
physician in order to obtain the benefits the physician has to offer. 184 Although the unequal 
distribution of power and authority in this relationship may seem unwarranted, it must be 
remembered that professionalism is necessary for the medical profession in its functional 
specificity. It can therefore be argued that power and authority are important components 
of medical practice and benefit society and the patient.185  
 
Eliot Freidson however disagrees.186 He distinguishes between the technical aspects of 
medical practice which requires professional autonomy, and professional authority in the 
doctor-patient relationship, which is a mask for the exercise of power. 187 He submits that 
professional autonomy was needed during the historical development of medical practice 
for protection from ignorance, sub-standard competitors and other potential harms for an 
infant discipline. But while professionalism did protect the discipline, facilitate scientific 
development and improve knowledge, it has impeded the improvement of the social 
application of this scientific knowledge. 188 I agree with Freidson that the general nature of 
professionalism in medical practice does protect the profession and certainly also places 
strain on the social dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship. However, Freidson 
oversimplifies the concept of professionalism and erroneously believes that medical practice 
only recently acquired the status of a profession, thereby referring to it as an infant 
discipline. It is clear from the discussion in sections 2.1. and 2.2.1. that the scientific 
tradition of medical practice and the development of medicine as a profession have a very 
long and rich history and that the special status and power of the medical profession is, to a 
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certain extent, necessary for the functional specificity of physicians. Nevertheless, 
Freidson’s theory on professional dominance need to be investigated, since the general 
nature of professionalism and self-regulation does provide for an unequal distribution of 
power and authority in the doctor-patient relationship which cannot be ignored.   
 
Eliot Freidson was the first sociologist who recognised the complexities and conflict in the 
doctor-patient relationship. According to his professional dominance theory the unique 
characteristics of a profession, like the medical profession, are not the reason for, nor the 
source of the occupation’s status as a profession.189 Rather, the medical profession’s 
dominance over its sphere of work is the only distinguishing characteristic.190 Such 
professional dominance entailed a dominant position in a division of labour, so that the 
profession gained control over the determination of the substance of its own work. 191 This 
dominance192 is established by the profession’s autonomy over its work, control over the 
work of others in the profession, institutional power and the cultural beliefs and deference 
of society towards physicians.193 Institutional power in this context refers to the profession’s 
claim to valuable and complex knowledge which has been internalised in society as cultural 
and legal authority and hence also in institutional authority. 194 The theory of professional 
dominance also explains why other occupations in the health care industry can not be 
classified as a profession. An occupation like nursing, for instance, does not have absolute 
dominance over the division of their specific labour and is not autonomous.  
 
Freidson also rejected Parsons’s social role theory, which was discussed in section 2.2.2. 
According to Freidson, practitioner behaviour is not guided by internalised motives, values 
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or knowledge unless these are continually reinforced by the social environment. 195 Various 
problems result from this situation of professional dominance. Two examples are the 
maldistribution of health care, since physicians tend to practise where they want to and the 
collective protection physicians sometimes afford one another, which impede any attempt 
at disciplinary action. Freidson continued to believe in his theory despite the changing social 
dynamics of the profession and the emergence of alternative theories like Marie Haug’s de-
professionalisation theory and Vincente Navarro’s proletarianisation theory. These 
alternative theories are based on the suggestion that the profession’s autonomy is 
declining.  
 
In 1973, Marie Haug claimed that de-professionalisation would be the trend of the future.196 
Haug anticipated that the medical profession would lose its monopoly over knowledge, that 
the public’s belief in the service ethos will decline and that the corresponding expectations 
of work autonomy and authority will fade, due to the diffusion of knowledge through 
computors, increased literacy as well as the rising dissatisfaction of society with 
professionals who are self-serving.197 (See Chapter Four for a discussion on these 
developments in health service delivery.) Haug also believed that the following factors 
would contribute to de-professionalisation: increasing specialisation which would make the 
physician more dependent on other role players, the emergence of consumer self-help 
groups and allied health care practitioners, and the rising cost of health care which 
tarnished the altruistic image of the medical profession.198 Freidson dismissed much of the 
de-professionalisation argument and maintained that the institutional dominance of the 
profession would remain intact. He believed that the consumer health movement and its 
consequent culture shift will not affect the dominance of the profession and that the great 
advances in technology and knowledge would counter the dissemination of knowledge in 
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the information age.199 (For a discussion on the emergence of consumerism in health service 
delivery see Chapter Seven.)  
 
Proletarianisation200 (Marxist) theorists of the 1970s focused on the process by which an 
occupation is divested of control and subordinated to the broader requirements of 
production, due to the rise of capitalism and the increased dependency of professions on 
advanced capitalism.201 The term “proletariat” refers to supervised manual workers who do 
not have control over the means or organisation of production. In the context of the 
medical profession, it refers to medical practitioners who have settled in salaried positions 
in bureaucratic institutions where regulatory norms and administrative hierarchy shape the 
delivery of medical care — a medical-industrial complex.202 This is an extremely important 
development in the practice of medical care, since this definition clearly shows that 
proletarianisation de-professionalises medical practice by taking away the control members 
of this profession have over their work. A new form of social control over the medical 
profession has arrived. Three very important changes form the basis of the 
proletarianisation theory:  
• modern medicine have become increasingly technical and organisationally 
complex, making the physician more dependent on other people/specialists to 
function effectively;  
• investor-owned health care corporations – especially hospital chains - have 
increased; and  
• the revolt and influence of institutional buyers who want to control the rising cost 
of health care services.203  
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The result, according to this theory, is that the medical profession is reduced to a common 
service level within the broader interest of capitalism and it is therefore no longer 
professionally dominant.204 The most important advocate of this argument is Vincente 
Navarro.205 Freidson acknowledged that capitalism has reduced the autonomy of the 
individual practitioner but maintained that the autonomy of the medical profession 
remained intact.206 He views the changes identified in the de-professionalisation and 
proletarianisation theories as part of the ever changing medical profession and not as 
changes happening outside the profession. The medical profession, according to Freidson, 
dynamically preserves its dominance by adapting to changing circumstances.207 It is 
furthermore argued that the social organisation of medicine or proletarianisation of the 
profession is not driven by capitalist notions, but rather by socio-economic beliefs to 
provide economic support for health care services, to provide optimal service delivery for all 
and to ensure quality by means of social management.208 
 
It is also necessary to take note of a theory referred to as the corporatisation of the medical 
profession. Corporatisation, in the context of proletarianisation, refers to the subjection of 
the medical profession to structures of corporate control e.g. quality review, incentive pay 
structures, restrictions and organisation of practice patterns and the restructuring of the 
marketplace to multi-institutional complexes.209 Although the medical profession is also 
dependent on such complex organisations, these institutions may de-professionalise the 
practice of medicine by controlling the work of medical practitioners and influencing the 
manner of health care delivery, their autonomy and independence to such an extent that 
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the doctor-patient relationship is ultimately revolutionised to fit this new mode of health 
care delivery. 
 
Irrespective of one’s personal view on these sociological theories on the position and future 
of the medical profession, it remains clear that power and authority remain distinguishing 
features and a central theme of the doctor-patient relationship. Even though the roles of 
those involved in the relationship may change, professional authority and power has a 
sociological structure and is not based on a superior status or a manifestation of superior 
wisdom.210 A patient is, for instance, not obliged to obey the physician’s instructions. 
Professional authority and power is based on the superior technical competence of the 
relevant professional and irrespective of the mode of health care delivery, this 
distinguishing factor will always be present in the doctor-patient relationship.211   
 
 2.2.4. Power and the doctor-patient relationship 
It has already been established that the doctor-patient relationship is probably one of the 
most unequal relationships in society and that where power imbalances exist, the potential 
for abuse is also present.212  Power is an integral component of all social relationships and is 
inherently neutral, neither good nor evil. It is also not a finite commodity; one person’s gain 
is not necessarily due to another’s loss. When the source of power is knowledge, the 
potential exists for both parties to be empowered by the exchange.213 The word “power” is 
derived from the Latin word potere which means “to be able”.   For the purposes of this 
dissertation the definition by Foucault will be used: Power is a general matrix of force 
relations at a given time in a given society; a vehicle through which discourses about 
knowledge unfold through the actions of subjects (individual or collective) upon others.214 It 
is also helpful to consider the following definition by Cassell: Power is the ability to do or act 
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so as to affect something, a potential capacity, an influence, a dominion, an authority, a 
right or ability to control, a legal authority of authorisation.215  
 
In addition to all the sources of power in the doctor-patient relationship that have already 
been identified in section 2.2. the following types of power as identified by Lewicki  are also 
relevant to this relationship and merit closer attention: 216  
• Informational power is based on the imbalance of knowledge in this relationship 
and the persuasive and influential value of information itself.  
• Expert power is a special form of informational power. 217 In the doctor-patient 
relationship the doctor possesses advanced scientific knowledge and technical skill 
on which the patient is dependent. Advanced education and knowledge have been 
identified as attributes of the physician’s role in Parsons’s social role theory in 
section 2.2.2. and a source of authority in section 2.2.3. 
• Legitimate power requires people to respond to the directions from another, 
because it is proper and expected of them to obey.218 Legitimate power exists in 
the doctor-patient relationship and is also identified in Parsons’s social role theory 
as a pattern of expected behaviour which is attached to a particular role. Parsons’s 
social role theory also indicates that the patient has legitimate power or 
expectations regarding the physician’s behaviour. In the doctor-patient 
relationship both the physician and patient are expected to respond in a particular 
manner based on their corresponding privileges and obligations. The need for 
social ordering and structure forms the basis of this legitimate power.219   
• Resource power is described as follows: If one can offer a service required by 
another, one has a resource and consequent resource power. In the doctor-patient 
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relationship the physician possesses the required knowledge and skills to assist the 
patient’s health. Resource power is therefore a source of power for the physician.  
• Principle-centered power is also present in the doctor-patient relationship. This 
type of power is derived from leadership power based on an honourable character 
and the exercise of certain power tools and principles and is related to moral 
authority as described in section 2.2.3. Principle-centered power is therefore also 
another source of power for the physician in the doctor-patient relationship based 
on their good standing in the public, the status which professionalism confers on 
its members, as well as the high regard placed on the ethical conduct of members 
of this profession.  
By this stage the existence of power in the doctor-patient relationship, its historical 
background as well as the sources of these powers should be clear. Talcott Parsons’s social 
role theory and its premise that deference and submission to the medical authority by 
patients assigned a sick role is necessary for the doctor-patient relationship to function 
effectively is an example of the necessity of power in the said relationship.220 From the 
discussion on the characteristics of professionalism it would seem that medical practitioners 
do require a certain degree of power in order to perform their duties in the unique doctor-
patient relationship and for patients to benefit from their professional expertise.221  
 
Before continuing the examination on power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship 
from a legal perspective, it is necessary to look at the research of the philosopher, Michel 
Foucault. A great deal of Foucault’s research deal with power relationships. He believed that 
power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere.222 According to Foucault power in the doctor-patient relationship is heavily 
weighted in favour of the physician and that this type of power is based on an old power 
technique developed in Christian institutions, the technique of pastoral power.223 Pastoral 
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power assured individuals of their salvation, was coupled with sacrificial stewardship and in 
the final instance had a subject matter which was of universal concern, not only for the 
whole community but also for each individual throughout his/her life. This power can also 
not be exercised without intimate knowledge about the subject and implies knowledge of 
the conscience and the ability to direct it  the power of the confessional.224 In the doctor-
patient relationship the benefit of salvation is replaced with health and the objective of the 
power is therefore changed to a more concrete reality. Foucault also recognises the dual 
nature of power relationships in the obligations and privileges of both the physician and the 
patient in Parsons’s social role theory.  
 
In the early 1970s Foucault began writing on how power and knowledge shape the 
relationships among legal, medical and social science discourses.225 For Foucault knowledge 
cannot be analysed purely as an expression of power or as an instrument of power. 
Discursive knowledge requires forms of power that enable classification, record keeping, 
accumulation and systematic communication; while power and the exercise of power 
require the formation of useful knowledge. According to Foucault, power and knowledge 
are therefore mutually dependent.226 
 
In order to restore these power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship, which are 
mainly based on the physician’s expert knowledge, Foucault suggests that the theory of 
right should be employed. The essential role of the theory of right, since the medieval times, 
was to “fix” the legitimacy of power. The discourse of rights addresses the intrinsic 
dominance of power in order to present power as the legitimate right of authority as well as 
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a legal obligation which must be obeyed. 227 In essence Foucault suggests that such power 
relationships should be placed in a legal framework of rights and obligations in order to 
recognise and justify the imbalances but also to ensure that parties to this relationship are 
protected, rights are honoured and obligations are met. This is also the aim of this 
dissertation.  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
This Chapter established that the perceptions and attitudes of societies towards the human 
body and the valuation of health and disease influence the status of the medical profession 
and the mode of health care delivery. It is clear that the practice of medicine cannot be 
separated from the social and cultural context in which it operates. Parsons’s social theory 
also confirmed that medicine is a social institution constructed around sickness and healing. 
This is important because despite all the advances in modern medical technology and 
knowledge, medicine is still grounded in a social and cultural dimension. When seeking 
medical help today, people want all the benefits of modern technology while also receiving 
specific attention to their emotional and personal attributes as ordinary and vulnerable 
people.228 However, it is also clear that the medical profession plays a substantial role in 
defining those values associated with the physician and the sick role. It is said that 
“[p]rofessionals profess. They profess to know better than others the nature of certain 
matters and to know better than their clients what ails them or their affairs. They presume 
to tell society what is good and right for the individual and for society at large in some 
aspect of life…The medical profession, for instance, is not content merely to define the terms 
of medical practice. It also tries to define for all of us the very nature of health and 
disease.”229  
 
Section 2.2. of this chapter focused on the distinguishing features of the medical profession 
that influence the doctor-patient relationship, including: professionalism, self-regulation, 
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state-sanctioned regulation, specific social roles with expected patterns of behaviour and 
comprehensive power, authority and autonomy. Relatively recent developments in the 
medical profession which may alter the scope of the profession’s autonomy, power and 
authority were identified in section 2.2.3. The autonomy of the patient will form the basis of 
the discussion in Chapter Three, which deals with medical decision-making and the doctor-
patient relationship in a medical paternalistic setting.  
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CHAPTER THREE: Medical decision-making and the doctor-patient 
relationship in a paternalistic setting 
 
 
In this chapter power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship will be identified and 
analysed from a legal perspective. The discussion will be structured according to the 
suggested approaches to health service delivery identified in Chapter One of this 
dissertation. Medical paternalism as an approach to health service delivery will form the 
basis of the discussion. Medical paternalism refers to the traditional beneficence-based 
mode of health service delivery that has dominated orthodox medical practice for the past 
2500 years.230 This approach is the first of five approaches which will be used to facilitate 
the analysis and discussion in the dissertation. It was selected not only because it is 
regarded as the dominant approach in health service delivery, and the characteristics and 
traits of professionalism in medical practice actually enable this approach, but also because 
this discussion will show that a paternalistic approach to the doctor-patient relationship 
generally results in far-reaching unwarranted power imbalances between the parties and 
potentially negative consequences, especially for the patient.  
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Section 3.1. of the chapter will provide a definition and general oversight of medical 
paternalism as one specific mode of health service delivery. Next, in sections 3.2. to 3.4., the 
first power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship will be identified and evaluated. 
This power imbalance is the lack of parity that exists between doctor and patient with 
regard to medical decision-making in a medical paternalistic setting.  The discussion will 
include a comprehensive analysis of the relevant case law, legislation and/or other legal 
instruments from the three jurisdictions which were identified in Chapter One of this 
dissertation and were selected for discussion in terms of the specific purposes and aim of 
this research - South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA). 
Reference will also be made to other jurisdictions where relevant and helpful. The analysis 
will not take the form of a typical legal comparison where the jurisdictions are extensively 
compared with one another since the power imbalances discussed in this dissertation are 
generally neutral and omni-present in all doctor-patient relationships. The chapter will 
conclude with commentary on the use and value of the available legal instruments to 
address the power imbalances identified in this chapter. 
 
3.1. Defining medical paternalism  
Medical paternalism refers to the traditional beneficence-based mode of health service 
delivery which has dominated orthodox medical practice for the past 2500 years. In spite of 
far-reaching social and cultural changes as well as great advances and developments in 
medical science, paternalism has remained the preferred and dominant ethos in medical 
practice. Paternalism requires that a person’s liberty be restricted for his/her own good in 
circumstances that would normally be perceived as violating that person’s autonomy. 
Motivated and justified by an allegedly beneficent concern for the welfare of patients, 
paternalism expects them to act in a certain way, employing mechanisms and means other 
than reasoned persuasion to reach its objectives and assuming that medical practitioners 
internalise the interests of patients.231 The patient is not considered as an active participant 
in decision-making. That responsibility is assigned to the medical practitioner instead, given 
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his/her expert medical knowledge.232 The notions of beneficence and non-maleficence are, 
as a matter of fact, in themselves paternalistic233  
 
The paternalistic doctor-patient relationship is actually akin to the relationship between a 
parent and a child. The doctor does have obligations towards the patient but is as the holder 
of expertise and knowledge, assumed to be dominant while the patient is submissive. The 
doctor disciplines and controls the decision-making process, the patient is expected to 
cooperate, and their shared goal is said to be the preservation and protection of the 
patient’s health.234 In medical practice and specifically in doctor-patient relationships, there 
is both direct and indirect evidence for the existence of this approach described by Katz as 
the conspiracy of silence that exists in the consulting room.235 Direct evidence can be found 
in surveys, articles and other academic literature in which patients and physicians attest to 
the existence of paternalistic practices in medicine. Indirect evidence can be found in the 
language used to describe doctor-patient interactions.236 The plaintiff in the case of Sidaway 
v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital,237 for 
example, described her neurosurgeon as “a man of very, very few words”. The trial judge 
later described this neurosurgeon as “reserved, slightly autocratic and of the old school”.238 
And in the South African landmark decision of Castell v De Greef239 the court pointed out 
that medical paternalism “stems largely from a bygone era predominantly marked by 
presently outmoded patriarchal attitudes”.240  
 
Medical paternalism is rooted in the historical development of the medical profession and 
the doctor-patient relationship as described in Chapter Two, and more specifically in the 
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unique characteristics and special status associated with the medical profession and the 
consequent power and authority attributed to its members. Assumptions underlying this 
unquestionable deference to professional authority are the following:  
• A single best treatment for most illnesses exists and physicians are generally 
informed about the latest treatment options.  
• Physicians can be trusted always to apply their expert knowledge and skill when 
deciding on treatment for their patients.  
• Physicians’ skills and expert knowledge qualify them to make the most appropriate 
treatment decisions.  
• Since physicians always act in the best interest of their patients, they have a 
legitimate interest in each treatment decision.241  
Specifically associated with these assumptions are: non-disclosure, deference, and an 
impersonal and detached relationship between doctors and patients; the ability of 
physicians to persuade rather than discuss, to advise rather than explain; extensive self-
regulatory powers, and legislative endorsements of these powers and far-reaching powers 
with regard to discretionary decision-making.242  
 
From about the 1960s this approach has been severely critiqued. The following count 
among the numerous sources of resistance to medical paternalism:  
• the political and ethical philosophy of individual rights ; 
• higher education levels among the general public; 
• public awareness of the powers and dangers of medical technology; 
• a general distrust of experts;  
• the rise of consumerism; and 
• the moral challenges of wars.243  
It has also been argued that paternalism prevents doctors from appreciating how illness is 
experienced.244 Physicians can, in other words, not relate to the attributes and needs of the 
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sick role as described by Talcott Parsons.245 Physicians furthermore have not respected the 
autonomy of patients and therefore have not actively encouraged their participation in the 
consulting room, and paternalistic physicians usually focus too much on relieving specific 
physical symptoms without paying attention to the individual patient’s overall needs.  
Kantianism offers a non-consequentialist and philosophical objection to paternalism: it 
harms rather than benefits its intended beneficiaries, for even though it may benefit those 
whom it targets, its negative side-effects outweigh that benefit. And even if it benefits those 
whom it targets, and harms no one else, it still violates some deontological side-constraint 
on permissible action.246 A generation critical of unjust claims to power that regards 
physicians’ defense of professional power and autonomy as self-interested authoritarianism 
(a notion also supported by Eliot Freidson and his theory of professional dominance) has 
thus allegedly caused the demise of the traditional paternalistic approach as an appropriate 
model for the doctor-patient relationship.247  
 
However, despite this critique, changing social and cultural dynamics , and centuries long 
developments in the practice of medicine, medical paternalism has continued to remain the 
template frame of mind of many a physician. The unique characteristics of professionalism 
in general, and the practice of medicine in particular, may possibly explain the resilience of 
the paternalistic model of health care: authority and prestige are attributed to the 
profession; the expert knowledge of its members is admired; patients as beneficiaries of 
health care are vulnerable; and medical practitioners exercise strong occupational control 
over their own profession.248 In particular, expertise acquired through education and 
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research is relied on as justification for paternalistic practices.249 According to Montgomery 
the juxtaposition of the physician’s  competence and the patient’s “non-competence” 
creates distance, conducive to paternalistic practices, between them. 250 Moreover, ready 
deference to the evidential judgements of medical professionals in lawsuits invests them 
with extensive discretionary powers, enabling them to determine their own standards of 
care.251   
 
Another possible reason for the dominance and resilience of medical paternalism in medical 
relationships is to be found in the historical development of the doctor-patient relationship 
as described in Chapter Two.252 The religious character of this relationship, dating back to 
the Greek medical tradition and also early modern societies , as well as the magical 
undertones of the doctor-patient relationship, especially evident in primitive societies and 
medieval times, may very well still be real and present in the doctor-patient relationship of 
the twenty-first century. It was clear from the exposition in Chapter Two that the modern 
doctor-patient relationship is still accorded a special status and is regarded as distinctive 
due to the intimate and intrusive nature of the relationship, the vulnerability of the patient 
and the valued quality of health which forms the reason for and subject matter of the 
relationship. These factors bestow on the doctor-patient relationship a sacrosanct quality, 
almost like a one-to-one pastoral bond, which also enables paternalistic practices.253 The 
subsequent paternalistic approach of medical practitioners promotes the welfare of an 
exclusive patient, creating an archaic, self-indulgent vision of medical practice far removed 
from the realities of health service delivery.254 
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However, not only physicians, but patients, too, are responsible for keeping paternalism in 
medicine alive. Physicians may resort to paternalism due to sheer work pressure, to avoid 
potentially stressful dialogues, to project an image of confidence and reassurance or simply 
because they feel comfortable with it. Many patients, on the other hand, choose to 
relinquish their autonomy and own responsibility when faced with a medical problem and to 
place trust in the expert instead.255 This attitude corresponds with the attributes of the sick 
role which Talcott Parsons identified in his social role theory. 256 According to Parsons, the 
institutional definition of the sick role is that the sick person is helpless and in need of 
assistance. The combination of helplessness, lack of technical competence and emotional 
strain results in a vulnerable patient who cannot perform at a high level of rational 
judgement when making decisions about his/her health. 257 The patient’s preferred role as 
passive recipient of treatment may also be due to the “magical” qualities historically 
attributed to the practice of medicine and the patient’s ignorance and blind trust in this 
science.258 
 
Clearly medical paternalism accords the physician great power and authority vis-à-vis the 
patient, based on the expert knowledge and skill that medical professionals have. Altruistic 
motives attributed to members of the medical profession also play a role in determining the 
dynamics of a paternalistic doctor-patient relationship. These characteristics, as well as the 
other distinguishing practices of medical paternalism highlighted in the discussion above, 
profoundly influence medical decision-making and make for a power imbalance in a doctor-
patient relationship.  
 
3.2. Medical decision-making in a paternalistic medical setting   
Historically, disclosure, consent and participatory decision-making have never been 
important objectives in medical practice.259 Hippocrates once said that “Life is short, the Art 
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is long, Opportunity fleeting, Experiment treacherous and Judgement difficult”. And since 
the art is long and life short, the undertaking to share knowledge and information with 
patients, to explain opportunities, experiments and the rationale underlying judgements 
have never been regarded as part of the Hippocratic task.260 In fact, the only reference 
made to communication between doctor and patient in the Hippocratic Corpus advises 
against disclosure.261 During medieval times this viewpoint on disclosure and conversations 
with patients was upheld and interactions between physicians and patients were based on 
three principles: patients must honour physicians since the latter received their authority 
from God, patients must have faith in their physicians and patients must promise 
obedience.262 Greater importance was consequently placed on beneficence and the 
physician’s opinion in medical decision-making than on patient autonomy, dignity and self-
determination. It was permissible for the physician (rather than the patient) to decide what 
action (or inaction) would be in the patient’s best interest, based on expert knowledge 
regarded as objective, scientific and value-free, while the patient’s welfare was defined in 
clinical terms excluding any normative dimension reaching beyond the physician’s clinical 
expertise. The participation of patients in the medical decision-making process was 
therefore not only regarded as unnecessary but actually also as unfeasible.263 In summary 
there are three main arguments for the justification of withholding information from a 
patient or misinforming a patient about the particulars of his/her condition. The first is that 
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physicians have a duty to prevent harm or to minimise harm to patients and it is therefore 
permissible for the physician to withhold information from patients . The second argument is 
that the physician-patient relationship is a contractual relationship and that the terms of the 
contract are such that the patient authorises the physician to minimise harm to the patient 
by whatever means the physician deems necessary.264 Finally, it is argued that physicians 
are justified in withholding information from patients when the patient is unable to 
understand the information.265  
 
It was only during the Age of Enlightenment (the eighteenth century) that some physicians 
started contending that the public in general and patients in particular should be informed 
about medical matters, but few medical professionalists took notice as the traditional 
approach was too ingrained.266 The British and American medical associations drafted their 
first codes of ethics without acknowledging this enlightened view. Instead they adhered to 
the writings of Thomas Percival, an advocate of custody and not of patients’ liberty.267 
Percival followed tradition and urged restraint in the disclosure of information to patients. 
Physicians were regarded as the custodians of abstruse knowledge not communicable to the 
lay person.268 Medical training and institutionalisation helped to sustain and promote this 
attitude.269 The authority and prestige of the medical profession as well as extensive 
privileges and legislative endorsement of self-regulation also aided the maintenance of 
these traditional views and practices.270 Discretionary decision-making powers and the right 
of the medical profession to determine its own standards became its trademark. 271  
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A telling example of the attitude of an early twentieth century physician towards – as well as 
his point of view on – his obligations and rights regarding disclosure and consent is to be 
found in the case of Pratt v Davis.272 The physician, Dr Pratt, bluntly told the court that “[h]e 
did not deem her [the patient] worthy [of an explanation];” that he had “worked her 
deliberately, systematically, taking chances which she did not realise the full aspect of [and 
that he had] deliberately and calmly deceived the woman”. He also stated that “when a 
patient places herself in the care of a surgeon for treatment without [express limitations] 
upon his authority, she thereby in law consents that he may perform such operation as in his 
best judgement is proper and essential to her welfare”. In the English case, Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee273 the physician unselfconsciously admitted that he would 
not divulge any information on material and catastrophe risks unless he was directly asked 
about this by the patient. And even then, he would only disclose slight risks since he did not 
want to drive his patients away. This sentiment on disclosure was also echoed by medical 
practitioners in the South African case of Richter and another v Estate Hammann.274 And in 
the case of Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 275 the medical practitioner stated that he 
did not consider it necessary to discuss the details of radiation therapy with the patient 
(then aged 10) nor with the patient’s parents.  
 
However, to completely deny the authority of medical professionals in the decision-making 
process would be to ignore the nature of medical practice.276 According to Dr Arnold Relman  
the “responsibility [of the physician] for the welfare of his patients often requires that he 
deal with technical medical issues which are of vital importance to his patients but which 
they are unable to comprehend fully, if at all, and which they must therefore delegate to 
him. Unless he is willing to assume this decision-making role on the patients’ behalf he is not 
really doing his job”.277  He elaborated on this statement by providing three justifications for 
the extensive decision-making powers by physicians. First he claimed that life and death 
decisions are and have always been medical decisions, traditionally made by medical 
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practitioners. Such decisions should be made by physicians since they usually involve 
technical-medical detail which cannot be properly apprehended by a lay person. He also 
stated that courts are incapable of handling such decisions since they do not have the 
necessary medical expertise.278 He furthermore believed that physicians are justified in 
having this extensive power in medical decision-making since patients have delegated this 
power to their doctors, believing that only their doctors can decide for them in an informed 
and rational manner.279 
 
But can doctors really make informed and rational decisions about the health of their 
patients on their own? And if so, how can such decisions be justified in the light of the vital 
role that autonomy and self-determination play in modern medical and ethical practice?280 
In the case of Pratt v Davis281 the physician removed the patient’s ovaries and uterus in 
order to cure her epilepsy. Although Dr Pratt submitted that he had informed the patient’s 
husband of this medical intervention he self-righteously pointed out that “when a patient 
places herself in the care of a surgeon for treatment without [express limitations] upon his 
authority, she thereby in law consents that he may perform such operation as in his best 
judgment if proper and essential to her welfare”.282 Dr Pratt’s statement is a good example 
of the sentiments and beliefs of physicians who adhere to the paternalistic approach in 
medicine. In the case of Mohr v Williams283 the plaintiff consented to an operation on her 
right ear, but under anaesthetic the defendant examined her left ear and found the 
condition of the left ear to be more serious and more in need of an operation than the right 
ear. The defendant continued to operate on the plaintiff’s left ear without obtaining her 
consent. In this case the defendant also submitted that he acted in the interest and welfare 
of the patient and that he could not be held liable for this medical judgement, nor for the 
skillfully performed operation. The medical practitioner in this case clearly believed that he 
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had the authority to decide on behalf of his patient, without obtaining her consent, since he 
had acted in the best interests of the patient.  
 
Although the consent to or refusal of surgical interventions was generally accepted and 
required as an ancient legal necessity, this right was extremely narrow in scope and did not 
include the right to be properly and fully informed of all risks, benefits and alternatives.284 In 
the Mohr-case,285 for example, the court confirmed that a patient should explicitly agree to 
or refuse medical interventions but the court also held that the judiciary should not lay 
down rules which would unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the physician’s 
discretion. And in the case of Bennan v Parsonnet286 the court concluded that when a 
person elected to continue with surgery and did not appoint another person to represent 
him/her during the period of unconsciousness the law would regard the surgeon to be the 
patient’s representative, authorised to act in the patient’s welfare as long as the surgeon did 
not perform an operation different to – and especially more risky than – the operation to 
which the patient had initially consented. An eighteenth century English judge observed that 
“a patient should be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put 
himself in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation”.287 Patients merely 
had an elementary right to be free from uninvited contact and therefore only needed to be 
informed of the nature of the medical intervention, nothing more.288  
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A final case illustrating the disregard of disclosure and consent which d ominated health 
service delivery for nearly 2500 years is the case of Hunt v Bradshaw.289 In this case Dr 
Bradshaw advised the patient that a small sharp-edged piece of steel lodged in the patient’s 
neck after an unfortunate work injury needed to be removed. Upon the patient’s enquiry 
about the seriousness of the operation Dr Bradshaw allegedly responded that “ it wasn’t 
nothing to it (sic), it was very simple”. After the operation, however, the patient found that 
he had lost the use of his fingers of his left hand and that this left hand was contracted in a 
claw like state. With regard to an alleged lack of disclosure in this case the court stated: “ It is 
understandable [that] the surgeon wanted to reassure the patient so that he would not go to 
the operating room unduly apprehensive. Failure to explain the risk involved, therefore, may 
be considered a mistake on the part of the surgeon, but under the facts cannot be deemed 
such want of ordinary care as to import liability”.290 It is clear from this judgement that the 
court did not want to challenge the medical professionals’ disclosure practices.291 
 
The medical profession justifies such non-disclosure and lack of consent in an essentially 
paternalistic manner. They submit that patients are not able to understand the complex 
medical jargon and information and are too emotionally distressed and dependent on 
medical practitioners to make rational decisions regarding their health. 292 This second 
argument is directly linked to Talcott Parsons’s also inherently paternalistic sick role and its 
attributes. None of these cases referred to above involved a sophisticated enquiry into the 
relationship between disclosure, consent and self-determination. The hesitance of the 
judiciary to address the general disregard for full disclosure and consent in medical practice, 
on the other hand, was based on judges’ unfamiliarity with medical science, their respect for 
the medical profession’s authority and expertise as well as a desire to maintain the 
profession’s independence, as a core characteristic of professionalism.293 The extensive 
power and authority of physicians in medical decision-making, due to this disregard for full 
disclosure and consent has created a power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship. 
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However, criticism of physicians’ customary exercise of paternalistic sovereignty and the 
increased emphasis on patient autonomy and self-determination could no longer be 
ignored. But before analysing the legal reaction to the paternalistic approach in medical 
decision-making, the conflicting underlying values in the medical decision-making process 
need to be considered.  
 
3.3. Autonomy, dignity, self-determination and beneficence in medical decision-making 
From the discussion in this chapter it is clear that medical practitioners’ obligations and 
virtues have traditionally been understood in terms of fundamental obligations of 
beneficence. However, the human rights movement with its increased focus on human 
rights in general and patient autonomy and rights in particular, has called for a new 
perspective, moving away from the traditional beneficence-based model of medical ethics 
to a model of autonomy.  According to the autonomy model, a physician’s obligations 
towards the patient are primarily established by the moral principle of respect for 
autonomy.294 The aim of this section is not to discuss the conflict between autonomy and 
beneficence in general, but to provide sufficient, if limited, background to these concepts in 
the context of medical paternalism and specifically with regard to medical decision-making 
in the doctor-patient relationship. 
  
Autonomy means that a person has sovereignty over his/her life.295 This sovereignty 
protects privacy as well as rights to control what happens to one’s person and property.296 
This concept related to self-determination was articulated in the case of Natanson v Kline: 
“A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or 
necessary, but the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgement for that of the 
patient by any form of artifice or deception”.297 Self-determination refers to the rights of 
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individuals to make decisions without interference by others (voluntas).298 In its extreme 
forms, paternalism, the adverse sibling of self-determination, requires a total surrender of a 
patient’s decision-making capacity to the will of others.299 The principle of autonomy 
requires that competent300 persons must be allowed to make their own decisions regarding 
every aspect of their life and that these decisions must be based on their own beliefs, 
principles, preferences and conceptions. Autonomy, in short, means self-rule.301 Known as 
“autonomy of will” in Immanuel Kant’s deontology autonomy302, autonomy emanates from 
the rational human will and exists prior to action. According to Kant, to be autonomous is to 
govern oneself, and this includes the right to make one’s own choices in accordance with 
universal moral principles.303 In John Stuart Mill’s dissimilar conception autonomy does not 
originate from a prior will to act but rather from the action itself, as “autonomy of 
action”.304 He believed that autonomy is the freedom of actions and worthwhile only to the 
extent that people respect one another’s autonomy. 305 Autonomy is moreover neither 
permanent nor immutable, but rather dynamic in nature.306  
 
Both autonomy and self-determination are recognised in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, in the provisions regarding the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity,307 the right to privacy,308 the right to life,309 the right to freedom of movement,310 
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and the right to freedom of religion and belief.311 The values of dignity, integrity, 
individuality, independence, responsibility and self-knowledge constitute the foundation of 
a person’s right to autonomy, and among these values, dignity is singled out as having a 
particularly close connection with a person’s health. Health is seen to be essential for life 
and human dignity; dignity is a founding value of the South African Constitution and is also 
protected as a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights.312 Autonomy and self-determination 
are also recognised in the National Health Act 61 of 2003, more specifically in sections 6, 7, 
8, and 12.313  
 
Section 10 of the Constitution, forming part of the Bill of Rights (Chapter Two) states that 
everyone has an inherent dignity and the right to have his/her dignity respected and 
protected. The Constitutional Court has emphasised that this right signals respect for the 
intrinsic worth of all human beings and that dignity as a constitutional value informs the 
interpretation of all other rights.314 Section 12(2) of the Constitution is also relevant to the 
present discussion. The value underlying this provision which also protects everyone’s right 
to bodily and psychological integrity is the right to self-determination. It also includes the 
right to security in and control over a person’s body (section 12(2)(b)) and the right not to 
be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without his/her informed consent (section 
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12(2)(c)). The origin of this right to self-determination as an ethical principle reflected in 
legal rules is explained in various ways. Some claim that it is based on inherent natural 
rights, others say that it is a political notion expressing the importance of the individual, and 
still another perception is that it is based on a patient’s right to dignity. 315 The reiteration of 
these rights and underlying values in various instruments and judicial decisions will now be 
discussed.  
 
In health law, autonomy refers to either liberal individualism or physical essentialism. 
Liberal individualism in this context (also referred to as the procedural quality of 
individualism) refers to the right to all relevant information, while physical essentialism (also 
referred to as the substantive quality of individualism) means that one’s body is the essence 
of oneself and autonomy thus means that one has exclusive rights over and the final say in 
what happens to one’s  body. In the rhetoric of modern medical ethics patient autonomy 
and self-determination are clearly values of considerable significance. As such, they trace 
their origin to Judge Cardoza’s famous dictum in the case of Schloendorff v Society of New 
York Hospital:  “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body”.316  In South African medical law the concept of 
patient autonomy was first recognised in the case of Stoffberg v Elliott, with Justice 
Watermeyer explaining that: “in the eyes of the law every person has certain absolute rights 
which the law protects. They are not dependent on statute or contract, but they are rights to 
be respected, and one of the rights is absolute security of the person…”.317 Consent 
expresses the primacy of autonomy and individualistic values in our society, as well as in 
medical practice. The significance of consent to an individual as well as to the greater 
community, which must decide whether to give effect to it, depends on each particular 
situation and its circumstances.318  
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The principle of autonomy is, however, not absolute and the truly independent and self-
determining self is but a theoretical construct.319 There is also a conflict between the 
principle of autonomy and the principle of beneficence, which underlies medical 
paternalism. The principle of beneficence requires a decision on what is good for others 
made in a way that is temporally neutral with regard to the person’s present and future.320 
Beneficence may also involve the prevention of harm, the removal of harm, benevolence or 
compassion.321 As mentioned in Chapter Two, section 2.2., this principle forms the 
foundation of medical paternalism and centers on an allegedly altruistic commitment of the 
doctor to the patient (salus aegroti).322 Society also regards such altruistic commitment or 
beneficence as the moral foundation of the physician’s role.323 Medical practitioners are 
generally regarded as having a positive duty to do good and some believe that it is a duty of 
supererogatory benevolence that goes beyond what can reasonably be expected from the 
rest of the population.324 This belief rests on a combination of assumptions: the expert 
knowledge of medical professionals; the vulnerability of patients; the sacredness of health; 
and the consequent unique relationship that exists between doctors and their patients. The 
principle of beneficence has four elements:  
• a medical practitioner should not inflict evil or harm;  
• evil or harm should be prevented;  
• evil or harm should also be removed if it is present; and  
• medical practitioners ought to do good and/or promote good.325 
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Beneficence is regarded as the raison d’être of the medical profession.326 It was first 
suggested by Hippocrates as the moral purpose of the medical profession and was later 
elaborated on by others like Dr John Gregory who defined medicine as being “the art of 
preserving health, of prolonging life and of curing diseases”.327 The service and altruistic 
motivation associated with the physician’s role also contributes to the notion that 
beneficence is the moral foundation of this role/profession. However, in return for this 
altruistic commitment the patient must accept that the physician will at times act 
paternalistically and must also recognise that illness will decrease his/her autonomy.328 
Beneficence is also recognised in the provisions of the Constitution, which state that 
everyone has the right to life,329 access to health care within available resources,330 
including reproductive health care,331 that children have a right to basic health care 
services,332 and that everyone has the right of access to information. 333 The principle of non-
maleficence, doing no harm, is closely linked to the principle of beneficence. Non-
maleficence is also invoked in constitutional provisions dealing with everyone’s right to an 
environment that is not harmful to health or well-being,334 the right of people not to be 
treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner, 335 not to be subjected to 
medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent,336 or not to be denied the 
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right to practise their religion or culture or to speak their language,337 and the provision that 
nobody may be refused emergency medical treatment.338 
 
Despite the significant role that autonomy and self-determination are said to play in a free 
and liberal state, and even though autonomy has been hailed as the most important 
principle of bio-ethics, both are continuously being subjected to restrictions in medical 
practice based on the principle of beneficence.339 But is this restriction of autonomy, liberty 
and self-determination in the doctor-patient relationship acceptable? Feinberg contends 
that “every person’s moral right to govern himself surely outweighs the “right” of benevolent 
intermeddlers to manipulate him for his own advantage, whether that advantage is health, 
wealth, contentment, or freedom”.340 The more private the choice to be made the more 
robust should autonomy be protected and promoted. Since few choices are more private 
and intimate than those concerning a person’s health, society should therefore not permit 
any interference with this choice.341 Beauchamp suggests that the autonomy model and the 
beneficence model should be understood as two polar opposites, but that it is possible to 
adopt principles from each of the models without resultant inconsistency.342 This much was 
acknowledged by the USA President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research: “The primary goal of health care in 
general is to maximise each patient’s well-being. However, merely acting in a patient’s best 
interest without recognising the individual as the pivotal decisionmaker would fail to respect 
each person’s interest in self-determination…When the conflicts that arise between a 
competent patient’s self-determination and his or her apparent well-being remain 
unresolved after adequate deliberation, a competent patient’s self-determination is and 
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surely should be given greater weight than other people’s views on that individual’s well-
being”.343  
 
Another attempt at resolving the conflict between the principle of autonomy and 
beneficence in medical decision-making is the Pellegrino-Thomasma Beneficence Model.344 
Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma promoted the preeminence of beneficence by 
reconstructing the traditional beneficence model to accommodate some of the concerns of 
the autonomy model.345 They submit that neither contemporary law nor contemporary 
medical ethics provides sufficient reason for or proof of the supremacy of autonomy above  
beneficence in medical decision-making: “None of [the court cases favouring patient 
autonomy] can be seen as an objection to the beneficence model. It might be tempting to 
think that these cases give precedence to patient wishes or presumed wishes over physician 
paternalism, but that is not so. Instead, they emphasise patient wishes…as a means for 
protecting the patient’s best interests. This is a critical point. While autonomy is not a clear 
winner in these cases, neither is paternalism. Rather, the best interests of the patients are 
intimately linked with their preferences. From these are derived our primary duties toward 
them”.346 Pellegrino-Thomasma’s theory is mainly founded on the principle of beneficence, 
submitting for example that technically correct decisions may not necessarily be in the 
patient’s best interest as defined in the patient’s own terms.347 Pellegrino even suggests 
that there are no absolute moral principles in the doctor-patient relationship, except the 
injunction to act in the patient’s best interest, since all illness represents a state of 
diminished autonomy.348 Both Beauchamp and Pellegrino-Thomasma therefore suggest a 
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combination of the principles of these two models in medical decision-making, Beauchamp 
from the autonomy model as starting point and Pellegrino-Thomasma from the point of 
view that beneficence supersedes both autonomy and paternalism in medical decision-
making.349  
 
From the discussion above it appears that the conflict between autonomy and beneficence 
in medical decision-making is historically rooted in the nature of medical care. The 
discussion has also demonstrated that a paternalistic approach in medical decision-making 
infringes on the patient’s autonomy and right to self-determination on the grounds of 
beneficence. Since the principle of beneficence is so ingrained in the doctor-patient 
relationship, and sometimes also necessary due to the functional specificity of the medical 
profession, it is no a simple task to find a balance between these conflicting values. It is 
therefore necessary to recognise the limits of both beneficence and autonomy in medical 
practice.  Excessive claims by patients dictating treatment cannot be justified in the name of 
patient autonomy, but at the same time physicians cannot be allowed to decide exclusively 
and unilaterally. They can also not simply withhold their guidance, lest patients forfeit the 
benefit of the professional expertise of the physician in medical decision-making.350 A 
balance between patient autonomy and beneficence in medical decision-making is 
therefore needed. The discussion in section 3.4. will show that the current legal valuation of 
patient autonomy in medical decision-making is not successful.  
 
3.4. A juridical response to traditional paternalism in medical decision-making 
Few concepts are more sensitive to a dynamic social context and the changing values of 
society than the notion of consent.351 With an increased recognition of human rights and 
the value of patient autonomy, as well as physicians being trained in a new patient-centred 
approach, the doctor-patient relationship and medical decision-making have been 
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remodeled.352 This was necessary since the traditional paternalistic approach to medical 
decision-making, based on the principle of beneficence, provided the physician with great 
power over the patient and with the potential of abuse. Various reasons for this rights-
based perspective exist, including revelations of the atrocities committed by Nazi doctors 
during World War II, the international and national guidelines and ethical codes drawn up as 
a consequence of this, a growing commitment to human rights in general, the highlighting 
of power imbalances, discrimination and the social disadvantages of minorities, and the 
medical malpractice crises in the USA during the 1970s.353 
 
In medical law, this shift of focus to patient autonomy and self-determination was 
facilitated, politically and legally, by abstract principles enshrined in foundational texts , like 
ethical codes354 and guidelines,355 legislation356 and the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa.357 But the impetus for more informed and participatory decision-making in 
health care first came with the doctrine of informed consent, formerly articulated and 
implemented in case law by the judiciary. The discussion that follows will include a 
comprehensive consideration of all these legal instruments which have made informed and 
participatory decision-making in health care possible. The discussion will commence with 
the doctrine of informed consent, a concept which also forms the foundation of present 
medical ethics. However, no attempt will be made to provide an exhaustive exposition on 
this doctrine of informed consent. The focus will be on the relevance of this doctrine for a 
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discussion of the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship within the framework 
of medical paternalism.358  
 
 3.4.1. Informed consent 
The doctrine359 of informed consent was formulated to address the general lack of 
importance placed on disclosure and consent in medical decision-making, as well as the 
ensuing power imbalance this creates in the doctor-patient relationship. This doctrine is 
inherently about patient autonomy and self-determination and theoretically in line with the 
underlying values of the South African Constitution.360 The doctrine of informed consent 
requires that medical practitioners explain to a patient what is involved in an intended 
diagnostic or therapeutic procedure before such procedure is carried out. This is necessary 
in order to secure the understanding consent of the patient before proceeding.361 The 
purpose of the doctrine is therefore to ensure that the patient’s rights to self-determination 
and freedom of choice are respected and also to encourage rational decision-making by 
enabling the patient to make an informed decision.362 Cases where a lack of informed 
consent is alleged are  usually based either on the submission that a physician failed to fulfill 
the duty to supply the patient with all material information about risks and alternatives for 
the proposed medical procedure or on the submission that a physician administered 
treatment beyond what was authorised by the patient. 363 This doctrine is usually held to 
have originated on 22 October 1957, when judgement in the case of Salgo v Leland Stanford 
Jr. University Board of Trustees, USA was handed down.364  
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  3.4.1.1. The origin of informed consent 
In the Salgo case the plaintiff was referred to one Dr Gerbode for continued and worsening 
cramping pains in his legs.365 Dr Gerbode diagnosed the plaintiff with advanced arterial 
insufficiency and subsequent advanced arteriosclerosis.  This was a serious diagnosis and a 
disease which could cause a stroke or coronary occlusion to the vessels of the heart. Dr 
Gerbode suggested further tests at an inpatient hospital, including an aortography. The 
plaintiff remained in hospital and seemed to recover well from the procedures. However, 
when the plaintiff woke up the following morning his lower extremities were paralysed. This 
condition was permanent.  The plaintiff claimed that this permanent paralysis was due to 
the negligent performance of the aortography by the doctors and staff of the Stanford 
University Hospital. He later claimed that the physicians had failed to warn him of the risks 
of paralysis inherent in this procedure.366 
 
One paragraph at the end of Judge Bray’s judgement in the ensuing case introduced the 
doctrine of informed consent. This paragraph was adopted verbatim and without attribution 
from the amicus curiae brief submitted by the American College of Surgeons to the 
California Court of Appeals.367 Judge Bray stated: “A physician violates his duty to his patient 
and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the 
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment… In discussing the 
element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full 
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent”.368  Although this introduction to 
informed consent stimulated debate on the subject, the paragraph quoted above did very 
little to clarify the conflict between disclosure, consent and the far-reaching authority of 
physicians with regard to their discretion in such matters. Nor did it offer an effective 
solution for the conflict between beneficence and self-determination in medical decision-
making. Judge Bray held that physicians should always place the welfare of their patient 
above all else, but should also be aware that each patient’s case presents unique problems 
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and that physicians should therefore employ their discretion in each individual case.369 It is 
evident from Judge Bray’s dictum that he believed that physicians’ and patients’ interests 
are one and the same and that physicians can therefore decide on their patients’ behalf.370 
It is also clear from the dictum that he viewed the principle of beneficence as the starting 
point in medical decision-making and the patient’s autonomy as secondary thereto. 
Although the court introduced new elements into the relationship of trust between doctors 
and their patients, its hesitance to interfere in medical practice was evident. In juxtaposing 
disclosure and discretion the medical and legal fraternity avoided the real issue at hand, 
namely the value of patient autonomy and self-determination versus the doctor’s obligation 
to disclose. 
 
Three years later the doctrine was affirmed and further developed in the case of Natanson v 
Kline.371 Judge Schroeder based his judgement on the following fundamental principle: 
“Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It 
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of 
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical 
treatment.…[H]e [the doctor] may not substitute his own judgement for that of the patient 
by any artifice or deception.”372 Although this was a great leap forward from the Salgo-
judgement, this pronouncement of informed consent also had its limitations. Judge 
Schroeder did not, for instance, deal with the crucial fact that the plaintiff’s consent was 
meaningless since the dangers of cobalt radiation had not been communicated to her.373 He 
furthermore limited his pronouncement on informed consent by stating that the duty of 
physicians to disclose is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner 
would make under the same or similar circumstances. The notion of informed consent 
consequently remained a question of medical judgement in which thorough-going patient 
self-determination had no place. 
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It was only in 1972 that the doctrine of informed consent was sufficiently developed and 
pronounced in medical jurisprudence in the United States in the case of Canterbury v 
Spence.374 The plaintiff suffered from back pain and submitted to an operation without 
being informed of a risk of paralysis incidental thereto. A day after the operation he fell 
from his hospital bed when left unattended and suffered an almost immediate setback. The 
lower half of his body became paralysed and despite extensive medical care he never fully 
recovered. Years later he hobbled on crutches [sic] and also suffered from paralysis of the 
bowels and urinary incontinence. The complaint in this case stated several causes of action 
but for the purposes of this discussion the focus will only be on the defendant’s alleged 
failure to inform the plaintiff beforehand of the risk involved in the operation. As in the 
Natanson case the judgement commenced with the root premise of self-determination first 
pronounced by Judge Cardozo in the Schloendorff case.375 Judge Robinson added to this that 
“true consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options and the risks attendant upon 
each”. He elaborated that the patient’s right to self-decision is central and shapes the 
boundaries of the duty to reveal. The right to self-determination can only be exercised if the 
patient possesses enough information to enable an informed choice. The test for 
determining whether particular facts and information should therefore be disclosed is the 
materiality of the disclosure to the patient’s eventual decision. All risks potentially affecting 
the decision must therefore be disclosed.376  
 
However, Judge Robinson also recognised the role of the medical practitioner’s judgement 
in this disclosure, since the content of the disclosure rests in the first instance with the 
particular medical practitioner who is the only one in a position to decide what information 
is materially important and necessary to divulge. He stated that the focus of attention is 
more upon the nature and content of the physician’s divulgence than on the patient’s 
understanding of consent. The vital inquiry regarding the duty to disclose relates to the 
physician’s obligation to disclose; the subjective degree of the patient’s comprehension is 
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mostly secondary thereto.377 The judge concluded that it is material and necessary to 
disclose a risk or information when a reasonable person in what the physician knows or 
should know to be the patient’s position, would likely attach significance to when making an 
informed decision.378 This calls for an objective test for disclosure based on the 
reasonableness of the physician’s divulgence and not a subjective test of materiality based 
on an individual patient’s needs.379  
 
Judge Robinson furthermore addressed the ability of the medical profession to establish its 
own standards, especially the ability of making use of expert medical witnesses to establish 
the professional standard of care in respect of disclosure: “We do not agree that the 
patient’s cause of action is dependent upon the existence and non-performance of a relevant 
professional tradition.”380 Robinson here rejected the professional standard of practice in 
disclosure disputes based on respect for a patient’s right to self-determination which 
requires a standard set by law and not a standard set by the medical profession.  He 
explained that ordinary disclosure does not involve a physician’s expert knowledge and skills 
and therefore does not require a standard set by members of the medical profession (a 
medical judgement), but rather a standard set by the law. He acknowledged that non-
disclosure by itself cannot establish liability to the patient.381 An unrevealed risk must 
materialise for otherwise the omission is legally without consequence. Negligence unrelated 
to injury is non-actionable. In addition, there must be a causal relationship between the 
physician’s failure to disclose and the patient’s injury. 382 Such a causal relationship can only 
exist when disclosure of a significant risk would have resulted in a decision against running 
such risk. Since a hypothetical investigation of what the patient would have decided if the 
information/risk was disclosed would have resulted in a subjective determination, Judge 
Robinson voiced his preference for a more objective approach by  asking  what a prudent 
person in the patient’s position would have decided if suitably informed of all significant 
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perils.383 However, the non-disclosure of a material risk already violates the patient’s right 
to self-determination and autonomy, even without (or before) any injury may follow as a 
result of this non-disclosure. 
 
The doctrine of informed consent in the legal system of the United States of America, as it 
was articulated in the Canterbury case therefore required an objective reasonable patient 
test to determine what information should be disclosed to the patient. The determination of 
what information and risks a reasonable patient would have found material for the decision 
and what a reasonable physician would have disclosed is furthermore a matter to be 
decided by the courts and not by a professional standard of practice. Finally, the test for 
causation adopted in this case was also an objective test, asking what a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position would have decided if the particular information and risks had been 
divulged. 
 
In English medical law the notion of “informed consent” was not adopted with much 
enthusiasm. The first medical law case in which the phrase “informed consent” was used 
was in the case of Re D (A minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation).384 Thereafter the phrase was only 
used in explaining the English law’s rejection of this American concept. 385 It was also 
described by Kennedy and Grubb as an “unfortunate phrase and one prone to mislead”.386 
English courts prefer the concept, “real consent”. In the case of Chatterton v Gerson387 it 
was submitted that once the patient is informed in broad terms of the nature of the 
intended procedure and gives her/his consent, that consent is real. 
 
The case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee388 was heard earlier during the 
same year as the landmark Salgo case in the USA. In the former case the plaintiff sustained 
injuries during the course of electro-convulsive-therapy treatment administered at the 
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defendant’s mental hospital. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had been negligent in 
several respects, including that they had failed to inform him of the risks involved in the 
treatment and that they had not provided him with the opportunity to decide whether or 
not he was willing to take those risks. Justice McNair instructed the jury to decide whether 
the practice adopted by the defendants not to divulge any material information but only to 
answer specific questions from the plaintiff fell below the proper standard of competent 
professional opinion. With this instruction Justice McNair opted for an objective test for 
disclosure based on a medical judgement and standards set by the medical profession – a 
professional practice standard, in other words. McNair also added that should the jury find 
that proper practice does require that material information about the procedure should be 
divulged, the jury must also decide whether such disclosure would have made any 
difference in this particular case. It is clear from Justice McNair’s instructions that the 
significance of patient autonomy and self-determination in medical decision-making were 
not regarded as critical to an eventual decision. McNair’s direction to the jury in this case 
has become known as the Bolam test according to which medical practitioners are not 
negligent if they act in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a 
responsible body of medical practitioners. 389 This test championed medical paternalism and 
has been described as an outdated keepsake of a hierarchical English society.390 
 
In South Africa the doctrine of informed consent was first introduced in 1976 in the case of 
Richter and another v Estate Hammann,391 although the groundwork for the acceptance of 
this doctrine in the South African medical- and health law had been laid by the preceding 
cases reaffirming the judiciary’s commitment to patient autonomy.392 In the Richter case 
Justice Watermeyer stated that the standard of the reasonable doctor should be used to 
determine the required nature and scope of disclosure in the doctor-patient relationship. He 
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also stated that medical opinion is necessary to determine what a reasonable doctor, having 
regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, should or should not discl ose, but 
added that the court would ultimately decide on the question.393 This test proposed in the 
Richter case corresponds to the Bolam test in English law.    
 
It is clear from these early decisions on the doctrine of informed consent that the courts 
have failed to provide for real self-determination. In the Salgo and Natanson cases the 
doctor-patient relationship was framed in terms of an encounter between right-bearing 
individuals, but both these cases ended up exaggerating the physician’s authority without 
allowing for thorough-going self-determination on the part of the patient.394 In the 
Canterbury case an apparently decided commitment to self-determination at the beginning 
of the judgement got weaker as Judge Robinson moved from jurisprudential theory to the 
realities of medical practice.395  Patient autonomy and self-determination do not even 
feature in the English Bolam and the South African Richter decisions. In both of these 
instances the courts opted for a professional practice standard, reinforcing the authority of 
the medical profession in medical decision-making. All these cases rhetorically professed 
self-determination, but left considerable scope for medical paternalism.396 According to Katz 
the courts continue to deal inadequately with the concepts of patient autonomy and self-
determination because they have their doubts about patients’ decision-making capacity and 
they fear that meddling with patients’ unquestioning faith could undermine cure.397   
 
  3.4.1.2. The development of the doctrine of informed consent  
The cautious introduction of the doctrine of informed consent  to medical- and health law 
just described was followed by many inconsistent rulings, which added very little to its 
analytical development and offered no extension of either the patient’s or physician’s rights 
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and obligations.398 Some judgements reasserted faith in the capacity of medical 
practitioners to set adequate disclosure standards themselves, thereby opting for a medical 
judgement and standard of care, rather than a standard set by law.399 In the case of Collins v 
Meeker,400 for example, the court submitted that expert testimony from the medical 
profession is required to establish that disclosures were made in accordance with what is 
expected of a reasonable medical practitioner. In the case of Bly v Rhoads401 the plaintiff’s 
contention that the standard of disclosure should be determined by the patient’s need to 
know and not by the standards of the medical community, was also rejected in favour of an 
approach placing  more importance on the medical judgement – a professional disclosure 
standard.402 In Woolley v Henderson403 the court stated that since a medical practitioner is 
not an insurer of his medical interventions (a material risk standard), liability for a risk that 
was not disclosed but later materialised, can never be allowed. The court also concluded 
that legal principles designed to provide compensation to persons injured by bad 
professional practice should not unduly intrude on the intimate physician-patient 
relationship. The court believed that this would place good medical practice in jeopardy.404 
Furthermore, in Malloy v Shanahan405 the court ruled that the doctrine of informed consent 
is not applicable to therapeutic treatment. A final example is the English case of Gold v 
Haringey Health Authority.406 Here, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had been 
negligent in failing to disclose to her that the sterilisation operation which she had 
undergone had a failure rate and that its success could not be guaranteed. The defendants 
had also failed to discuss alternatives to the operation, such as a vasectomy, with her. The 
court in this case applied the Bolam test and emphasised that expert medical testimony is 
necessary to determine whether particular facts, risks and information should be 
divulged.407 
 
                                                 
398
 Katz, Jay The Silent World of Doctor and Patient Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore (2002) 80. 
399
 Katz, Jay The Silent World of Doctor and Patient Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore (2002) 80. 
400
 Collins v Meeker 424 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1967), 495. 
401
 Bly v Rhoads 222 S.E. 2d 783 (Virg. 1976). 
402
 Bly v Rhoads 222 S.E. 2d 783 (Virg. 1976), 787; Woolley v Henderson 418 A.2d 1123 (Maine 1980), 1129. 
403
 Woolley v Henderson 418 A.2d 1123 (Maine 1980), 1129. 
404
 Woolley v Henderson 418 A.2d 1123 (Maine 1980), 1131. 
405
 Malloy v Shanahan 421 A.2d 803 (Penn 1980). 
406
 Gold v Haringey Health Authority [1988] Q.B. 481 CA. 
407
 The Bolam-test was also applied in Blyth v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority HA [1993] 4 Med LR 151.  
91 
 
There were, however, other cases where the doctrine of informed consent was developed 
to provide greater protection for patient autonomy and to extend the patient’s right to self-
determination. The USA case of Scott v Bradford408 is a case in point.  The plaintiff suffered 
from fibroid tumours on her uterus. The defendant admitted her to hospital, where she 
signed a routine consent form, and the defendant then performed a hysterectomy. After the 
surgery the plaintiff experienced problems with incontinence, which is an inherent risk of 
the procedure performed by the defendant. The plaintiff’s action against the defendant was 
based on the defendant’s failure to advise her of the risks involved in the procedure and to 
inform her of available alternatives. The plaintiff maintained that if she had been properly 
informed, she would not have elected to continue with the surgery. The court applied the 
doctrine as articulated in Canterbury but also added that the objective reasonable man 
approach used in Canterbury backtracks on its own theory of self-determination and limits 
the protection granted to an injured patient. 409 The application of a reasonable man 
approach in deciding whether a patient would have declined the medical intervention based 
on the disclosed information, was therefore rejected in this case. The court thought that the 
patient’s testimony as to her reaction to a full disclosure should be accepted. Such a 
subjective approach provides greater protection of patient autonomy and self-
determination. 
 
The minority judgement of Lord Scarman in the English case Sidaway v Board of Governors 
of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital is another example of a decision 
favouring the protection of patient autonomy and the realisation of self-determination in 
medical decision-making.410 The plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries as a result of surgery 
performed by a neuro-surgeon. The plaintiff claimed that had she been properly informed of 
all the material risks inherent in this operation she would not have consented to it. The 
majority decision in this case, based on professional judgement criteria, found in favour of 
the defendants, holding that a doctor should act in accordance with a practice accepted at 
the time as proper by skilled and experienced medical practitioners. In addition, where 
there is a substantial risk of grave consequences which no reasonably prudent doctor would 
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fail to disclose without having a compelling clinical reason, the court may deem its 
disclosure to be necessary.411 Lord Diplock submitted that the Bolam test should apply to 
cases concerning disclosure and that the duty to disclose is part of a doctor’s normal duty of 
care. Lord Donaldson in turn added that the courts cannot stand idly by when the profession 
by an excess of paternalism denies patients real choice.412  
 
Of considerable significance for the present discussion, however, is the previously referred 
to minority judgement of Lord Scarman, reaffirming that the duty of a doctor to warn a 
patient is part of the duty of care and skill that the former owes the latter.  He also pointed 
out that the patient’s right to make his/her own decision regarding medical treatment is a 
basic human right protected by the common law and that the courts should not allow 
medical opinion to override the patient’s right to self-determination. He acknowledged that 
in many cases factors other than purely medical considerations may play a significant part in 
a patient’s decision-making. It should therefore be acknowledged that a doctor’s objective 
opinion and a particular patient’s needs, personal beliefs and values might not always be 
the same. Lord Scarman consequently held that an objective approach should be applied to 
determine whether all material information was divulged – if a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the information/risk. He found 
that the Bolam test is not applicable to cases concerning disclosure and consent and 
suggested that the USA doctrine of informed consent be accepted for this purpose instead. 
The majority was fearful, however, that informed consent would threaten the professional 
authority of medical practitioners and the doctrine was therefore not accepted in English 
medical law. Decisions like Scott v Bradford and Lord Scarman’s effort in Sidaway are 
unfortunately few and far between and disappear amongst the numerous contradicting 
judgements on informed consent.  
 
In South Africa however, the landmark decision in Castell v De Greef,413 about 17 years after 
the Richter case, can generally be viewed as the impetus for a paradigm shift in South 
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African medical- and health law from medical paternalism to an approach focusing on 
patient autonomy.414 The plaintiff had a history of breast cancer in her family and on 
discovery of malignant lumps in her breasts , she decided on a treatment plan that included 
a mastectomy followed by reconstructive surgery. After the reconstructive surgery the 
plaintiff experienced a discolouration of the areolae, necrosis of tissues and a discharge that 
exuded an offensive odour due to a staphylococcus aureus infection.  She suffered extreme 
pain, embarrassment, and psychological trauma and underwent numerous surgical 
procedures to rectify the damage. One of the causes of action submitted by the plaintiff was 
that the defendant neglected to inform her of the material risks and complications inherent 
in the procedure treatment plan. The plaintiff’s claim, which was based on the lack of 
informed consent, was dismissed, but the judgement nonetheless had a significant impact 
on the doctrine of informed consent in South African medical- and health law in that it 
clearly opted for patient autonomy at the expense of medical paternalism. Justice 
Ackermann held that self-determination and the rights to bodily integrity and autonomous 
moral agency are fundamental rights of each patient and that a doctor is therefore under a 
legal duty to obtain the patient’s informed consent for any medical intervention.415 He also 
stated that “the best interests of the patient” can never prevail above patient autonomy 
and self-determination.416 Informed consent requires that a patient fully appreciates the 
nature and extent of the harm or risk inherent in the intervention.417 The court also treated 
lack of informed consent as an issue of assault rather than negligence. In this case, a 
subjective patient-centred test for disclosure was used – a medical practitioner should 
disclose all information and risks that a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if 
warned of these risks, would be likely to attach significance to; or that a reasonable 
practitioner in this situation should be aware that the particular patient, if warned of these 
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risks would be likely to attach significance to.418 By opting for this subjective patient-
centered test the court clearly placed patient autonomy before traditional medical 
paternalistic beliefs and practices. The court furthermore required that the consent be 
comprehensive, meaning that informed consent requires ongoing dialogue between a 
patient and a doctor.419 It also required that the patient be supplied with relevant 
information about post-operative / treatment aspects as well as matters of significance 
after her/his discharge from hospital.420 The court also pointed out that expert medical 
evidence is necessary to determine what information about risks is material and should be 
disclosed, but that the court, and not expert evidence alone, will ultimately decide the 
question.   
 
According to Van Oosten the court in the Castell case actually introduced the patient’s right 
to self-determination or freedom of choice as a separate and distinct category of personality 
rights in South African medical- and health law.421 But true self-determination did not fully 
materialise in this landmark judgement for the development of patient autonomy and self-
determination, because the court neglected to provide guidelines for the implementation 
and application of this approach in the South African medical- and health law.422 
Furthermore, the test for disclosure in this judgement appears to be a subjective patient-
centred test, but the court did not allow thorough-going self-determination to realise. The 
starting point of the test is still the practitioner’s and not the individual patient’s 
perspective. The court actually did not apply the test it formulated, but asked whether the 
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plaintiff would have made a different decision if information about the risk had been fully 
disclosed.423  
 
In Broude v McIntosh424 the test formulated in the Castell case was implicitly accepted but 
the court failed to realise that lack of disclosure already violates a patient’s right to self-
determination, irrespective of whether it results in injury or damage.425 Carstens suggests 
that the legal uncertainty ensuing after Broude will revive the “regressive spirit of medical 
paternalism”.426 In McDonald v Wroe 427 the test as articulated in Castell was recently 
applied, the court holding that a lack of disclosure violated a plaintiff’s right to bodily 
integrity entrenched in section 12(2) of the Constitution. 428 Thus, as in English and USA law, 
the purpose and aims of this informed consent are obscured by numerous contradicting 
judgements, each opting for a different approach or standard and with courts mostly still 
believing that doctors know best.  
 
  3.4.1.3. The current status of the doctrine of informed consent  
The doctrine of informed consent is well developed in civil law countries such as France, 
Germany and Switzerland.429 In Germany the right to give informed consent (ӓrztliche 
Aufklӓrungspflicht) has long been recognised and is directly linked to a constitutionally 
entrenched guarantee of individual self-determination.430 Much of the impetus towards the 
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development of this doctrine in Germany can be traced to experiences and human rights 
violations under the Third Reich.431 Physicians are required to disclose all that a patient 
needs to know in order to decide whether to run the risks of a particular form of treatment. 
The disclosure should include the following: details about the diagnosis, proposed 
treatment, alternatives to the treatment, attendant risks and prospects of recovery.432 
Where an operation is for diagnostic purposes, is not an emergency and has no therapeutic 
goal, the doctor is still required to disclose all risks including extremely remote risks.433 For 
therapeutic operations the patient must be informed im grossen und ganzen.434 In addition, 
the disclosure must take into account each patient’s individual circumstances.435 A 
subjective standard of disclosure is therefore used.  
 
In Swiss law the starting point in informed consent cases is also the patient’s basic human 
right of autonomy and self-determination, and this principle is not reduced or limited by any 
considerations that will allow the medical profession to override the patient’s own will 
based on beneficence.436 In Japan however, the right of patients to take part in the medical 
decision-making process to a large extent remains ignored, even though the West German 
legal concept of informed consent was introduced into Japanese academic legal theory in 
1970.437 
 
In the 1992 Code of Medical Ethics, prepared by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of 
the American Medical Association, the medical profession’s standard for informed consent  
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was codified in the USA.438 According to this document the patient’s right of self-decision 
can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses enough information to make an 
intelligent choice. The physician’s obligation is to present the medical facts accurately and to 
make recommendations for the management of the medical condition in accordance with 
good medical practice. This obligation is also viewed as an ethical obl igation to assist the 
patient in making choices from the available therapeutic alternatives, consistent with good 
medical practice. This code furthermore describes informed consent as a basic social policy 
and the only two exceptions allowed are in cases of emergency where the patient is 
unconscious or otherwise incapable of consent and in risk-disclosure situations where 
disclosure will result in serious psychological harm. In addition to this code various different 
versions of the doctrine of informed consent have also been enacted in informed consent 
legislation in about 24 of the 51 USA states.439 Some examples of these statutes include the 
Wisconsin informed consent law, 440 the New York Public Health Law §2805-d,441 the Florida 
Statute Ann. §768.132(3)(a)442 and the Georgia statute.443 These statutes were created in 
response to the medical malpractice “crises” experienced in the USA between 1975 and 
1977 and generally attempt to limit the liability of medical practitioners. (See Chapter Six for 
a discussion on the consequences of the medical malpractice “crises” in the context of 
managed health care interventions.) 
 
The doctrine of informed consent was recently also codified in South African law in the 
National Health Act 61 of 2003.444 In section 6 of this act the nature and scope of 
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information that should be disclosed to a patient are provided for.445 Section 6(1) of the act 
is premised on an extensive understanding of informed consent, requiring that the diagnosis 
and alternatives to the proposed treatment be divulged as well as the risks, costs and 
consequences inherent in the procedure. Section 6(1)(a) also provides for an exception, 
namely where disclosure would be contrary to the patient’s best interests.446 Section 6(2) 
furthermore requires that this information be divulged in a language that the patient 
understands and in a manner that takes into account the patient’s level of literacy. This 
section should be read in conjunction with sections 7, 8 and 9. While section 7 of the act 
makes provision for the exceptions to the general requirement of informed consent, section 
8 provides health care users with the right to participate in decisions affecting their health, 
thereby advocating an approach of shared decision-making. The right to self-determination 
has also been extended considerably in section 8, which provides that a patient’s informed 
consent is required even though he/she has previously been treated and the necessary 
consent was obtained. The section also provides for participatory decision-making of 
individuals who cannot give the consent themselves but who can participate in the decision-
making process to a certain extent. 447 Strauss believes that these statutory requirements 
with regard to informed consent now supersede the common law in South Africa.448 Since 
the act came into effect only recently, this remains to be seen.  
 
The relevant sections in the National Health Act449 referred to above should be read 
together with section 12 of the Constitution. Section 12 affirms that everybody has the right 
to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right to security and control over 
his/her body. All patients in South Africa therefore have the right to free choice, and 
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informed consent and refusal in the health care context. 450 But autonomy is not absolute. 
Section 36 of the Constitution limits all rights in the Bill of Rights on condition that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.451 
 
In 1999/2001 a National Patients’ Rights Charter was  launched in terms of the constitutional 
mandate to set a common standard for achieving the right of access to health care services 
and as an endorsement of a human rights approach in medical practice.452 This charter 
provides “an officially sanctioned baseline standard” and “can be used as a tool of 
accountability by patients, health workers broader civil society and institutions”.453 The 
rationale for this charter was to assist in the transformation of the South African health care 
system which was described by the Minister of Health as indifferent, arrogant, negligent, in 
the business of covering up, and with total disregard for human dignity, respect and 
privacy.454 The charter recognises the doctrine of informed consent and states that: 
“Everyone has the right to be given full and accurate information about the nature of one’s 
illnesses, diagnostic procedures, the proposed treatment and the costs involved for one to 
make a decision that affects any one of these elements”. But no reported cases have 
referred to this charter. The provisions of both the National Health Act as well as the 
Patient’s Charter accord with the constitutional values and principles, specifically the right 
to bodily integrity in section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution as well as the right of access to 
information in section 32.455 
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The National Patients’ Rights Charter can be compared to the New Zealand Code of Health 
and Disability Consumers’ Rights (1996) in terms of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
Act of 1994.456 The code and the act set out consumers’ rights and impose obligations 
relevant to the doctor-patient relationship. Clause 1 of the code, for example, provides that 
every provider should take action to inform consumers of their rights and enable consumers 
to exercise these rights.457 An enormous range of providers, situations and activities are 
covered by the code which together with the act have the effect of creating a new form of 
civil liability.458 The code is also widely available and providers are required to bring its 
content to the notice of consumers.459 One of the functions of the code and the act is to 
promote, educate and market relevant particulars regarding informed consent to all 
consumers of health care services.460 The code also attempts to strike a fair balance 
between the sometimes conflicting interests of the providers and users of health care 
services.461 However, the main differences between the New Zealand Code and the South 
African National Patients’ Rights Charter as well as the United Kingdom Patient’s Cha rter is 
that the New Zealand Code is enacted as law and accompanied by the statutory structure of 
the New Zealand Code of Rights, while the same is not true of the South African and UK 
Charters.462 
 
Although no judgement on informed consent has been handed down since the enactment 
of the National Health Act, both of the most recent cases in South African medical law, 
McDonald v Wroe463 and Louwrens v Oldwage,464 did not pay any attention to the National 
Patient’s Charter nor to the provisions of the National Health Act (then bill). In the case of 
Louwrens v Oldwage the subjective patient-centred test for disclosure was accepted in the 
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court a quo but the court of appeal by contrast applied the dictum from the Richter case 
which required a professional standard for disclosure.465 This is problematic since these two 
opposing tests can obviously not co-exist in South African medical- and health law. It is also 
regrettable that the Supreme Court of Appeal did not make use of the opportunity to 
develop the doctrine of informed consent to provide certainty regarding the required 
standards and application of a more patient-centred approach.466 
 
Real protection for self-determination in medical decision-making has not yet materialised 
in the USA and the majority of states still adhere to the professional practice standard.467 
However, the relatively recent and controversial case of Arato v Avedon468 is noteworthy. 
The plaintiffs (the widow and children of a pancreatic cancer victim) claimed for the 
physician’s failure to disclose information concerning the statistical life expectancy of 
pancreatic cancer patients. They claimed that due to this failure to disclose such information 
the physician consequently failed to obtain the patient’s informed consent. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the patient would not have consented to the treatme nt if all material 
information had been disclosed and that the patient would have averted the economic 
losses that resulted from his failure to put his business and financial affairs in order. 
Although the court acknowledged a patient-centred standard for disclosure, the court also 
held that the disclosure of information beyond that i mplicated by the risks of death or 
serious harm and the potential complications from the treatment, should be defined by a 
professional standard and that in specific cases expert testimony is essential to determine 
the standard of disclosure.469 It was also accepted in the court a quo that in cases like these, 
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the primary duty of a physician is to do what is best for his/her patient. 470 Although Justice 
Hanssen in the case of Scaria v St Paul Fire and Marine Ins Co471 (USA) submitted that the 
rights of a patient and the duties of a physician are standards recognised and circumscribed 
by the law and are not entirely dependent upon self-created customs of the profession, he 
concluded in his dissenting judgement that he still had more confidence in the standards of 
the professional group involved than in a court deciding what disclosures needed or ought 
to be made. “Children play at the game of being a doctor, but judges and juries ought not 
to”.472  
 
The decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority473 is regarded by some as the death knell of the Bolam test in English law.474 This 
case did not deal with the duty to inform but rather the quantum of care expected from a 
doctor. In this case it was reaffirmed that the content of the duty of care is determined by 
the courts whilst mindful of technical medical matters for which expert medical testimony 
from a responsible medical body may be necessary, but the Bolam test was also modified by 
requiring that the medical testimony or opinion should be capable of withstanding logical 
analysis. The current orthodox position in English law with regard to the standard of 
disclosure can also be found in the case of Pearce v United Bristol Health Care HNS Trust475 
where a broader patient-centred approach was embraced. 476 In this case Lord Woolf held 
that a medical practitioner should normally inform a patient of the relevant risks involved in 
order for the patient to make an informed decision. This test was furthermore also applied 
in Chester v Afshar,477 a case in which the court of appeal described the doctrine of 
informed consent as onerous.478 In this case the English law with regard to informed 
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consent was developed further. The court gave due recognition to the aim of the doctrine of 
informed consent to protect patient autonomy and choice.479  In his majority judgment Lord 
Steyn elaborated on this aim and held that patient autonomy should always be the starting 
point in situations of disclosure and obtaining consent. 480 Although all rights are not equal, 
he believed that a patient’s right to receive appropriate warning required effective 
protection where possible.481 Lord Steyn emphasised that the doctrine of informed consent 
does not only assist in avoiding injury for which the patient is not prepared, but that this 
doctrine also has another purpose; it respects the autonomy and dignity of each patient.482 
The court furthermore established that the judiciary has the ultimate say and the medical 
profession is not the final arbiter of the required standard for disclosure.483 Although the 
court did not embrace an absolutely subjective patient-centred standard, it did recognise 
that various considerations will influence a patient’s decision. 
 
As in the USA, the focus on patient autonomy and self-determination suffered due to 
numerous contradicting judgements. The Bolam test furthermore does not seek to achieve a 
fair balance between the sometimes conflicting interests of the health care providers and 
the users of health care services, and standards of disclosure are preferably left to the 
medical profession to determine.484 An analysis of English case law shows that relatively 
little emphasis is placed on the fact that other medical alternatives should also be disclosed 
and discussed with patients.485 According to Teff, the legal characteristics of the doctor-
patient relationship in England are shaped by a judiciary generally well -disposed towards 
                                                 
479
 Thomas, Rhiannon Where to from Castell  v De Greef? Lessons from recent developments in South Africa 
and abroad regarding consent to treatment and the standard of disclosure South African Law Journal (2007) 
188- 215, 200. 
480
 Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All  ER 552, 594 para 16. 
481
 Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All  ER 552, 594 para 17. 
482
 Chester v  Afshar [2002] 3 All  ER 552, 594 para 18; Thomas, Rhiannon Where to from Castell  v De Greef? 
Lessons from recent developments in South Africa and abroad regarding consent to treatment and the 
standard of disclosure South African Law Journal (2007) 188- 215, 200. 
483
 Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All  ER 552, 593 para 14. 
484
 Skegg, P.D.G. English medical law and ‘Informed Consent’: An Antipodean Assessment and Alternative 
Medical Law Review Vol 7 (1999) 135 – 165, 148.   
485
 Skegg, P.D.G. English medical law and ‘Informed Consent’: An Antipodean Assessment and Alternative 
Medical Law Review Vol 7 (1999) 135 – 165, 148 - 149.  
104 
 
the medical profession.486 Consequently, while the rate of medical malpractice litigation in 
the USA is excessive, the rate in Britain is too low to be realistic. 
 
3.5. An evaluation of medical decision-making and the doctor-patient relationship 
It is clear from the discussion above that patient autonomy and self-determination 
dominate the rhetoric in the law regarding medical decision-making, but they are definitely 
not being served by the law. The law, and especially case law, still fails to deliver on its 
promise of patient-centred decision-making and patients’ freedom of choice, and is not 
effective in addressing the power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship.487 
Furthermore, the conflict between autonomy and beneficence still remains, since patients 
seek medical assistance not merely to exercise their right to self-determination but also to 
ask medical practitioners to act for their benefit; based on their expert knowledge and skill 
and during times when patients are vulnerable and generally uninformed of matters relating 
to medical science.488   
 
Although it is seems as if very little has changed since the Salgo case first introduced the 
doctrine of informed consent, according to Katz this lack of progress should not be viewed 
as failure. It will take much more time and effort to change a 2500 year old tradition of 
silence.489 However, Katz believes that those who look for evidence of committed 
implementation of patient self-determination and autonomy will be sadly disappointed, as 
the doctrine of informed consent can merely be regarded as an inspiration of patient’s 
rights, autonomy and self-determination at common law.490 The words of Justice 
Frankfurter can furthermore be applied to the current status of this doctrine: “…it is an 
excellent illustration of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase 
begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon 
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establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes 
contradictory ideas”.491  
 
The reason for this lack of development and progress in the law of informed consent as well 
as the perceived ambiguity of the doctrine is generally due to the diverse perceptions that 
surround it. To illustrate this, it is useful to distinguish between three different perceptions 
of the informed consent doctrine. The first perception is the ideal, true doctrine in service of 
real patient autonomy and self-determination. The second perception is the doctrine as it is 
imagined, feared and often caricatured by some members of the medical profession who 
believe that the ultimate outcome of this doctrine is the de-professionalisation of the 
medical profession. Some also fear that the doctrine of informed consent will open the 
floodgates to medical negligence cases. However, this fear is definitely unfounded and in no 
jurisdiction where the doctrine of informed consent has been accepted, either at common 
law level or in statute law, can it be proven that the incidence of medical negligence cases 
has increased. The USA state of Kentucky is an ironic example of this. No plaintiff has ever 
succeeded with a common law action based on informed consent, as the main goal of the 
Kentucky statute is in fact to minimise a plaintiff’s chances of success in light of the USA 
medical malpractice crises.492 The final perception of this doctrine is a consequence of the 
gap between the first two perceptions and it pertains to the doctrine as it is actually 
practiced by clinicians – the doctrine in action.493 These different perceptions of this 
doctrine are partially responsible for the numerous contradicting judgements on informed 
consent and the lack of agreement on the standards that should apply.  
 
In addition, those who have commented on the doctrine can be divided into two camps. The 
idealists advocate a relatively expanded conception of patients’ rights and physicians’ 
obligations. Idealists emphasise the qualitative dimension of the doctor-patient interactions 
and argue for a subjective patient-centred approach.494 The realists are usually medical 
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professionals and they doubt whether patients really desire the kind of dialogue proposed 
by the doctrine. They also question the alleged gains of this doctrine — autonomy and self-
determination — and lastly, they emphasise the impracticality of the doctrine. 495 The 
perceptions and comments on informed consent which are relevant for the aims and 
purposes of this research, will now be discussed, with specific focus on the value of 
informed consent in addressing power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship.  
 
3.5.1. Standards of disclosure 
 Clearly, the doctrine of informed consent is currently not effective in ensuring patient 
autonomy and self-determination in medical decision-making. The first weakness of the 
doctrine pertains to uncertainty regarding the appropriate standard or test that should be 
used for determining what information concerning risks should be disclosed. Few 
jurisdictions agree on the standard or test for disclosure, and even within a particular 
jurisdiction various contradicting judgements exist. Generally, three standards of disclosure 
can be identified: The professional practice standard uses the customary practices of the 
medical professional community to determine what information should be disclosed. The 
standard therefore appeals to the profession’s technical skill and competence. According to 
this standard, disclosure and treatment are functions that belong to the medical profession 
by virtue of its professional expertise, role and commitment. 496 This is not a reliable 
standard, however, since physicians’ technical judgements are often infused with values 
traditionally considered to be central to medical practice, such as the principle of 
beneficence and the commitment to clinical freedom. 497 Their judgements will also be 
coloured by personal beliefs and values and this standard in the main also reflects a 
philosophy of paternalism and is tantamount to denying the patient’s right to self-
determination.498 The professional practice standard furthermore assumes that all medical 
decisions require technical expertise and that there is a certain degree of professional 
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agreement on what should be disclosed and what not. 499 The professional practice standard 
was used in the cases of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,500  Richter and 
another v Estate Hammann,501 Louwrens v Oldwage 502  and the test is currently used in the 
informed consent statutes of most USA states.503  
 
The reasonable person/patient standard requires that the information and risks which a 
reasonable person would find significant in making his/her decision be disclosed. This 
objective test is the default position employed by the judiciary to strike a balance between 
medical paternalism and patient autonomy and self-determination. The test was used in 
Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees,504 Natanson v Kline,505 Canterbury v 
Spence,506 as well as the Canadian case Reibl v Hughes.507 The trial judge in this last case 
held that the duty to disclose arises primarily from the special relationship between 
physician and patient. The test established in this case is based on what a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position would want to know, coupled with another objective test for 
causation – whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would have consented to 
the treatment had the information been disclosed. This case rejected the paternalistic 
approach in determining what should be disclosed and emphasised a patient’s right to 
know. But, by using an objective test, it also helped to ensure that the medical system 
would enjoy protection against liability claims while accommodating a reasonable patient’s 
concerns and needs.508   
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In the Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker509 the reasonable patient standard was also 
used. The patient, who was almost blind in one of her eyes, consented to an operation in 
order to improve her eyesight. Although the patient questioned the surgeon on the possible 
complications she did not enquire whether the operation could adversely affect her other 
eye. The surgeon also did not offer any information on this , even though there was a 1 in 14 
000 chance of sympathetic ophthalmia occurring. This risk was furthermore slightly higher in 
this patient’s case since the eye to be operated on had previously been injured by 
penetration. Though the operation was conducted with the required skill and care, the 
patient did develop sympathetic ophthalmia and became almost completely blind after one 
year. In this case, the court found that the failure to disclose the risk constituted a breach of 
the duty of care.510 The court repudiated the Bolam test and submitted that it is for the 
courts to adjudicate on what is the appropriate standard of care.511 As to what information 
and risks should be divulged Justice Gaudron also stated that this is not a matter exclusively 
within the province of medical knowledge and expertise but often simple commonsense.512 
In this case the Canterbury test was used, namely whether a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position would have attached significance to the information/risk. This reasonable 
patient test was reaffirmed in the cases of Chappel v Hart513 as well as Rosenberg v 
Percival.514 However, the reasonable patient standard is unrepresentative of the vast 
numbers of individuals who have varying levels of experience and knowledge using different 
levels of health care services. This is especially problematic in a country like South Africa 
were a great discrepancy between public and private health care exists, where  the 
differences between public and private health care services are vast,  and the population 
also represents a vast  number of individuals with varying levels of education, literacy and 
access to health care services.515 The test fails to protect a particular patient’s right to self-
determination since every patient has the right to be his/her own self, even though the 
                                                 
509
 Rogers v Whitaker 175 CLR 479 [1992]. 
510
 Teff, Harvey Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the Doctor-patient Relationship Clarendon Press Oxford 
(1994) 222. 
511
 Rogers v Whitaker 175 CLR 479 [1992], 484. 
512
 Rogers v Whitaker 175 CLR 479 [1992], 493. 
513
 Chappel v Hart (1998) 72 ALJR 1344, *1999+ Lloyd’s Rep Med 223, Aust HC.  
514
 Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18. 
515
 See the Canadian case of Ciarlariello v Schacter [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119 for an example of the requirement that 
information should be disclosed to a patient in a language which the patient understands. 
109 
 
patient may be wrong, unreasonable or irrational in the medical practitioner’s eyes.516 The 
test may cause the informed consent process to be compromised in public health care due 
to a lack of infrastructure and resources.517 This test also does not allow for real self-
determination in medical decision-making.  
 
The subjective personal standard, which has been adopted in Germany and Switzerland, 
refers to the particular patient’s personal need for information and what information such a 
patient would consider significant.518 It was introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when the courts held that the reasonable patient standard does not live up to the ideals of 
patient autonomy.519 The subjective patient standard was used in Scott v Bradford,520 Castell 
v De Greef,521 Broude v McIntosh and others522 and Arato v Avedon.523 The standard is 
mainly criticised for the suspect nature of the testimony given by injured and bitter patients 
with the benefit of hindsight.524 It is also suggested that this standard is out of step with 
standards of liability in other areas of the law and that it places an unfair burden on medical 
practitioners since they are expected to read each patient’s mind.525 However, it can be 
argued that the relationship between a doctor and patient is a very intimate relationship 
and it should therefore generally be possible for medical practitioners to assess the amount 
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and quality of information patients need.526 English courts in particular are hesitant to 
include subjective considerations, since they do not want to open the proverbial floodgates  
of malpractise actions, place too heavy a burden on medical practitioners, require doctors 
to second-guess their patients and finally, because it is difficult to quantify these types of 
claims.527 
 
In most of the cases discussed an objective test was allowed to determine what information 
is material for the patient’s decision rather than a subjective test based on what an 
individual patient would have considered a significant risk. However, an objective test limits 
the role and importance of autonomy and self-determination in the doctor-patient 
relationship. While the courts tried to strike a balance between physician paternalism and 
patient sovereignty by requiring a reasonable patient as the standard, this objective 
standard for disclosure actually contradicts each individual ’s right to decide what will be 
done to his/her body, since there is no one reasonable response for every situation. 528 This 
objective test also contradicts the aim of the doctrine, to preserve individual choice. While 
accepting that to ascertain a patient’s informational needs is very difficult and that it is an 
art that needs to be learned, it must be remembered that the aim of the doctrine of 
informed consent is not to encourage uniform medical treatment. 529 And since there is no 
custom reflecting a consensus on the communication of information and risk, exactly how 
this art of ascertaining each individual patient’s information needs can be learned remains 
uncertain.530 It is for this reason that Katz submits that the medical judgement necessary to 
ascertain what information should be divulged and what information is material to the 
specific patient’s needs and decisions (the objective test) actually allows the medical 
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practitioner’s own subjectivity to determine the extent of the disclosure.531 The strongest 
consideration should rather be the patient’s right to self-determination, a right independent 
of medical custom and practice. 532  
 
While courts should guard against returning to the older reasonable doctor test and the 
current duty to disclose should be expanded, an absolutely subjective test is also not 
advisable.533 In the Canadian case of Arndt v Smith534 Justice Cory held that neither a purely 
objective nor a subjective test could ensure a reasonable balance of the underlying values in 
medical decision-making. While an objective test would unduly favour the medical 
profession, a completely subjective test would place an unfair burden on physicians. The 
test of Reibl was consequently applied but extended to require that the particular concerns 
and special considerations affecting the specific patient must also be divulged.535 Canadian 
jurisprudence therefore allows for the consideration of a patient’s particular concerns as 
well as any special considerations that might affect the patient. 536  
Thomas suggests a more precise and appropriate standard for disclosure in South Africa: 
“Recognising the importance of the rights to dignity and bodily integrity, the duty of 
disclosure requires that the patient must be informed of the material risks and benefits 
as well as any other special or unusual risks and benefits that the particular patient 
would have considered material. In determining which risks and benefits the patient 
would have considered material, the medical practitioner should have regard to the 
particular patient’s concerns, that is, those that the patient volunteered and those 
discovered through questioning. The patient must also be apprised of the alternatives, 
with their risks and benefits, and the costs involved. The risks to the particular patient 
of sustaining the injuries, the inherent risks of injury that arise from rare and random 
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causes in every surgical procedure, those unavoidable risks that cannot be eliminated 
by the exercise of reasonable care and those risks, though slight, with serious 
consequences, such as death or paralysis, should also be disclosed. The duty should 
begin when the patient walks into the consulting room and end when the whole course 
of treatment is complete”.537 
 
 3.5.2. Historical attributes 
A second weakness of the current doctrine of informed consent stems from the historical 
attributes that are attached to both the sick role and the physician’s role in the doctor-
patient relationship. While informed consent was a desirable goal in all the cases discussed, 
pragmatic considerations made the full realisation of self-determination in the doctor-
patient relationship nearly impossible.538 This was generally due to the attributes of both 
the sick role and the physician’s role as explained by Talcott Pa rsons in his social role 
theory.539 (See Chapter Two, section 2.2.2.) It is also clear from the discussion on informed 
consent that the legal doctrine and its commitment to self-determination and shared 
decision-making challenges this core of professionalism, the power and authority physicians 
have based on their expert knowledge and experience. The allowance of such paternalistic 
attitudes, based on the historical attributes attached to doctor and patient in the doctor-
patient relationship, is unwarranted for the following two reasons: It prejudices the sick by 
implying that they are not fully autonomous; and secondly, the medical professional’s 
expert knowledge and skill are elevated to include the ethical qualifications and the 
prerogative to decide on behalf of others.540  
 
Katz proposes that more attention should be given to these historical attributes and 
specifically the sick role and physician’s role in the doctor-patient relationship, as described 
by Parsons.541 An exploration of these complex roles and interaction of caretaking and 
being-taken-care-of can shed light on the nature and quality of the process, which can then 
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be translated into meaningful legal and medical prescriptions based on mutual trust and 
respect.542 The basis of the doctrine should also be that physicians have a legal, ethical and 
moral duty to respect patient autonomy.543 And in addition to their duty to disclose all 
material information, physicians also need to respect patient choice and the right to self-
determination.  
 
3.5.3. Practical considerations  
The application of the doctrine of informed consent was the very first attempt of the 
judiciary to get involved in and comment on medical decision-making. Unfortunately this 
attempt initially had very little effect.544 The courts relied on this doctrine to try and 
encourage shared decision-making, but most judges did not realise how deeply rooted the 
traditional approach to health service delivery was.545 In some informed consent cases it 
was held that the doctrine served the value of patient autonomy,546 while other cases 
explicitly excoriated paternalism.547 There are strong reasons to suspect that informed 
consent is honoured in the breach but almost impossible to enforce in practice and that the 
traditional paternalistic approach to medical decision-making consequently prevails.548  
 
Social science evidence demonstrates that informed consent in action is often ritualistic, 
formalistic and hollow.549 For example, medical practitioners who are currently taught that 
autonomy is the dominant value in doctor-patient communication now act in a more 
passive manner. Some provide patients with a full range of choices but do not give 
recommendations, or their own opinion, fearing that they may overstep the mark in the 
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decision-making process.550 Others make use of various other mechanisms, including non-
disclosure and persuasive tactics to ensure that their patients make the decision they want 
them to make.551 These examples make a mockery of what patient autonomy in medical- 
and health law should involve. Clearly, the commitment to autonomy needs to be rethought 
without returning to unbridled paternalism and giving medical practitioners authority that 
exceeds their expertise.552   
 
The cases pertaining to informed consent that reach the courts are furthermore believed to 
be just the tip of the iceberg. It can be argued that neither the medical profession nor the 
judiciary has fully realized the actual problem regarding consent and informed decision-
making in medical practice.553 In this regard it must be noted that South Africa is largely a 
non-litigious society since litigation is very expensive and certainly beyond the means of the 
ordinary person.554 In developing countries like South Africa, with eleven official languages 
and a great diversity of cultures and customs, medical practitioners are not always able to 
communicate with patients in their first language, nor do they always understand and 
support patients with differing customs and beliefs about sickness and healing . 
Furthermore, they tend to have a highly paternalistic approach towards those who are 
illiterate or have a low level of education. 555 Nevertheless, surveys and empirical research 
indicate that medical practitioners are now more careful about obtaining consent and most 
say that they also provide more information to patients than before. Unfortunately, these 
actions do not necessarily improve the quality of patient decision-making. 556  
 
On the other hand, medical practitioners complain that informed consent wastes valuable 
time and is impracticable and unnecessary; patients are unable to understand the technical 
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complexities; doctors’ ethical duty to heal ranks above a legal duty to inform; the doctrine 
undermines the trust which patients should have for their physicians and consequently has 
an adverse effect on the doctor-patient relationship; it requires the disclosure of risks which 
if known to the patient may lead to a psychologically self-fulfilling prophecy; the disclosure 
may frighten the patient from undergoing necessary treatments ; the goal of disclosure is 
illusionary since it is possible for medical practitioners to disclose information in such a way 
as to ensure that the patient agrees to the treatment; and in some instances the patients 
have already made up their minds and the disclosure does not change their decision.557 In 
addition Shuck identifies the following three impediments to the implementation of 
informed consent: first, most doctor-patient interactions are perfunctory and reinforce 
physician control; second, the clinical setting of medical practice discourages the meaningful 
exchange of information; and third, the nature of the legal system (as the discussion on the 
case law illustrates) makes it difficult for patients to establish an effective legal claim.558  
 
Regarding this last impediment it must also be noted that non-disclosure of a material risk 
violates the patient’s right to self-determination and autonomy even without (or before) 
any injury following as a result of this non-disclosure However, under the doctrine of 
informed consent the only kind of injury that can constitute a compensable harm is an 
adverse medical outcome.559 The principles of the applicable law of delict require that the 
undisclosed risk must materialise and cause the patient harm in order to establish liability 
and for a claim to realise.560 The patient must also prove that the lack of informed consent 
was the cause of the adverse medical outcome. 561 There are many intricate elements which 
must be proven in order to establish legal liability, among them, the standards of disclosure, 
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wrongfulness and causation.562 According to Carstens and Van Oosten it is inherently 
incorrect that the risk or injury must first mate rialise and causation be proven since in these 
cases the violation is against the patient’s physical integrity, dignity and privacy, rather than 
against his/her health.563 This is also in line with the general spirit of the South African 
Constitution and should be seen as an infringement of a person’s right to bodily integrity, 
entrenched in section 12(2)(b). While the court in Castell accepted this reasoning and 
granted compensation (in the form of a solatium) by way of the actio iniuriarum for the 
infringement of bodily integrity (irrespective of whether the plaintiff suffered physical 
injury), the supreme court of appeal in the case of Broude v McIntosh found this way of 
pleading “conceptually odd” and held that it be re-examined when an appropriate case 
arose.564 This is unfortunate since the doctrine would be much more effective if 
compensation were measured by the interests that are really affected, the patient’s 
autonomy and the right to self-determination. Waddam also believes that if moderate sums 
for such actions were awarded this would be welcomed by the medical profession since the 
approach would be predictable, it would facilitate settlements and it would distinguish 
between negligence in the consulting room and in the operating room.565  
 
3.5.4. The efficiency of the doctrine of informed consent  
The most important shortcoming of the current doctrine of informed consent is that it does 
not succeed in its aim to protect patient autonomy and self-determination in medical 
decision-making.566 It consequently does not provide efficient relief to address the extensive 
power and authority medical practitioners have in the doctor-patient relationship and does 
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not allow for rational and participatory medical decision-making. As Judge Brown in the case 
of Pratt v Davis stated, the right to the inviolability of one’s person is the most important 
right of all.567 This right is the subject of universal acquiescence and although both the 
physician and patient share the same interest — the patient’s health — such shared interest 
does not allow for an implied acquiescence in anything the medical practitioner may decide 
on to reach this common goal. Although the doctrine of informed consent promises to 
protect patient autonomy and self-determination in medical decision-making, it certainly 
does not deliver adequately on this promise within the wider context of an emerging 
appreciation of basic human rights and human dignity.568  
 
However, some argue that the failed practical consequences of this doctrine are not that 
important and that irrespective of how poorly it achieves its goals, the value of autonomy 
and self-determination which it aims to promote is paramount, while the costs involved in 
achieving this are de minimis.569 In other words if the consequence of the doctrine of 
informed consent, irrespective of whether it is successful in its aim or not, is to raise the 
medical profession’s consciousness about the need to fully inform patients , then the law has 
been successful in this instance and the inherent inequality in power between the 
professional provider and vulnerable patient has been redressed.570 In the Rosenberg case 
for example Justice Kirby stated that the obligation of the physician to disclose all relevant 
and material information and risks may even out the power imbalances inherent in the 
doctor-patient relationship. He also expressed the view that rigorous legal standards, like 
the doctrine of informed consent, may bring about change in medical practice. According to 
this reasoning informed consent is an ideal to which daily practice can only aspire but will 
never fully reach.571 This argument is inherently flawed and in essence paternalistic. 
Autonomy and self-determination cannot remain idealistic values, but have to be realised in 
accordance with the fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights , especially as set out in sections 
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10 and 12. Autonomy and self-determination should be the primary point of reference in 
medical decision-making.  
 
 3.5.5. Recommendations 
Brenner suggests that the following three principles should govern medical decision-making: 
first, the paternalistic approach to medical decision-making should be rejected; second, the 
altruistic ethic of medical professionals should be endorsed and, third, patient autonomy 
should be actualised through reassurance and mutual participation in the decision-making 
process.572 Based on the analysis and suggestions in this chapter so far, as well as Brenner’s 
suggestions, further recommendations can be made to:  
• address the power imbalance identified in this chapter;  
• address the identified weaknesses of the doctrine of informed consent; and  
• propose a new approach to disclosure and consent which will ensure that patient 
autonomy is protected and self-determination is realised in medical decision-
making.  
Clearly, a new doctrine of informed consent with a different standard of disclosure or an 
altogether different point of view is not suggested. The recommendations are based on the 
underlying values of patient autonomy, dignity and self-determination, with due cognisance 
of the principle of beneficence, and in line with the constitutional principles and values.  
 In the first instance the protection of patient autonomy and self-determination, and the 
assurance that patients will still receive the maximum benefit from professional expertise 
and guidance can only be achieved with a more honest relationship between doctor and 
patient. In other words, a moral573 relationship built on trust, equality and respect.574 The 
doctor-patient relationship is a moral relationship for four reasons: 
• the patient’s reliance on the doctor’s competence, morality and compassion; 
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• the holistic, caretaker-like character of the medical decisions made by doctors; 
• society’s investment of faith in medicine; and  
• the personal commitment and advocacy that patients expect from their doctors.575 
Trust in this context can be defined as individual’s expectations that certain other 
individuals or institutions will meet their responsibilities.576 In this sense trust and respect 
are synonymous with autonomy, although the focus is changed. Trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship cannot refer to blind faith in, and unquestioned submission to, the physician’s 
authority. Patients should be considered as thinking, willing, active beings, taking 
responsibility for their own choices and able to explain them by reference to their own ideas 
and purposes. The doctor-patient relationship can furthermore be regarded as a moral 
phenomenon that imposes collective responsibilities on physicians based on the following 
three attributes of medical practice: first, the nature of illness; second, the non-proprietary 
nature of medical knowledge; and third, the nature and circumstances of medical ethics.577 
Physicians should respect and trust their patients, and as a result do what is best for 
patients within the limits of their expertise, valuing their patients’ interest and 
acknowledging their patients’ autonomy and right to self-determination.578 Although 
autonomy is still placed first, beneficent components may be added to, and constrained by, 
respect for this patient autonomy. Put in another way, the physician’s duties are not 
founded in the principle of beneficence but rather in the correlative rights of patients.579 
According to this perspective, physicians’ altruism is based on patients’ autonomy and when 
physicians therefore act in a beneficent manner, patients’ autonomy will not necessarily be 
diminished.580  
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Such a humanised relationship between doctor and patient will reinforce patients’ 
confidence in physicians and will also reinforce the authority of the medical profession, 
while improving the quality of both patients’ and physicians’ treatment decisions.581 This 
new relationship can, however, only exist if physicians learn how to communicate effectively 
with their patients and how to assess whether their patients’ informational needs have 
been satisfied.582 It is clear from the case law discussed in this chapter that disclosure of 
particular warnings and risks by one party in the relationship, as the current doctrine of 
informed consent requires, does not allow for active participation but actually cosigns 
patient participation in decision-making to an unacceptable passive role, which does not 
assist in establishing meaningful communication and consent. 583 Reform is therefore 
necessary since autonomous decisions require a two-way conversation. Information in this 
context can therefore only be meaningful if patients are active participants in the decision-
making process.584 Such a social ethic of participation in the decision-making process will go 
beyond the liberal ethic of autonomy and will also validate patients’ views, obviate a 
paternalistic stance towards patients, and improve treatment decisions.585  
 
However, many still believe in the supremacy of professional knowledge inherent in the 
principle of beneficent paternalism and may regard shared decision-making as de-
professionalising the medical profession.586 Traditional professional notions of trust and 
respect are also based on a paternalistic model which calls for patients’ absolute and 
unquestioning trust in their physicians and medical professionals in general. A new 
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understanding of trust and respect in the doctor-patient relationship is therefore necessary 
and should be based on the following assumptions:  
• there is no single right decision for dealing with health and illness;  
• both physicians and patients bring their own vulnerabilities to the decision-making 
process;  
• both physicians and patients should relate to one another as equals and unequals 
(physicians have expert medical knowledge and patients know what their specif ic 
needs and personal beliefs are); and  
• all human conduct is influenced by rational and irrational expectations.587  
By being aware of these assumptions in the medical decision-making process patients will 
receive the maximum professional benefit from medical practitioners, while the main focus 
remains on patient autonomy. It will rid the law of fiction, reduce opportunities for abuse of 
patients, promote people’s actual desires, foster good medical care and give society the 
benefits it deserves in exchange for the support it provides to professionals.588 It will also 
ensure that a higher quality of therapeutic success is achieved and the quality of medical 
decisions will improve.589 It has been suggested that shared decision-making will enable 
patients to survive, heal or otherwise improve their health. 590 However, it must be 
remembered that the therapeutic gains to be achieved from the practice of informed 
consent cannot be the aim for or justification of this doctrine. These consequences are 
secondary to the purpose of giving the necessary significance to autonomy  and self-
determination in medical decision-making. To argue that a patient’s welfare will be 
maximised by shared decision-making will allow for justification based on the principles of 
beneficence and will not give the necessary and required consideration to patient autonomy 
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and self-determination.591 Thus, the core value of informed consent must constantly be 
reviewed and defended, even at the risk of triteness.592  
 
Secondly, it is evident that the courts place too great an emphasis on consent while paying 
relatively little attention to the quality of choice and the extent to which patients’ decisions 
made exhibit understanding.593 In essence, informed consent suggests more than a 
notification. It suggests a process of deliberation and understanding. The aim of this 
doctrine must be served and in the absence of patient comprehension individual choice 
cannot be preserved.594 It has even been suggested that the doctrine of informed consent 
should rather be referred to as informed choice or informed decision-making, since the 
suggested expressions better reflect the underlying notion of autonomy based on 
knowledge and appreciation.595 An emphasis on informed choice will not only focus on what 
information is disclosed but also how, when and by whom the information is disclosed.   
 
In this sense the rebuilding of patient autonomy and self-determination in medical decision-
making is actually the responsibility of the medical profession as well as that of the 
judiciary.596 However, physicians’ apprehension of and resistance to breaking with the 2500 
year old tradition and practices of the medical paternalistic approach will be the major 
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obstacle in the change of medical decision-making.597 Katz suggests that this resistance is 
due partly to a reluctance to depart from their familiar practices but also their concern that 
shared decision-making will reveal vexing problems about the state of the art and science of 
medicine.598 Although a degree of empathy with the medical profession is not out of place, 
action is now necessary, action that goes beyond symbolic gestures and provides guidance 
on how to translate rhetoric into practice. 599 The current doctrine of informed consent can 
be described as “a charade, a symbolic but contentless formality” and it does not give true 
meaning to patient autonomy and self-determination in medical decision-making.600 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The paternalistic approach in medical decision-making has been accurately described as a 
sad tale of high hopes, good intentions, dashed expectations, much anguish and ensuing 
recriminations.601 Clearly, there is no place for medical paternalism in either the medical 
profession and doctor-patient relationship or medical- and health law, not even if it is 
thought to be in the name of the patient’s best interests.602 “Paternalism was more 
appropriate to a by-gone age when the population were presumed to be uneducated and 
therefore incapable of playing an equal role in the doctor-patient relationship. Such a view 
has no foundations in our present society and consequently does not have any right to be 
reflected in our legal system”.603 Patient autonomy and self-determination are values 
fundamental to the Constitution and the general rights-based approach in South Africa. The 
medical paternalistic practices and justifications for the limitation of this basic human right 
are therefore intolerable. In the case of Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v 
Walters Judge Kriegler observed that “…the rights to life, to human dignity and to bodily 
integrity are individually essential and collectively foundational to the value system 
prescribed by the Constitution. Compromise them and the society to which we aspire 
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becomes illusory. It therefore follows that any significant limitation of any of these rights 
would for its justification demand a very compelling countervailing public interest”.604 
 
The current doctrine of informed consent, as applied by our courts, is monolithic and needs 
to be refined in order to be more sensitive to the intricacies of the distinctive doctor-patient 
relationship and to be more context specific with due regard to the unique attributes and 
needs of the health care setting.605 It also needs to be remembered that informed consent is 
a normative variable; a doctrine that treats all physicians and patients the same although 
they are not, exacts a price.606 In section 3.3. of this chapter it was shown that the power 
imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship ultimately result from the conflict between 
patient autonomy and medical paternalism. It is quite clear from the discussion above that 
both the value of patient autonomy and self-determination as well as practices based on a 
medical paternalistic approach (which require of physicians to make moral judgements 
instead of medical judgements) cannot co-exist in a doctor-patient relationship. However, 
the functional specificity of medical practitioners, the basic tenets of the medical profession 
and the realities of medical practice can also not be ignored. An exaggerated focus on one of 
these concepts will have dire consequences for both the quality of care patients can expect 
as well as the functional specificity of the medical profession. Balance is therefore key.    
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PART B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this part, two alternative perspectives on health service delivery will be 
introduced. The discussion of these two alternative approaches in this particular part 
also serves as an illustration of the development of medical practice from its 
historical roots described in Part A. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The doctor-patient relationship in the medical marketplace 
 
Chapter 5: The fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship 
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CHAPTER FOUR: The doctor-patient relationship in the medical marketplace  
 
 
The discussion in Chapter Three revealed a real conflict between autonomy and beneficence 
in the doctor-patient relationship, and the ethically and legally unacceptable power 
imbalances resulting from this conflict. The doctrine of informed consent as a legal 
mechanism to address these power imbalances, specifically with regard to medical decision-
making, was found to be an inadequate attempt to ensure a more equal distribution of 
power in this relationship. Clearly, a new approach to, or understanding of, health care 
delivery ― as opposed to the traditional paternalistic ethic discussed in Chapter Three ― is 
required.  
 
In Chapter Four the first of two dominant alternative approaches to health care delivery will 
be considered. This approach emphasises the contractual nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship in the medical marketplace and is known as the business model to health 
service delivery. According to the business model, health service delivery is viewed as an 
ordinary commodity and the doctor-patient relationship as a contractual relationship 
regulating the distribution of this commodity. The question whether an alternative 
perspective on the doctor-patient relationship can assist (if at all) in ensuring a more equal 
distribution of power between doctor and patient will also be considered.  
 
The second alternative approach, focusing on the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship will be discussed in Chapter Five. As indicated in Chapter One, these two 
approaches to health service delivery serve as a framework within which the power 
imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship will be considered.  
4.1. Defining the business model in medical practice 
4.2. The relevance of the business model to medical practice and the doctor -patient relationship 
4.3. The business model and the power imbalances in the doctor -patient relationship 
4.3.1. Informed consent 
4.3.2. Patients’rights, patient autonomy and the defiance of beneficence 
4.3.3. The erosion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship 
4.4. Conclusion 
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In section 4.1. of this chapter the characteristics and effects of the business model in 
medical practice will be described to provide a general overview of this development in 
health service delivery. In section 4.2. this alternative approach will be analysed in more 
detail order to determine its relevance and suitability to health service delivery. Some of the 
power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship will be considered in section 4.3.; 
medical decision-making, informed consent, patients’ rights, patient autonomy  and 
beneficence will again be discussed. The importance of trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship will be considered with regard to the identified power imbalances and in 
preparation for the discussion and analysis of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship in Chapter Five. The present chapter will conclude with a summary of how the 
proletarianisation of medical practice influences health service delivery in general, as well as 
the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship in particular. 
 
4.1. Defining the business model in medical practice 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century there was no open trade in medical care as 
was the case with other commodities such as food, machines and other materials. Yet as far 
back as the end of the eighteenth century, the stage was set for a radical change in the 
nature and economic status of medicine; primarily due to increased medical possibilities, a 
decline in mortality and morbidity, an enthusiastic embrace of medical research and the 
emergence of a market for medical care.607 Today, health care delivery is increasingly 
regarded as a business; an ordinary commodity608 produced directly for its exchange value, 
to be bought and sold in the marketplace and bound by the rules and principles of the law 
of contract. Patients are referred to as clients, customers or consumers, while medical 
practitioners are described as service providers. This inevitable revolution in medical 
practice is a result of  
• the increased incorporation of competitive market values in health care;  
• escalating medical malpractice costs;  
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• scientific and technological advances in medicine;609  
• the growth of specialisation areas in medicine at the expense of general medical 
practice;610  
• the bureaucratisation of medical practice;611  
• the de-professionalisation and proletarianisation of the medical profession;612 and  
• the commercialisation of health service delivery in general.  
In summary, the increased complexity of modern medicine in an industrial and 
commercialised context, as well as the growing functional significance of health as a social 
factor, have led to the increase in the cost of medical services and the rise of this 
organisational mode of health care delivery referred to as the business model in medical 
practice.613 This model is replacing the lone physician with his/her “familiar black bag”614 
and the paternalistic medical ethic615 (discussed in Chapter Three) with a new 
depersonalised medical industrial complex and ideal.616 In the medical industrial complex, 
the role of the physician has shifted from that of a direct provider of health care to a co-
ordinator of the production of complex services, including the use of the resources provided 
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by hospitals.617 In this dissertation the way in which intrusions of capitalist initiatives have 
led to the bureaucratisation and proletarianisation of medical practice and the extent to 
which the medical profession has as a consequence been de-professionalised, will not be 
discussed. In the present chapter only the business model to health service delivery will be 
considered as a framework for the discussion and continued analyses of the power 
imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
The business model regards the doctor-patient relationship as an economic relation and 
also suggests that the cost, price, availability and distribution of health care services should 
be left to the free market. The nature of the doctor-patient relationship as an economic 
relation can be described as a legal bond or juridical relation consisting of a system of rights 
and duties, in other words, a contract. A contract, in terms of the South African law of 
contract still seems to be primarily premised on business concepts, perceptions of the 
manner in which markets operate and the kinds of goods and services relevant to such an 
exchange market.618 The business model consequently regards medical practice as a 
commodity transaction, similar to buying a motor vehicle or taking it to a mechanic  – the 
letting or hiring of work (locatio conductio operis) or the letting and hiring of services 
(locatio conductio operarum).619 In stark contrast to Parsons’s physician’s and sick role  
discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.2.2., the physician and patient are, in terms of the 
business model, not only regarded as contracting equals, but they also have minimal ethical 
obligations to each other.620 No special attributes are attached to either role and the 
physician is only required to provide a “good product” while the patient is expected to pay 
for the service provided. Patients are furthermore free to choose among providers of 
medical services. It has been suggested that these characteristics of the business model of 
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medical practice will result in a decline in the cost of health care services, while the quality 
and accessibility of such services will be maintained or will improve.  
 
Supporters of the business model in health care contend that the contractual nature of this 
approach will also close the traditional power gap between doctor and patient, since it will 
empower the patient to play a more active role in the doctor-patient relationship and foster 
a culture of competitive service provision between the suppliers  of medical services.621 The 
approach is therefore a direct response to paternalism and represents a move towards 
more patient autonomy. It is based on the patient’s right to make decisions — a right’s ethic 
— equal to consumer rights. This right’s ethic outweighs the “right” of benevolent others to 
manipulate a person for his/her own good, also known as the professional public service 
ideal (or principle of beneficence), which traditionally formed the cornerstone of health 
service delivery and was discussed in Chapter Three, section 3.3.622 The present chapter will 
only consider the business model of health care delivery and the movement towards a 
right’s ethic in so far as this approach attempts to provide for a more equal distribution of 
power in the doctor-patient relationship. (Consumerism and patient choice as a product of 
this approach will form the basis of the discussion in Chapter Seven, while managed care 
will be discussed in Chapter Six.) 
 
The practical effects of the business model of medical practice are evident from the case 
law. In E v Australian Red Cross Society623 a public hospital in New South Wales was 
described by a court as engaged in trading activities comprising patients’ fees and other 
business activities, and was deemed to be a trading corporation.624 The judge held that if 
patients are to be regarded as consumers, the trade of the hospital is the provision of 
services to the patients and a contract between any patient and the hospital is entered into 
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in the course of business.625 Although the court’s stance on how health care should be 
provided cannot directly determine the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, the view 
that medical relationships should be regarded as ordinary contractual  and business 
relationships does have a bearing on how patients and physicians perceive medical care.626 
Sulmasy submits that the linguistic symbols and metaphors used to describe any human 
endeavour, including medical practice, also shape our thoughts about that particular 
endeavour.627 In South African case law the “language” of the business model of health 
service delivery is also evident. In Shiels v Minister of Health628 the process whereby 
orthopaedic technicians make and fit artificial limbs for patients was compared to that of a 
tailor making suits for a client.  In Afrox Healthcare v Strydom,629 which will be discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.3.3., the effects and rationale of the business model of health 
service delivery also influenced the judgement as well as the arguments submitted in this 
case for the exemption of the hospital nursing staff from any liability based on negligence.    
 
Some countries seem to be more willing than others to entertain and pursue market related 
ideas and principles in their health care system and medical practice in general, but hardly 
anywhere in the world have these initiatives not been applied to health service delivery in 
some way or another.630 While the USA is described by Callahan and Wasunna as the 
heartland of market and health care experiments, Europe in general is said to use market 
practices in health service delivery in a much more pragmatic and less ideological manner 
than the USA.631 Since ex-president Clinton’s administration, however, there has been a 
move away from a pure market economy in the USA health care system. In Germany, there 
is a move towards Ökonomisierung – a more market-oriented approach to health care.632 
Other European countries with a history of rejecting large-scale market practices in health 
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service delivery and who continue doing so are Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and 
France.633 Canada, with the help of its 1984 National Health Act, has also largely managed to 
hold on to its traditional health care values and organisation, fending off market 
proponents.634 Tanzania can be singled out as an African country that also rejects market 
practices in health service delivery even in the face of economic pressure, while Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi and Zambia represent African countries that have put various market 
practices in place under pressure from the World Bank.635 Countries that show a willingness 
to introduce market ideas and mechanisms in their health care systems include Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, while India and China can be described as laissez-faire countries where the 
health care market is allowed to flourish in an unimpeded and unregulated way with few 
safety-net features.636 Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Australia can be described 
as market accommodators, that is, countries that have found a role for some market 
practices in their health care systems, and New Zealand and the Czech Republic are two 
examples of countries that first pursued market related principles in their health care 
systems but became disillusioned with the results and moved back to a strong solidarity 
model.637 
 
This revolution in health service delivery is also evident from the manner in which health 
care institutions and providers are being managed and viewed in South Africa and is 
recognised in South African case law. However, the preamble to and objectives of the 
National Health Act 61 of 2003 as well as the preamble to the National Patients’ Rights 
Charter reaffirm that health care delivery in South Africa is a special service, regarded as the 
primary responsibility of the state and sustained by the dedication, promise and 
commitment of the medical profession in South Africa. Other examples confirming the 
special nature of health service delivery in South Africa are the relatively recent 
amendments to the Medical and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965, which make express 
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provision for a transparent system for the pricing of medicines, a single exit price and 
professional fee for the suppliers of medicines. Sections 18A, 18B and 22G of this act 
prohibit a mark-up on the cost price of medicine and outlaw systems for bonusing, rebates, 
sampling and volume or bulk discounts. Although such practices are common in other trades 
and sectors they have been outlawed by the act, thereby emphasising the fact that health 
services are different from other services, the global proletarianisation of medical practice 
notwithstanding.638  
 
The notion of market principles in health service delivery can invoke stereotypes of crass 
commercialism, the commodification of important health needs and aspirations as well as 
the falling away of an ideal such as the affordability of health care for all. Market principles  
may, on the other hand, hold some appeal since they promise greater patient choice and 
stricter external control and regulation according to t rade related principles. Clearly, the 
effects of the depersonalised medical industrial complex cannot be ignored. But has this 
business ethic in health care delivery transformed the underlying reality of the traditional 
doctor-patient relationship or is it simply commercial rhetoric? In other words, what is the 
place of market theory and practice in medicine and health care? In the following section 
the relevance of the business model and business ethics to health service delivery, as well as 
the ethical implications of this development, will be evaluated in order to determine the 
suitability of this alternative approach to health care delivery, and to the doctor-patient 
relationship.   
 
4.2. The relevance of the business model to medical practice and the doctor-patient 
relationship  
When evaluating the influence of the business model and its perspectives on health service 
delivery, it is essential to revisit the historical development of the medical profession as well 
as the unique qualities and characteristics of both the medical practitioner and the patient 
in the doctor-patient relationship.639 When comparing the business model of health service 
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delivery with the altruistic and service orientated approach of the early medical 
practitioners discussed in Chapter Two section 2.1., as well as the unique characteristics of 
medicine as a profession and the social dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship 
discussed in section 2.2., the vast disparity between the traditional medical ethic and 
business ethics becomes evident. The business model does not make provision for the 
unique culture of medical care.640 For example, one of the characteristics of medical 
professionalism is the profession’s orientation towards service. However, from a business-is-
business point of view the maximisation of one’s own profits takes priority over altruism. 
Another characteristic of the medical profession is its independence from lay influence and 
control based on the advanced and prolonged education of its members and their expert 
knowledge. In business though, more emphasis is placed on appropriate training than 
extensive education. Professions also have extensive self-regulatory powers and their own 
ethical codes, disciplinary guidelines and procedures. Businesses on the other hand lack 
such political and commercial independence and their comments on public policy usually 
verbalise vested interests. 
 
According to the business model, health care delivery should not be regarded as a “special” 
good qualitatively distinct from other commodities . Health care delivery in the business 
model of medical practice is an ordinary commodity, which refers to a product valued for its 
usefulness to the consumer or its satisfaction of the consumer’s preferences.641 The 
business model consequently suggests that health care is not of a moral and economic order 
different to any other good or service. On a practical level this means that the patient 
retains authority over all personal matters while the physician possesses authority over the 
goals and values regarding all technical matters.642 However, limiting the physician’s 
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interests to technical matters is not very realistic, since this disregards the physician’s 
humanity and interest in the patient’s well-being and also ignores the fact that physicians do 
not deal only with technical matters.643 Health care services cannot be regarded as an 
ordinary commodity and the relationship between doctor and patient is certainly not 
stripped of personal interests. This is so for the following reasons:  
• The nature of health care is non-proprietary. One cannot sell that which is not 
owned, and physicians cannot claim ownership of the health care that they 
provide.644 It is therefore obvious, given the special nature of illness and healing as 
well as the non-proprietary nature of medical practice, that although commodities 
may be used in the process of providing health care, health care as a whole is not 
an ordinary commodity and health services rendered demand obligations not 
associated with general commerce.645  
• The vulnerability of patients and the large measure of trust placed in a physician is 
unique to the doctor-patient relationship.646 Health care delivery is a special good, 
the product of the historical development of medical practice, influenced by the 
characteristics of professionalism — which is necessary due to the functional 
specificity of medical practitioners and the vulnerability of patients — as well as 
the particular social dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship.647  
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• Medical care is built on a moral relationship of trust, confidence and honesty, and 
it is not a business transaction.648 
• It is said that there are only two types of commodities – necessary and 
adventitious. Health care delivery does not conform to either of these types, as 
there is a qualitative difference between health care and other commodities.649 In 
Sulmasy’s analyses on necessary commodities, based on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, it 
becomes evident that a good can only be considered a necessary commodity if, 
when absent over some period of time varying according to the item, illness 
results.650 Adventitious commodities, on the other hand, are described as goods 
and services which do not directly address basic human needs and it has already 
been established that health is a very important and basic human need. 651 
 
The business model furthermore overestimates patient autonomy and the rationality of 
patient decisions. Since the model views the doctor-patient dynamic as a simple, 
straightforward purchase of services, it overlooks the complex nature of health service 
delivery and the historical development of the medical profession, which have contributed 
significantly to the understanding and practical dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship 
today.652 Supporters of the business model of health care delivery submit that this 
contractual approach overcomes the paternalistic interpretation of the Hippocratic ethic 
and aims to provide a more balanced view of the dynamics in the doctor-patient 
relationship, but this is an oversimplification of the nature of the Hippocratic ethic, - which 
was discussed in Chapters Two and Three – and it fails to address clinical realities and the 
impact of illness and disease on vulnerable patients. A measured, dispassionate appraisal in 
medical decision-making, which is normally associated with the abstract distinguishing on 
                                                 
648
 Esser, Jan Hendrik Who cares? Moral reflections on business in healthcare Thesis presented in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree M Phil (Applied Ethics) Stellenbosch University, March 200 1 
(Supervisor: Prof AA van Niekerk), 65.  
649
 Esser, Jan Hendrik Who cares? Moral reflections on business in healthcare Thesis presented in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree M Phil (Applied Ethics) Stellenbosch University, March 2001 
(Supervisor: Prof AA van Niekerk), 65.  
650
 Sulmasy, Daniel P What’s so Special about Medicine Theoretical Medicine Vol 14 (1993) 27 – 42, 35. 
651
 Sulmasy, Daniel P What’s so Special about Medicine Theoretical Medicine Vol 14 (1993) 27 – 42, 35. 
652
 Teff, Harvey Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the Doctor-patient Relationship Clarendon Press Oxford 
(1994) 113. 
137 
 
rights, is implied by the business model.653 However, it is clear that this suggested rational 
and detached style in medical decision-making is unrealistic and does not take into account 
the specific attributes and vulnerabilities attached to both the physician’s role and the sick 
role in the doctor-patient relationship.654 A rational and detached style in medical decision-
making makes no allowance for the particular qualities and traditional ethical obligations of 
medical professionals — like their altruistic commitments and actions based on beneficence 
— to be utilised for the benefit of and in the best interests of the patient in the doctor-
patient relationship.  
 
The market model of health service delivery can also be criticised because it does not 
account for the fact that physicians and patients do not explicitly discuss the particulars of 
their relationship like they would in any other ordinary contractual setting, or understand 
their relationship as a contract. In Chapter Five it will be shown that courts sometimes view 
and describe physicians as fiduciaries, and most medical practitioners do regard themselves 
as such. A fiduciary is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace and the 
goal of fiduciary law is to raise the morality of the marketplace. 655 Finally and probably most 
importantly, there is a disparity between the business model and traditional health ethics as 
to the application of the price mechanism of the market economy on health service 
delivery.656 The price mechanism of the business model is “…that kind of economic 
coordination that uses freely formed prices as the central means for allocating resources on 
the one hand and for the production and distribution of goods and services on the other”.657 
This means that  
• price rations – if a patient is unable to pay for a service he/she does not have 
access to that particular health service;  
• price indicates scarcity – the greater the demand and the less supply of the 
particular service the higher the price; and  
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• price directs resources in the direction of demand – the higher the price of the 
service, the more profitable it will be to provide this service.658  
 
In sum then the business model in health service delivery does not make provision for the 
clinical realities and gives rise to a moral conflict with the social and constitutional 
obligations of providing access to health care.659 The rationale of the business model offers 
an idealistic and oversimplified perspective of the intricate doctor-patient relationship, 
which does not acknowledge the unique and complex dynamics inherent in this relationship. 
Consequently, it is not an appropriate approach to health care delivery. 660 As Sulmasy 
indicated: “Health care…is fundamentally a relationship of caring and is not fundamentally 
an object of production and exchange.”661  
 
However, there do seem to be potential improvements and advantages involved in allowing 
the perspectives of the business model in health service delivery to set the stage for medical 
practice in general. If patients are encouraged to view themselves as consumers, the quality 
and extent of patient choice should increase. The quality and provision of services should 
also improve since the medical profession will not have the exclusive and extensive self- 
regulatory and decision-making powers usually associated with the profession. Also, the 
cost of health care might decrease and medical services could become more affordable due 
to consumer choice and competitive market values. Unfortunately none of these potential 
advantages for patients as consumers of health care services have so far realised, despite 
increased reliance on the business model in medical practice.662  
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It may be concluded then that the business model results in an overwhelming concern for 
“rights” and overestimates patient autonomy. It is overly individualistic and moreover 
unrealistic in discounting the social dimension of medical care.663 The business model views 
the doctor-patient relationship in economic rather than moral terms and is therefore 
incompatible with the clinical realities of medical practice, reducing the doctor-patient 
relationship and medical practice to “objective” quantitative phenomena.664 However, as 
indicated in section 4.1., the inevitable bureaucratisation and proletarianisation of medical 
practice and the consequent realities of market related principles in health service delivery 
can not be ignored. Pass et al described this complexity and the variety of market 
mechanisms in health care as follows: 
“There is no single, simple concept of market that can be adopted for use in a health 
system. Rather, market-style mechanisms include a number of specific instruments 
such as consumer sovereignty (patient choice), negotiated contracts and open bidding. 
They can be adopted in markets organized on different principles: on price, on quality 
or on market share. Markets can, in turn, be introduced into different sectors of the 
health system: in health care funding, in one or more subsets of the production of 
health services...Competitive incentives can be brought to bear on the behaviour of 
physicians, nurses, support personnel or home care personnel. In practice, then, there 
is not one decision but a series of decisions to be made. Rather than a monolithic 
commitment to one of two abstractions – state or market – both Western and Eastern 
European health care systems confront a range of smaller decisions...it typically 
involves a multitude of approximations, if not compromises”.665  
The business model is therefore not a suitable approach to the complex and unique culture 
of medical practice and the discussion in section 4.3., will show that it is also not an effective 
compromise to ensure a more equal distribution of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship.  
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4.3. The business model and the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship 
Some of the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship will now be considered 
against the background provided in sections 4.1. and 4.2. In the context of medical decision-
making, informed consent, patients’ rights, patient autonomy and beneficence will again be 
discussed. The importance of trust in the doctor-patient relationship will also be considered 
with regard to the identified power imbalances in the relationship and in preparation for the 
discussion and analysis of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship in Chapter 
Five.  
 
 4.3.1. Informed consent  
In essence, the discussion in Chapter Three centred on the concepts of autonomy, self-
determination and beneficence in the doctor-patient relationship and the need to find a 
balance between these conflicting qualities. The business model of health service delivery 
brings with it further potential conflicting qualities with regard to medical decision-making. 
While the traditional way of practicing medicine was not necessarily free of moral conflicts 
or dilemmas, the physician’s obligations to each patient are now also embedded in a 
network of competing obligations and conflicting interests.666 These competing obligations 
and conflicting interests have, to a certain extent, always been present in medical practice, 
but until now were not powerful enough to make a significant impact on the medical 
decision-making process.667 In this section, the economic and price considerations of the 
business model as well as the influence of other role players in the medical decision-making 
process will be considered.  
 
The following two statements illustrate the presence of economic and price considerations 
in medical decision-making: “For a patient who is unlikely to be able to afford the treatment 
on his own, disclosure may be not only pointless, but also cruel”668 and “It is the patient’s 
prerogative, not the physician’s, to decide which medical options are worthwhile, at what 
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price.”669 Krause suggests that while the doctrine of informed consent requires the patient 
be informed of alternatives to the proposed treatment, considerations about the cost of 
such alternative treatments and which treatments will or will not be covered by the 
patient’s health insurance policy may influence the extent of the information the physician 
is willing to disclose.670 Krause also submits that the traditional doctrine of informed 
consent (discussed in Chapter Three) is ill equipped to address non-disclosure due to 
financial, rather than medical paternalistic, considerations.671 Since the analysis in section 
3.5. of this dissertation already concluded that the doctrine of informed consent is  not a 
truly effective legal mechanism to allow for the full realisation of patient autonomy and self-
determination in medical decision-making, the utilisation of the medical profession’s own 
regulation system to enforce the physician’s obligation to disclose will be considered in this 
section. 
 
To allow cost considerations to dictate the types of information that should be disclosed to 
patients is a consequence of the business model of health service delivery. The fact that this 
consideration may take priority over patient autonomy and self-determination in a 
particular situation causes another power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship, 
limiting the patient’s ability to participate in medical decision-making. The failure to disclose 
alternative treatments which the patient in all probability may not be able to afford or 
which will not be covered by the patient’s health insurance policy prevents the patient from 
making an informed decision and prevents the patient from exercising his/her right to self-
determination since the patient is not even aware, in situations like these, that an 
alternative has been denied.672 Medical practitioners have historically been trusted to make 
decisions on what is best for their patients and such trust was based on their medical 
                                                 
669
 Morreim, Haavi E Economic Disclosure and Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care 
Journal of Legal Medicine 12 (1991) 275, 291. 
670
 Krause, Joan H Reconceptualising Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost containment Iowa Law 
Review 85 (1999 -2000) 260 – 386, 265. 
671
 Krause, Joan H Reconceptualising Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost containment Iowa Law 
Review 85 (1999 -2000) 260 – 386, 265. 
672
 Krause, Joan H Reconceptualising Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost containment Iowa Law 
Review 85 (1999 -2000) 260 – 386, 303; Miller, Frances H Denial of Health Care and Informed Consent in 
English and American Law American Journal of Law and Medicine 18 (1992) 37 – 71, 40; Wolf, Susan Toward a 
Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care Houston Law Review Vol 35 (1999) 1631 – 1681, 1660. 
142 
 
expertise and certainly not on their financial opinions.673 An example of a situation where 
financial incentives influenced the extent of disclosure can be found in the case of Shea v 
Esensten.674 The patient died of cardiac symptoms after his physician told him that it was 
not necessary for him to see a cardiologist. The deceased’s wife argued that the deceased 
would have disregarded the physician’s opinion and would have consulted a cardiologist at 
his own expense had the physician disclosed that the particular health maintenance 
organisation (HMO) gave the physician financial incentives to reduce referrals.675  
 
The business model also gives other role players like the pharmaceutical industry, hospital 
governing bodies and health insurance companies a more prominent place in the medical 
decision-making process. Such role players, who often have competing interests, certainly 
influence the doctor-patient relationship in general, as well as the power imbalances in this 
relationship with regard to informed consent. Medical practitioners’ co-operation with, and 
in some instances, dependency on these role players may affect the nature and degree of 
their disclosure to patients. The USA case of Wickline v State676 serves as a point in case. The 
plaintiff, who had undergone vascular surgery, was discharged from hospital on a certain 
date determined by her insurer’s theoretical length-of-stay guidelines. These guidelines 
incorporated quality of care as well as cost-containment considerations. However, the 
plaintiff developed post-surgical complications and her doctor requested an eight-day 
extension of her stay in the hospital. Based on the said guidelines, the insurer only approved 
a four day extension and the surgeon consequently signed her discharge order after only 
four days. Further complications developed after the plaintiff left the hospital and these 
necessitated that her right leg be amputated. The plaintiff’s action against the insurer was 
based on the negligent implementation of the cost-containment programme which 
corrupted her doctor’s professional judgement. In this case all the medical expert witnesses 
agreed that the physician acted within the standards of the medical profession by 
discharging the plaintiff early, according to the insurer’s edict. It was also clear from the 
evidence provided by these medical expert witnesses that the physician’s obedience of third 
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party directives in the personal doctor-patient relationship and crucial situations of medical 
decision-making did not fall outside customary practice. Since the particular doctor was 
found not to be negligent, based on this customary practice as confirmed by the expert 
witnesses, the court did not have to decide on the question whether the insurer’s directive 
improperly undermined medical judgement. However, the court did note that “…the 
physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, 
when his medical judgement dictates otherwise cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for 
his patient’s care. He cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when 
the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour.”677  
 
In another USA case, Truman v Thomas,678 a patient refused to undergo a pap smear test 
which her physician recommended several times over the course of six years. She 
continuously cited financial pressures and difficulties as reasons for not undergoing the test. 
After the patient subsequently died of cervical cancer, her estate brought an action against 
the physician alleging that he had negligently failed to provide the deceased with sufficient 
information about the importance of undergoing such a test. It was affirmed in this case 
that a doctor also has a professional duty to disclose the hazards of declining treatment, 
even though the reason for the refusal may be financial constraints.679 In the case of Moore 
v Regents of the University of California680 it was held that professional conflicts of interest 
that might compromise physician recommendations should also be disclosed. The majority 
in this case concluded that a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the 
patient’s health that may affect his/her judgement, irrespective of  whether such interests 
are based on research or economic considerations.  Thus, the only way in which to ensure 
that a patient’s interest and autonomy remain paramount is by obtaining the patient’s 
consent based on disclosure of all relevant and related information. This is also the case in 
South African law where section 6(1)(d) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 requires that 
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a patient be informed of the right to refuse health services, as well as the implications, risks 
and obligations of such a refusal. 
 
In English law, however, such truly informed consent is not possible due to the fact that 
medical alternatives may theoretically be available and necessary but may not be practically 
accessible, due the English health care system’s economic limitations. (The UK system is a 
centrally planned system funded almost entirely by the public sector.)681 According to Proff 
Schwartz and Grubb, medical practitioners in such situations elect not to inform their 
patients of the true circumstances.682 “…[I]nstead of openly advising patients that economic 
and societal considerations are the constraint, they are led to believe that a medical decision 
has been made, assumed (incorrectly) to be in the patient’s best interests.”683 Thus, 
economic decisions in such cases are disguised as medical judgements and Abrams argues 
that these physicians fail to be patient advocates, acting in the best interests of their 
patients, but rather become agents of the state, regulating and controlling the UK health 
care system.684 This practice is unacceptable since self-determination and patient autonomy 
cannot realise if the patient is not even aware that all information about alternatives and 
risks has not been disclosed. 
 
Patients should therefore be informed of all the alternatives, with their risks and benefits, as 
well as the costs involved. This is also confirmed in section 6(1)(c) of the National Health Act 
61 of 2003. According to the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs the non-disclosure of information on alternative treatments due to financial 
incentives interfering with such disclosure constitutes an unethical intrusion on the doctor-
patient relationship.685 Physicians who withhold information on alternative treatments 
based on financial considerations not only usurp patient autonomy and self-determination 
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but also assume the moral burden by compromising the raison d’etre of the informed 
consent doctrine.686 At the very least physicians who cannot, due to economic reasons, 
make use of the necessary medical resources that they believe their patient needs should 
have an affirmative professional obligation to provide this information.687 However, Katz 
and others warn that such disclosure of financial interests or incentives which might have a 
bearing on medical decision-making may also have a downside: it can undermine physician-
patient trust, which is a cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship as well as the aim 
informed consent is designed to foster. 688  (Trust and the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship will form the foundation of the discussion in Chapter Five below.) 
 
It is clear from this discussion, especially the case-law references cited, that medical 
practitioners have a duty to disclose and assist patients with regard to their economic 
responsibilities in health care. Medical practitioners also have to reveal conflicts of interest 
which may compromise their loyalty to their patients.689 These specific duties and 
obligations of medical practitioners can be based on the doctrine of informed consent; or 
patient autonomy and the right to self-determination; or even contract-based obligations. It 
is trite, though, that these duties and obligations are necessary to protect an already 
vulnerable patient in the medical marketplace.  
 
To what extent then should medical practitioners assist patients in making wise economic as 
well as medical decisions? While the traditional doctor-patient relationship required medical 
practitioners to act only as healers, helping the patient to attain and maintain health, the 
business model of health service delivery now also requires that medical practitioners act as 
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business agents.690 Morreim suggests that the principle of self-determination and patient 
autonomy – discussed in Chapter Three – encompasses duties of economic disclosure as 
well as economic advocacy.691 Medical practitioners should not only disclose all information 
relevant to economic and price considerations, but they should also provide patients with 
the necessary assistance and information to make sound economic decisions about health 
service delivery. Without this assistance from medical practitioners, patients will not be able 
to give full effect to self-determination in medical decision-making.692 The law of contract 
also provides a foundation for such economic disclosure and advocacy; patients hire medical 
practitioners to promote particular interests and goals implicitly as well as explicitly, 
expecting that medical practitioners will be dedicated to their patients’ welfare in 
preference to competing interests.693 
 
The ongoing economic reorganisation of health care delivery is reshaping medical practice 
and contributing to the existing power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship. To 
ensure some protection for the vulnerable patient in the medical marketplace, society will 
have to broaden its understanding of the type of service and assistance medical 
practitioners should provide to patients.694 A prominent legal textbook stated: “…expert 
physicians who care for their patients will also care about their patients’ economic welfare 
and the financial impact of their medical care. It is not proper to abrogate responsibility for 
medical costs by assuming that some third-party payer will provide coverage. It is the 
physician’s responsibility not only to hold down costs for society overall but also to know 
what the costs of tests and treatments are for individual patients and how much of the cost 
the patient will have to bear”.695 Since patients cannot escape the effects and consequences 
of the business model in health service delivery, their right to receive pertinent information 
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and assistance with regard to the economics of care is crucial for ensuring that patient 
autonomy and self-determination are realised.696  
 
  4.3.2. Patients’ rights, patient autonomy and the defiance of beneficence 
Although at first glance it may seem that the right’s ethic and the increased focus on 
patients’ self-determination associated with the business model of health care delivery may 
truly help realise patient autonomy, it actually does not provide the necessary security for 
the patient in the medical decision-making process. Doctors nearly always have a better 
understanding and knowledge of the medical indications, nature and quality of the 
proposed treatment as well as the available alternatives.697 In addition, patients have a 
diminished objectivity and autonomy together with the physical incapacities brought on by 
illness and are therefore exceptionally vulnerable. Thus, the greater the emphasis on patient 
autonomy and the equality of the contracting parties, the more vulnerable the patient 
actually becomes.698  
 
In this respect Teff argues that the primary concern for patients is usually the pursuit of 
mutual harmony in medical decision-making and not the excessive assertion of rights, since 
patients are aware that they might risk transforming what may have been a caring and 
amicable relationship into an adversarial one, should they stake out a position based on 
rights.699 Such an impersonal relationship will not encourage dialogue, trust and honesty 
and will certainly not ensure that patients obtain the maximum benefit from their 
professional relationship with the medical practitioner. The contractual approach may 
consequently lead to the erosion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship since it 
discourages the patient’s involvement in medical decision-making as well as dialogue 
between the doctor and patient.700  
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With regard to beneficence and the right’s-ethic of the business model, it should also be 
noted that physicians traditionally played a special role in the doctor-patient relationship; 
acting as patient advocates and, based on the Hippocratic principle of beneficence, putting 
patients interests before their own.701 In other words, “[p]hysicians’ dedication to patients’ 
best interests expressed a special professional ethos and thus created the rational 
foundation for patient trust”.702 However, the rationale of the business model seeks to 
empower patients by emphasising patients’ rights and patient autonomy, by protecting 
patients from benevolent others in medical decision-making and providing security within 
the boundaries and principles of the law of contract, for example, by exclusively relying on 
contractual principles like bona fides, boni mores, reasonableness and fairness; principles 
which presuppose the equality of the contracting parties. It furthermore overestimates 
patient autonomy as well as the medical profession’s commitment to full disclosure of all 
relevant facts and considerations and ignores the fact that the physician’s beneficent aim is 
precisely to restore the patient’s previous degree of autonomy. 703 
 
The case of Afrox Healthcare BPK v Strydom 704 is an example  of how the business model of 
health service delivery places new responsibilities on newly empowered patients , 
diminishing the role of beneficence in health care, while assuming that patients have all the 
facts and truly comprehend all the information disclosed.705 In this case, where the Supreme 
Court of Appeal overturned a judgement by the Pretoria High Court,706 the respondent had 
been admitted to a private hospital, owned by the appellant, for an operation and post-
operative medical treatment. Upon admission, the respondent signed an agreement which 
also contained an indemnity clause exempting the hospital and its staff/agents from any 
liability due to any loss or injury (of any nature) caused directly or indirectly by any factor or 
element connected to the respondent’s stay and treatment in the facility.  After the 
operation, the negligent conduct of a nurse led to complications, which caused the 
respondent to suffer damages. The respondent argued that the negligent conduct of the 
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nurse constituted a breach of a tacit term in the agreement that the appellant’s nursing staff 
would treat him in a professional manner and with reasonable care. The appellant, 
however, denied liability and relied on the indemnity clause contained in the agreement. 
The respondent advanced several reasons why the provisions of the indemnity clause could 
not operate against him, including that the particular clause was contrary to public interest 
due to the unequal bargaining positions of the parties as well as the nature and ambit of the  
conduct of hospital personnel, and that the clause was in conflict with the principles of good 
faith.707   
 
The crucial error in the judgement of Brand JA is his reliance on the business model of 
health care delivery, assuming that providers of health care services are no different from 
any other commercial supplier.708 The judgement is based exclusively on the principles of 
the law of contract and does not take into account the special nature of medical practice 
and the unique doctor-patient relationship.709 The court, for example, held that it was not 
obvious that an unequal bargaining power between contracting parties justifies a conclusion 
that a contractual provision, which is to the advantage of the stronger party, will be in 
conflict with public interest. The court also found that there was absolutely no evidence that 
the respondent was in a weaker bargaining position than that of the appellant during the 
conclusion of the agreement. In actual fact, the respondent had no bargaining power 
regarding the clause since all private and public hospitals in South Africa make use of 
indemnity clauses in their admission agreements. If he objected to it he would have   
nowhere else to go and would not have gained access to the required health care 
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services.710 Strauss furthermore argues that such an exemption clause, whether in a 
contract with a medical practitioner or with a hospital, ought to be regarded as null and void 
and contrary to public policy, since it does not protect the patient’s fundamental interest in 
his/her bodily inviolability due to the patient’s inherent vulnerability in the doctor-patient 
relationship, and it erodes the patient’s trust in the motives of the service provider, who is 
apparently more concerned about its commercial interests than about providing care and 
complying with professional standards.711  
 
It was also hinted in the Afrox judgement that since the appellant had a reputation and 
competitive edge to maintain, that this would be adequate protection for patients against 
risks of professional negligence of the appellant’s employees.712 These observations suggest 
that health care delivery is a marketable commodity in the same category as other services 
advertised by means of word of mouth recommendations and also suggesting that people 
regularly “shop” at hospitals.713 Brand JA furthermore confused the true purpose and 
character of professionalism and the characteristics of the medical profession in particular, 
by creating the impression that the disciplinary powers of the relevant professional bodies 
for physicians as well as nurses somehow reduce the weight of the public policy 
considerations in favour of holding the employer vicariously liable, and that the threat of 
disciplinary action by professional bodies and the general concern for the hospital’s 
reputation will ensure that hospitals avoid negligent conduct. 714 The emphasis should rather 
have been on the professional standards and obligations associated with the medica l 
profession and medical service providers in general.  
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The Supreme Court of Appeal in the Afrox case did not distinguish between the providers of 
health services and other service providers and consequently did not take into account the 
particular culture of medical practice, the nature of the medical profession and the 
vulnerable position of patients in the medical marketplace. In the Afrox case, too much 
emphasis was placed on patient autonomy and the equal bargaining position of the 
contracting parties as well as the business interests of the hospital, rather than on the non-
commercial interests of the patient and the vulnerable position of the patient in the doctor-
patient relationship or the relationship between a medical service provider and patient. The 
contrasting viewpoint of Justice Tobriner in Tunkl v Regents of the University of California715 
and Yekiso J in the case of Oldwage v Louwrens716 with regard to medical services is 
preferable. According to this view, the medical profession deals with protecting the life, 
personality, physical integrity, health and dignity of human beings and for this reason the 
profession is the focus of a constant searchlight and appears to be one of the most over-
regulated professions in the world.717  
 
4.3.3. The erosion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship  
As stated earlier,718 the business model of health service delivery suggests that the 
transaction between physician and patient is a commercial relationship, regulated by the 
rules of commerce and the law of contract. The business model also presumes that health 
care delivery is not of a different moral and economic order than any other good or 
service.719  The precepts of professional ethics, which include altruism and the traditional 
moral obligations a physician is expected to have towards his/her patients  (based on the 
Hippocratic ethic and also described in Parsons’s physician’s role) have no place in this 
relationship.720 However, professionalism and the medical profession in particular are 
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rooted in the medical practitioner’s moral nature – to profess is an ethical act and it makes 
the professional a moral being who prospectively affirms the moral nature of his/her 
activity.721 Esser contends that the business enterprise and the capitalist free market system 
of the business model of health service delivery has a “questionable moral history” which 
does not correspond with the history of medical practice and the nature of medical care 
described in Chapter Two.722 The business model is devoid of specific moral principles and 
virtues important to medical practice and is driven by desires of self-interest, greed and 
competitive strategies. Profit and efficiency are the essential components on which this 
model is based.723 Many medical practitioners and patients are already socialised into this 
corporate way of thinking which depreciates the true value of the doctor-patient 
relationship:724 “If health care comes to be viewed primarily as a commodity whose value is 
purely instrumental to the improvement of one’s health status, such persons could slowly be 
trained to label as ‘silly’ or ‘sentimental’ their own desires to attach intrinsic value to the 
manner and context in which care is provided to them.”725 The business model of health 
service delivery may thus create an atmosphere in which medical practitioners believe that 
contractual provisions define the outer limits of their professional obligations.726  
 
Brennan described the net effect of this new approach to health service delivery, and the 
doctor-patient relationship in particular, as an approach in which rights rather than duties 
are the appropriate form of moral discourse.727 However, moral certainty in health service 
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delivery is not found in the rights contained in statutes, guidelines and the principles of the 
law of contract but rather in the context of the particularities of the doctor-patient 
relationship.728 The moral centre of the doctor-patient relationship is more than merely a 
contractual understanding; caring and trust are the crux of the relationship.729 In Chapter 
Three it was suggested that the protection of patient autonomy and self-determination, and 
the assurance that patients still receive the maximum benefit from professional expertise 
and guidance, can only be achieved through an honest relationship between doctor and 
patient. And although society’s understanding of medical practice may change from a 
paternalistic ethic to a business model, the unchanging event in medicine remains the 
clinical encounter between patient and physician.730 The doctor-patient relationship is a 
moral731 relationship built on trust, equality and respect. It is not merely a commercial 
transaction, as the relationship in itself is therapeutic.732 The success of medical care 
therefore depends on patients’ trust in their physicians  – the expectations that  
• their physicians will perform their responsibilities in a technically proficient 
manner (competence);  
• they will assume responsibility and not inappropriately defer to others (control); 
and 
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• their commitment towards patients’ welfare will be their highest priority 
(agency).733 
 
The rational foundation for patient trust is significant in three ways:  
• trust promotes the confidence required for full disclosure and consent in medical 
decision-making;  
• the public’s perception of the trustworthiness of medicine affects the willingness 
of citizens to seek medical care when necessary; and  
• the perceived trustworthiness of medicine is a key factor in the prestige associated 
with the profession.734  
Other expectations of patients also based on trust in the doctor-patient relationship include 
mutual respect and abidance by the rules of privacy and confidentiality. Throughout the 
history of the medical profession, efforts have been made to build this trust and confidence 
in the medical profession’s ability and competence mainly through the implementation of 
rigorous ethical standards, the high standard set for education and accreditation, as well as  
through active public relations and consultation.735 The business model of health care 
delivery potentially challenges this trust in the doctor-patient relationship by regarding 
health care delivery as an ordinary commodity, by influencing medical judgement and 
control, and by restricting open communication between medical practitioners and their 
patients, so creating multiple conflicts of interest between doctor and patient.736 
 
It has been argued that it is imperative that medical practitioners and the medical 
profession in general develop the skills and motivation to advocate actively and effectively 
for their patients’ best interest and welfare in the medical marketplace.737 This obligation of 
medical practitioners is based on the principle of beneficence, as a cornerstone of medical 
practice, and patients’ trust in the doctor-patient relationship.  Although it is not the sole 
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responsibility of the medical profession to protect the vulnerable patient and address the 
power imbalances resulting from the business model of health care delivery, the profession 
should use its status and the power of professional ethics to eliminate restraints on 
physician behaviour that may undermine trust in the doctor-patient relationship.738 Put 
another way, traditional medical and professional ethics should stop focusing just on 
individual cases as they arise. Instead medical and professional ethics should address larger 
ethical concerns such as the effects and consequences of the business model on health care 
delivery in general, and the ensuing vulnerability of the patient in the medical 
marketplace.739 
 
At the heart of medical practice is the doctor-patient relationship, and since no study has 
ever proved the actual impact of this relationship on health outcomes, it can safely be 
assumed that more than health is at stake.740 The doctor-patient relationship should 
therefore be protected from conflicts of interest and those aspects of trust that are most 
important to the public and vital to ensuring the quality of future health care should be 
preserved.741 The business model of health service delivery will not ensure a more equal 
balance of power in the doctor-patient relationship nor contribute to the social dynamics of 
the relationship.   
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The question whether medicine is a business is actually a very old one.742 In the Republic, 
Plato has Socrates asking Thryasymachus: “Now tell me, is the doctor in the precise sense, of 
whom you recently spoke, a money-maker or one who cares for the sick? Speak about the 
man who is really a doctor.” Thrasymachus answers and Plato agrees: “One who cares for 
the sick.”743 Plato also writes that “The business of the physician, in the strict sense, is not to 
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make money for himself, but to exercise his power over the patient’s body...”.744 The moral 
premise behind Plato’s description of the ethically responsible physician in the Republic is 
that, even though the physician is some kind of merchant who sells his skills, his highest aim 
must be to remain true to the altruistic medical profession.745 The Greek poet Pindar 
celebrated the victory of the athlete Hieron in the Pythian Games of the year 474 BC in an 
ode that relates the story of the demigod Asclepius.746 According to this fable, which is 
deemed to be the first case of medical ethics, a competent physician tutored by the centaur 
Chiron in the arts of healing is induced by money to perform a forbidden medical service.747 
 
The commercialisation of medical practice is a pervasive and an inevitable development of 
this new millennium in health service delivery dominated by specialisation, technology and 
bureaucracy.748 As discussed in section 4.2.2., there may be some positive features 
associated with the business model of health service delivery, but these features are not 
necessarily linked to the continued commercialisation of health care and can be secured 
without it.749 Also, from the patient’s point of view, the law of contract is not the ideal 
approach to relationships in health service delivery, since the bargaining power  of the 
vulnerable patient does not really compare to the expert and economic power of medical 
practitioners.750 To reduce the doctor-patient relationship to ordinary commercial 
exchanges is demeaning and dangerous for medical practitioners and unacceptable to 
patients.751 And to regard health care delivery as an ordinary commodity ignores the special 
nature of medical practice and health care delivery which has a very direct connotation with 
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the range of effective life opportunities available to an individual.752 Fuchs suggests that the 
business model of medical practice will eventually lead to the loss of public confidence in 
the medical profession’s commitment to the welfare of patients and the weakening of the 
traditional values of the medical profession.753   
 
The business model of health service delivery results in an insensitivity to the symbolic 
nature of the physician’s role and also to the social dynamics of the doctor-patient 
relationship.754 It ignores the public’s interest in the manner in which health care services 
are delivered, the nature of the services as well as the accessibility of such services.755 
Although one cannot eliminate money and commerce from health service delivery, since 
health service delivery is in some way entangled with market practices and ideology, they 
remain two distinct cultural traditions of service provision, the commercial and the 
professional.756 Some suggest that the answer may be to recognise the plural understanding 
of the doctor-patient relationship and to regard health care delivery as incompletely 
commodified, a category of goods identified by Margaret Radin as goods that human beings 
value and as having both market and non-market characteristics.757 In the South African 
context however the solution is that the Grundnorm in health service delivery should be 
respect for and the protection, promotion and fulfilment of the rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights as well as the objectives of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 which include the 
protecting, respecting, promoting and fulfilling of the rights of the people of South Africa to 
the progressive realisation of the constitutional right of access to health care services .758 
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The metaphor of medicine-is-a-business does not contribute to the rationale and objectives 
of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and also does not assist in establishing a more equal 
distribution of power in the doctor patient relationship. 759 Instead, the Oslerian conception 
that medicine is a calling has been reaffirmed in this chapter. Medicine has indeed no 
analogy with business and the medical profession ought to be supported for a benign, not a 
selfish, and for a protective, not an exploitative purpose.760 How to ensure that the medical-
industrial complex serves the interests of patients first is the responsibility of everyone 
involved in health care services, especially medical professionals, as well as the informed 
public making use of these services.761 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship  
 
 
The discussion so far has emphasised the characteristic dynamics of the doctor-patient 
relationship and the unique culture of medical care. The unique qualities associated with 
the medical profession and the doctor-patient relationship in particular, as well as with 
health service delivery in general, have remained a continued feature of the analysis and 
discussion. It is evident from the discussion of the historical development of the medical 
profession, the paternalistic approach to health service delivery and the business model of 
health service delivery, that the true nature of medical practice and the unique dynamics of 
the doctor-patient relationship continue to influence the interaction between doctor and 
patient and consequently the success of the medical intervention. Clearly, these unique 
qualities remain essential for establishing a more equal distribution of power in the doctor-
patient relationship, despite economic and technological advances, and cultural and social 
transformations.  
 
Some of the unique qualities and characteristic dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship 
include the following: the ideal medical practitioner is an obligatory altruist – acting 
selflessly, although not without remuneration, and showing a sincere dedication towards 
his/her patients. Patients, in turn, have a reasonable expectation of such dedication and rely 
on it implicitly. The importance and necessity of particular qualities in the doctor-patient 
relationship, especially respect, honesty and trust, have become apparent in the discussion. 
It is also clear that these qualities are necessary to establish a more equal distribution of 
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power in the doctor-patient relationship, while still allowing for the nature of medical 
practice and the unique dynamics between doctor and patient. Other important aspects 
highlighted in Chapter Two, section 2.2. and especially vital to this discussion are the 
extensive self-regulatory powers and general authority of members of the medical 
profession, which are a result of the functional specificity of medical practitioners, and the 
contrasting vulnerability of patients. 
  
Given the unique qualities and the characteristic dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship 
one would expect the fiduciary nature of this relationship and the corresponding fiduciary 
duties of physicians to be well established in law and that they would also sufficiently 
address the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship. However, the underlying 
legal content of the fiduciary nature of this relationship is not that obvious and will 
therefore form the basis of the discussion in this chapter.762 The aim of the discussion is to 
determine what exactly the legal content of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship is and most importantly, whether it can assist in establishing a more equal 
distribution of power between doctor and patient.   
 
In section 5.1. the doctor-patient relationship will be analysed in terms of fiduciary 
principles and values. Specific cases in which the fiduciary nature of the said relationship 
have been discussed or referred to will also be considered. Section 5.2. of this chapter will 
look at the legal content of the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient and in 
section 5.3. the specific duties of the physician as a fiduciary and the patient as a beneficiary 
will be considered with reference to relevant case law. The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis and evaluation of the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship.  
 
5.1. The doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship   
The term “fiduciary” comes from the Latin word fidere, which means “to trust”.763 A 
fiduciary relationship is a very special legal relationship and has its origins in the law of 
                                                 
762
 Litman, Moe Self-referral and kickbacks: Fiduciary law and the regulation of “trafficking in patients” CMAJ 
March 30, 2004 170(7) 1119 – 1120.  
763
 Johnston, Kim Patient Advocates or Patient Adversaries? Using Fiduciary Law to Compel Disclosure of 
Managed Care Financial Incentives San Diego Law Review Vol 35 (1998) 951 – 992, 958. 
161 
 
trusts and agency.764 It comes into being when a beneficiary entrusts another, the fiduciary, 
with a power which may affect the beneficiary’s interests and which may only be exercised 
for the beneficiary’s benefit.765 The foundation of the fiduciary relationship is the 
beneficiary’s well-placed trust and confidence in the fiduciary’s integrity and fidelity. 766 The 
following four principles are the core values sustaining a fiduciary relationship: 
• fiduciaries must avoid conflicts of interest, as well as potential conflicts of interest 
with the beneficiary;  
• fiduciaries must not profit from their position without prior disclosure to and 
authorisation from the beneficiary;  
• fiduciaries owe a duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary; and 
• fiduciaries owe a duty of confidentiality to the beneficiary. 767  
Fiduciary law plays a significant role in protecting vulnerable people. While fiduciary law has 
frequently been utilised and developed to remedy perceived injustices in medical- and 
health law cases, no precise definition of when a fiduciary relationship between a doctor 
and patient exists and what exactly it entails has been offered.768 Instead, the fiduciary 
nature of the doctor-patient relationship has been described by various indicia or qualities 
associated with the relationship, for example trust, vulnerability, reliance, selflessness, 
confidentiality and loyalty.769   
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The idea that physicians are, or should be fiduciaries  for their patients has been a dominant 
metaphor in medical ethics and law for some time and is presumed by much of the legal and 
ethical analysis of physicians’ conflicts of interest. 770 According to McCullough, its roots can 
be traced to two eighteenth century physicians, Dr John Gregory (Scottish) and Dr Thomas 
Percival (English), who were early proponents of establishing ethical standards for medical 
practitioners largely as a response to the entrepreneurial nature of medicine at the time. 771 
Gregory then already feared that medicine had become commercial in its nature, a trade or 
means to the end of the physician’s self-interest. He wished to re-establish the physician as 
a moral fiduciary. Both Gregory and Percival laid the groundwork for distinguishing medicine 
as a profession from medicine as a business by establishing physicians’ fiduciary obligations 
towards their patients as a basic tenet of the ethical practice of medicine.772 Today, the 
ethical tenets of medical societies inform the doctor-patient relationship with a fiduciary 
quality, even if the term is not used expressly.773 
 
The doctor-patient relationship thus shows many of the hallmarks of a fiduciary 
relationship, but is it also regarded as a fiduciary relationship in law? Or, put another way, 
how far does the law play out this metaphor in the way it treats doctors? 774 Courts have 
developed fiduciary law by analogy and have consequently expanded the range of fiduciary 
relationships to include various professionals who stand in a confidential relationship with 
their clients, like bankers, legal practitioners  and priests.775 These relationships usually 
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involve the property or financial interests of the beneficiary.776 For instance, when a doctor 
deals with a patient’s property, English law has recognised that the doctor will be in a 
fiduciary position vis-à-vis the patient.777 In such cases, a presumption of undue influence 
arises against the doctor because of the particular nature of the relationship — a 
relationship which is based on trust and confidence.778 This presumption can be rebutted if 
it is proved that the property was given freely as a result of the patient’s  full and informed 
consent.779 In Canada it is also generally accepted that where a doctor deals with a patient’s 
property the doctor will be in a fiduciary position vis à vis that patient.780 But does the 
fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship extend beyond the property or financial 
interests of the beneficiary?  
 
Grubb submits that the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship indeed extends 
beyond such interests, since the said duty does not arise from the subject matter, but rather 
from the very nature of the relationship between the parties. Where confidential 
information is entrusted to another who uses it to his/her own advantage, fiduciary 
principles apply.781 Thus, the legal duty to respect the confidential nature of the doctor-
patient relationship, which is based on a relationship of trust between the confider (patient) 
and the confidant (doctor), may be regarded as an aspect of the fiduciary duty of loyalty the 
doctor owes to his/her patient.782 In English law however, the judiciary have so far been 
reluctant to ascribe such a fiduciary duty to a doctor, except for the traditional property-
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type cases.783 The English informed consent case law discussed in Chapter Three has 
focussed on the doctor’s duty to inform patients in terms of the standards of “the 
reasonable doctor” and the law of delict, rather than the doctor’s fiduciary duty to inform 
patients of all material facts. In Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors, for instance, 
Lord Scarman admitted that the doctor-patient relationship is a very special one; “...the 
patient putting is health and his life in the doctor’s hands...”, but held that there was no 
comparison to be made between the relationship of a doctor and a patient and that of a 
solicitor and client.784 Also, in the case of Barclays Bank v O’Brien the House of Lords 
confirmed that the doctor-patient relationship could be characterised as a fiduciary 
relationship, but unfortunately did not elaborate on this statement.785   
 
In the Australian case of Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation 786 it was 
suggested that a fiduciary relationship exists if a person is obliged or undertakes to act in 
relation to a particular matter in the interests of another, and is entrusted with the power to 
affect those interests in a legal or practical sense. The reason for this principle was said to 
be found in the special vulnerability of those whose interests are entrusted to the power of 
another and the potential for abuse of that power. However, Mason J held that it is not 
possible to make a general statement about the circumstances in which a fiduciary 
relationship will exist, since fiduciary relationships are of different types, carrying different 
obligations. A test which may therefore be appropriate to determine whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists for one purpose may be inappropriate for another. He used the 
relationship between a physician and patient as an example of a relationship which may be 
described as fiduciary if there is a presumption of undue influence. However, according to 
Mason J the doctor-patient relationship cannot be described as fiduciary in cases of alleged 
conflict between duty and interest. He also held that inequality of bargaining power alone is 
not enough to create a fiduciary relationship in every case and for all purposes.  
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However, in the USA case of Yates v El-Deiry787 Justice Heiple decided that public policy, 
which favours and upholds the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship, is reflected in the 
fiduciary relationship existing between a doctor and a patient. The nature of this 
relationship does not stem from the physician’s ethical duties, but rather from his/her 
unique role in society. Justice Heiple also emphasised the importance of the qualities of 
trust, confidence and good faith in this relationship. The doctor-patient relationship was 
thus in casu regarded as a fiduciary relationship with all the duties and expectations 
associated with it. In Natanson v Kline788 the jury was also instructed that the relationship 
between a physician and a patient is a fiduciary relationship and in the case of Wohlgemuth 
v Meyer789 the doctor-patient relationship, as well as the hospital-patient relationship, were 
described as fiduciary. 
 
In the Canadian case of Norberg v Wynrib790 the patient was addicted to painkillers. She 
obtained a prescription for painkillers from the defendant, a medical practitioner, after she 
had told him that her ankle, which she had broken the previous year, was hurting. After this 
particular incident the defendant continued to prescribe painkillers for this and various 
other illnesses the defendant claimed she was suffering from, even though he realised that 
she was an addict. After some time the defendant suggested to the patient that he would 
provide the required drugs on condition that she allow him to engage in sexual activity with 
her. The patient first declined this proposition but later gave in to the defendant’s demands 
and they had sex on a number of occasions. After some time the patient decided to institute 
legal action against the defendant, alleging that his conduct amounted to assault and 
seeking compensation for damages based on the law of delict as well as the doctor’s breach 
of his fiduciary duty towards her as his patient. The patient’s action was dismissed by the 
court a quo, who held that her conduct fell within the defence of ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio. The court did however accept the basis of her claim for breach of fiduciary duty.791 
The action was also dismissed in a majority judgement of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, who rejected her claim for breach of fiduciary duty and also rejected her claim of 
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assault based on the grounds that she had consented and that the defence ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio applied.792 On appeal however the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s decision and the patient’s claim for damages was upheld. Three of the appeal 
judges in this judgement held that the patient’s vulnerability as a drug  addict created a 
relationship of unequal power between her and the doctor and that the latter had exploited 
his patient. The court applied the contractual principles of unconscionability and inequality 
of bargaining power and held that the patient’s consent was consequently cancelled out. 
Another appeal judge focussed on the principles of the law of delict and held that the doctor 
had breached his duty of care to the patient by not treating her addiction and that this had 
caused her damage in that her addiction was prolonged.  
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the dissenting judgement (in the Supreme Court) of 
Justice McLachlin (with Justice L’Heureux Dubé concurring) is of particular importance and 
will be discussed in more detail.  Justice McLachlin rejected the approaches of all the other 
judges on appeal, as she was of the opinion that the principles of the law of contract and the 
law of delict did not adequately “capture the essential nature of the wrong done to the 
plaintiff”.793 Instead, Justice McLachlin based her judgement on the principles of fiduciary 
law and held that there was no reason why a doctor’s fiduciary duty should be confined to 
property and financial cases, since fiduciary law is “...capable of protecting not only narrow 
legal and economic interests but also serves to defend fundamental human and personal 
interests...”.794 She held that the most fundamental characteristic of the doctor-patient 
relationship is its fiduciary nature and described the essence of the said relationship as 
“...trust of a person with inferior power that another person who has assumed superior 
power and responsibility will exercise that power for his or her own good and only for his or 
her own good and in his or her best interests”.795 Justice McLachlan also identified three 
characteristics of the doctor-patient relationship which made the relationship a fiduciary 
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relationship: the power of the doctor, the affect of the doctor’s power on the patient’s 
interests and the vulnerability of the patient. 796  
 
Justice McLachlin did, however, accept that the doctor-patient relationship is not a fiduciary 
relationship for all purposes, since fiduciary duty claims would not include all the duties 
imposed by law on a medical practitioner in a doctor-patient relationship. The law of delict 
and/or the principles of the law of contract would, for instance, still apply in cases where 
the doctor failed to exercise the degree of care and skill required of a reasonable medical 
practitioner, while the criminal law of assault would still be relevant in situations where a 
doctor treated a patient without obtaining the proper consent first.797 Justice Sopinka in 
Norberg also agreed that not all obligations existing between doctor and patient are 
fiduciary in nature and that fiduciary obligations must be reserved only for situations where 
special protection is truly needed. She therefore described the doctor-patient relationship 
as a relationship of a hybrid genre with certain obligations fiduciary in nature and others 
either based on the law of delict or the principles of the law of contract.798 
 
While most of the states in the USA799 regard the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary 
relationship in all contexts and with regard to most disputes , Canadian,800 English, Australian 
and South African law seem to prefer a more cautious approach. 801 These jurisdictions 
recognise the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship in cases involving the 
patient’s property and/or finances, but do not wish to extend this to recognising the doctor-
patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship in all contexts.802 It can be concluded from 
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the analysis that although the doctor-patient relationship has been described and regarded 
as a fiduciary relationship in a number of cases, and although doctors perform fiduciary-like 
roles and like to be seen as fiduciaries in their ethical codes, the law generally only holds 
doctors accountable as fiduciaries in restricted situations.803 
 
5.2. The legal content of the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient 
What then is the legal content of the fiduciary aspects of the relationship between doctor 
and patient? Generally, a fiduciary relationship entails the following:  
• the fiduciary must act intra vires;  
• the fiduciary should promote and preserve the interests of the beneficiary; and  
• the fiduciary should not pursue any interest of his/her own which might be in 
conflict with the particular duties owed to the beneficiary.804 
 
According to Birks, fiduciary law is a vehicle for exporting incidents of express trust by 
analogy, and it is characterised by the high degree of altruism required of the fiduciary.805 
Birks describes this altruism as “…the third and highest degree of legally obligatory 
altruism”.806 Johnston describes the fiduciary duty as the highest standard of duty implied 
by law and due to its origin in equitable and ecclesiastical courts, believes that fiduciary law 
has always been heavily imbued with notions of morality and justice.807 In this dissertation 
the importance of trust in the doctor-patient relationship has been (and will continue to be) 
highlighted throughout, and the characteristic qualities of beneficence and altruism in the 
medical profession have also been discussed in Chapter Three, section 3.3. In Chapter Four 
the absence of these qualities in the domain of health service delivery was considered and 
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found to be morally objectionable: To reduce the doctor-patient relationship to ordinary 
commercial exchanges is demeaning and dangerous for medical practitioners and 
unacceptable to patients.808 It is therefore evident that these unique qualities which Birks, 
Johnston and others usually associate with fiduciary relationships are also central to health 
service delivery and the dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship.  
 
Rainbolt offers another argument in support of the above. He dismisses both the traditional 
patient ethic with its emphasis on the qualities traditionally associated with health service 
delivery and the unique dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship, as well as the business 
model of health service delivery with its commercialised doctor-patient relationship. Instead 
he argues that a normal fiduciary ethic is morally preferable.809 According to Rainbolt, such 
an ethic encompasses the contractual ethic (discussed in Chapter Four) and the traditional 
ethic of health service delivery (discussed in Chapters Two and Three).810 He shows and 
reminds us that not all relationships in the competitive marketplace are governed by a 
contractual ethic; the competitive marketplace also involves the fiduciary ethic.811 Such an 
ethic can, for example, exist in a competitive, commercialised environment, while still 
retaining the qualities of the traditional patient ethic, including that the physician should act 
in the best interest of the patient. In addition, it should be noted that health service delivery 
is not the only primary or special good in the competitive marketplace. Food, shelter, a 
certain level of income and education are generally also included in the class of primary 
goods.812 There are also many fields in the marketplace where consumers are unable to 
bargain effectively, due to the particular vulnerable state in which they may find 
themselves.813 Rainbolt furthermore submits that the asymmetry of knowledge between 
doctor and patient in health service delivery is not unique to the field of medical practice. 
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Tax preparation and architecture are two other examples where such an asymmetry of 
knowledge in the competitive marketplace exists. And since asymmetry of knowledge is the 
standard justification for a fiduciary ethic and, according to Rainbolt’s argument, not unique 
to the field of health service delivery, the normal fiduciary ethic is morally preferable and 
appropriate in the context of the doctor-patient relationship.814  
 
Rainbolt supports his argument for an ordinary fiduciary ethic in health service delivery by 
pointing out that the promulgation in society of the incorrect view that physicians are held 
to a higher moral standard than other professionals encourages paternalistic actions by 
medical practitioners, which in turn (see Chapter Three) results in a power imbalance in the 
doctor-patient relationship.815 In addition to this individual paternalism, the traditional 
patient ethic also encourages social paternalism, which promotes the view that physicians 
as a group have special authority when it comes to public policy and moral issues.816 A 
change to a normal fiduciary ethic in medical practice will reduce these individual and social 
notions of paternalism and increase the autonomy and self-determination of patients.817 
Moreover, since a fiduciary is a moral person, acting within the constraints of the fiduciary 
ethic, trust, honesty and respect will also remain hallmarks in the doctor-patient 
relationship. The fact that societies attach such importance to health will ensure that the 
said relationship will not become similar to other contractual relationships in the 
commercial marketplace.818 Finally, a fiduciary relationship is more one-sided than the usual 
relationship between parties contracting at arm’s length due to the special nature of 
fiduciary obligations and the corresponding expectations of the beneficiary. Public policy 
and justice to the doctor-patient relationship dictate that the relationship cannot be 
governed solely by the morals of the marketplace.819 
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However, in medicine there is a gap between the fiduciary ideal, as described by Rainbolt 
and practice.820 This is evident from the discussion in section 5.1., where it was submitted 
that fiduciary law principles have been applied to physicians only in particular circumstances 
and for limited purposes.821 In addition, the idea that physicians are fiduciaries for their 
patients is further challenged by the following developments in medical practice: 
• a shift in influence over doctors from patients to other groups;   
• a shift in authority from doctors to managed care organisations (this concept of 
managed care will be discussed in Chapter Six); 
• a growing concern with groups rather than individuals. 
According to Rodwin, these trends, as well as the inevitable commercialisation of medical 
practice in general discussed in Chapter Four, reinforce the idea that physicians should serve 
interests beyond those of their individual patients. 822 And when doctors serve the interests 
of several parties and not their individual patients, the fiduciary metaphor is strained.823  
 
Yet the competing demands on physicians can be resolved within a fiduciary framework.824 
Dworkin suggests that the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship requires not 
only that the fiduciary provide adequate attention to the needs of the beneficiary, but also 
to the needs of others. The doctor’s obligation to act with respect should be extended to all 
significantly affected individuals.825 He also refutes the concern that doctors will be 
overburdened by this extended fiduciary obligation, stating that fiduciary duties are 
obligations to make reasonable efforts to achieve certain ends, not obligations to actually 
achieve them.826 It is furthermore important that the fiduciary metaphor for the doctor-
patient relationship should not be abandoned too quickly, since the core of the fiduciary 
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ideal is accountability and greater physician accountability and a more equal distribution of 
power in the doctor-patient relationship is imperative. 827  
 
The advantage of the fiduciary metaphor in the doctor-patient relationship is that it 
provides courts with an increased flexibility to extend obligations beyond the traditional 
fiduciary situations. This enables them to offer specific, equitable remedies in a range of 
situations that may arise in health service delivery.828 The fiduciary metaphor in health 
service delivery can ultimately guide courts and legislatures in how they treat doctors and 
view the doctor-patient relationship.829 In the following section, the scope of the doctor’s 
fiduciary obligations will be considered. 
 
5.3. The doctor as a fiduciary in the doctor-patient relationship 
In ordinary fiduciary relationships, the fiduciary duties are usually divided into two classes: 
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, the latter also known as the duty to act in the 
patient’s best interest.830 Justice McLachlin held in the case of Norberg v Wynrib (supra) that 
“[t]he scope of a physician’s fiduciary obligations can only be determined on a case -by-case 
basis, having reference to the degree of power imbalance and patient vulnerability present 
in the relationship under examination.”831 Thus, while the fiduciary duties of the medical 
practitioner arise from the inherent nature of the doctor-patient relationship, the particular 
circumstances will indicate whether or not a medical practitioner has abused his fiduciary 
duty/duties.832 And this conservative, case-by-case application of the principles of fiduciary 
law to the doctor-patient relationship will not lead to an increase in unfounded claims based 
                                                 
827
 Rodwin, Marc A Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing 
Health Care System American Journal of Law and Medicine Vol 21 (1995) 241 – 257, 255. 
828
 Stauch, Marc; Wheat, Kay; Tringle John Text, Cases and Materials on Medical Law 3
rd
 ed Routledge: 
Cavendish (2006) 40. 
829
 Rodwin, Marc A Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing 
Health Care System American Journal of Law and Medicine Vol 21 (1995) 241 – 257, 256; Litman, Moe & 
Sheremeta, Lori The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Case Involving Dr Nancy Olivieri: A Fiduciary 
Law Perspective Health Law Review Vol 10, No 2 (2002) 3 – 13, 3.  
830
 Johnston, Kim Patient Advocates or Patient Adversaries? Using Fiduciary Law to Compel Disclosure of 
Managed Care Financial Incentives San Diego Law Review Vol 35 (1998) 951 – 992, 960 – 961 Some authors 
identify three classes: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care and also the duty of confidentiality. Healey, M & 
Dowling, Kara L Controlling Conflicts of Interest in the Doctor -Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v 
Regents of the University of California Mercer Law Review Vol 42 (Spring 1991) 989 – 1005, 1002. 
831
 Norberg v Wynrib (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449, 497; Grubb, Andrew Principles of Medical Law (2
nd
 ed) Oxford 
University Press 2004, 58. 
832
 Grubb, Andrew Principles of Medical Law (2
nd
 ed) Oxford University Press 2004, 58. 
173 
 
on the real or perceived inequality of power. Before such a claim can arise, Justice 
McLachlin’s test requires that a court must first establish that there is an imbalance of 
power, that the potential for interference with a legal interest or a non-legal interest of vital 
and substantial practical interest be identified. In addition, the fiduciary must have 
undertaken to look after the beneficiary’s interest.833 In this section the two specific 
fiduciary obligations referred to above will be considered, namely the duty of loyalty and 
the duty to act in a patient’s best interest. 
 
 5.3.1. The duty of loyalty 
Probably the most important quality of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship is the doctor’s fiduciary duty of loyalty towards the patient or beneficiary. Birks 
describes this duty as the distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary.834 The obligation entails 
that the doctor must always endeavour to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
beneficiary, since fiduciary law aims to proscribe selfish conduct by the fiduciary and to 
prevent the abuse of trust vested in him/her.835 The duty of loyalty also underlies a wide 
range of ethical obligations, including that physicians must maintain the confidentiality of 
their patients’ disclosures, care for patients who are too poor to pay for such care; and care 
for the sick even when doing so exposes them to personal health risks.836 While the business 
model of health service delivery discussed in Chapter Four assumes that patients and health 
service providers are at arm’s length, primarily concerned with their own self-interests and 
therefore exist as equal contracting parties in the doctor-patient relationship, the essential 
qualities of the fiduciary’s obligations are focused on the interests of the beneficiary. 837 The 
claim that the doctor as a fiduciary has exploited the beneficiary and abused the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty is usually a claim in property cases.  
 
An example of this can be found in the Californian case of Moore v Regents of the University 
of California.838 The defendant treated the plaintiff for a form of leukaemia while also being 
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involved in a research project to develop a therapeutic cell-line. During the period of 
treatment, which lasted almost seven years, the defendant collected samples of the 
plaintiff’s bodily tissue and fluids for the purposes of this project  and without the plaintiff’s 
knowledge or consent.  Some of these samples were taken solely for the purpose of this 
project and the patient was never informed of the defendant’s involvement in the  project, 
its commercial value or that the samples were used for these research purposes. Based on 
the findings of the research project, a therapeutic cell-line was eventually successfully 
developed and it was estimated to be worth over $3 billion. On learning of this and his own 
involvement in the research, the plaintiff instituted legal action against both the defendant 
and the bio-tech company for a share of the expected profits to be made from the cell -line.  
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant stood in a fiduciary relationship with him and had to 
act in his (the patient’s) best interests. The defendant also had a fiduciary duty to disclose to 
him both the research activities and his (the patient’s) involvement in them and to obtain 
neither an interest adverse to his, nor unfairly profit from hi m. The plaintiff submitted that 
the bodily tissue and fluid samples obtained from him during the treatment period were his 
tangible personal property and that the activity of the defendant constituted a substantial 
interference with the plaintiff’s possession or right thereto.  
 
The majority of the California Supreme Court held that the defendant had a duty to inform 
the plaintiff of his involvement in the research project, the purpose for which the samples 
were taken, and the financial and commercial interest the doctor (defendant) had in the 
patient’s (plaintiff’s) treatment and body materials.839 They viewed the case as 
“...fundamentally raising questions concerning a patient’s right to the control of his or her 
own body, and whether the commercial exploitation of a patient’s cells by medical care 
providers, without the patient’s consent, gives rise to an action for damages...”.840 They also 
held that the cause of action could be characterised as either a breach of the physician’s 
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fiduciary duty or as the failure to obtain informed consent to medical treatment.841 
Although the Moore court hereby recognised a new cause of action, they also made the 
following cautionary statement: “In some respects the term ‘fiduciary’ is too broad. In this 
context the term ‘fiduciary’ signifies only that a physician must disclose all facts material to 
the patient’s decision.”842 However, the Moore case is actually better understood as one 
where the doctor as fiduciary abused his position, using it to further his own personal 
interests.843 Grubb correctly suggests that the Moore case is similar to classic fiduciary cases 
where the fiduciary obtains financial gain at the expense of the beneficiary. Based on this 
analysis the defendant as well as the bio-tech company would be liable for at least a share 
of the profits.844 By contrast, the dissenting justices held that while the tissue taken from 
the patient was his property, and that without the patient’s explicit consent the use of these 
tissues and fluids amounted to conversion of the plaintiff’s property, the bulk of the profits 
was made by the bio-tech company and not the defendant (doctor). Therefore, this was not 
an action which allowed the patient to reach the profits of the bio-tech company, since only 
the doctor owed the patient a duty to inform him of the use to which his bodily tissue was 
to be put.845  
 
Another interesting case with regard to the fiduciary duty of loyalty is D.A.B v Brown846 from 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Dr Brown prescribed a particular drug to over 200 patients 
over a period of eight years for the treatment of growth deficiencies  in children. Dr Brown 
received kickbacks from the distributor of this drug every time he referred patients for drug 
related services and supplies, but never disclosed this to any of his patients. The court in this 
case also recognised the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship, but refused to 
find that a patient could bring a claim against a physician for breach of fiduciary duty for 
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conduct that related to examination, diagnosis, treatment and care.847 Instead the court 
held that all conduct related to the examination, diagnosis, treatment or care of a patient 
should be governed solely by the law of delict.848 
 
The discussion in this section has shown that the fiduciary approach to the doctor-patient 
relationship can provide a workable and fair solution to cases of financial conflict or 
property interests in the doctor-patient relationship, based on the doctor’s fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. According to Grubb the application of fiduciary law to the doctor-patient 
relationship will give legal effect to many of the existing ethical duties of doctors.849 
 
 5.3.2. The duty to act in the patient’s best interest 
From the case law discussed in this dissertation it is evident that a number of jurisdictions 
accept that doctors have a legal duty to act in a patient’s best interest.850 But where does 
this duty come from and what does it entail? According to Grubb it has actually been 
borrowed from case law involving the medical treatment of young children. 851 These cases 
were about the fiduciary duties of the parent towards a child and the analogous duty of the 
court as the child’s judicial parent. “*T+here is therefore an unbroken line between these 
cases and the decisions concerning adult patients. Without appreciating the significance of 
what they [the courts] were doing, the courts have utilised language reflective of fiduciary 
law”.852  
 
The New Zealand case of Smith v Auckland Hospital Board853 offered another point of view 
with regard to medical practitioners’ duty to act in the best interests of their patients. 
Justice Turner held that the relationship between a doctor and a patient is not a contractual 
relationship. Where there is a special relationship of this type, it is unnecessary to do more 
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than to prove its existence; the duty to act in the best interest of the patient will follow. 
Thus, it was held that wherever there is a relationship equivalent to a contract (like a 
doctor-patient relationship), there is a duty of care and a corresponding duty to act in the 
patient’s best interests. In contrast to this, it was decided in the USA case of Regina v Mid 
Glamorgan Family Health Services Authority and another ex parte Martin 854 that the 
relationship between a doctor and a patient is contractual in origin and that the doctor 
implicitly contracts at the same time to act in the patient’s best interests. 
 
In Canada, in the case of Hopp v Lepp,855 it was asserted that  
“…the duty [to act in the best interest of the patient] is assumed to arise in those cases 
where there was a breach of a duty to which equity had attached its sanction arising 
from the circumstances and relation of the parties…it includes a moral, as 
distinguished from a legal duty to be careful, and as an obligation it arises out of the 
duty independently of contract or of special obligation. For if a man intervenes in the 
affairs of another, he must do so honestly, whatever be the character of that 
intervention.”856  
In the USA case of Nixdorf v Hicken857 a similar line of reasoning was followed. In this case it 
was also held that the special relationship which exists between a doctor and a patient 
creates a duty for the physician to act in the patient’s best interests, and that this duty 
stems from the fiduciary nature of the relationship. Unfortunately the court did not 
elaborate on this duty, nor did it elaborate on the presumed fiduciary nature of the doctor-
patient relationship. 
 
In the English case of Heldley Byrne v Heller & Partners858 it was submitted in the court a quo 
that the duty to act in the best interest of another can only arise in a special relationship 
and it is doubtful whether the sphere of such a special relationship can be extended beyond 
that of a contract or a fiduciary relationship. On appeal, however, it was held by the 
majority that the duty of care and the duty to act in the best interest of another may arise 
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from implied as well as express contracts, including fiduciary relationships and any other 
special relationships which the courts may find to exist, based on the particular 
circumstances and the relationships between the parties. The constant factor in all these 
types of relationships was said to be the trust of one party that the other person will act in 
his/her best interests. In another case it was held that such a duty will arise where a 
confidential relationship exists.859 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the doctor’s fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of a 
patient springs from the trust and confidence placed by one party in another, who by reason 
of a specific skill, knowledge, training, judgement or expertise is  in a superior position to 
advise or to act on behalf of the party bestowing the trust and confidence on him/her.860 
However, the notion that the doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship with the 
ensuing fiduciary duty of the doctor to act in the interest of the patient may also create an 
anomaly with regard to the patient’s autonomy and self-determination. When the doctor-
patient relationship is described as fiduciary in nature it may potentially create tension 
when the fiduciary yields control over the beneficiary’s well-being in order to foster the 
beneficiary’s autonomy  — thereby creating a “power-dependency” nature on the patient in 
relation to the doctor.861 This is a realistic danger of the fiduciary metaphor in medical 
practice, as the primary reason why persons are assigned fiduciary obligations is because 
their beneficiaries are thought to need special protection and that the fiduciary is well 
situated to satisfy these needs.862 The fiduciary metaphor in medical practice can therefore 
potentially fail to deliver on true patient autonomy and self-determination in the doctor-
patient relationship. 
 
Dworkin suggests that this potential anomaly can be addressed by focussing on the qualities 
of respect, honesty, trust and confidence in the doctor-patient relationship, and by re-
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establishing this relationship as a moral863 relationship built on trust, equality and 
respect.864 Under this approach, a doctor’s obligation will be not only to act in the best 
interest of the patient, but also to act with respect. In this particular context, respect can be 
seen as synonymous with a commitment to autonomy, as the doctor will give the patient’s 
autonomy and self-determination due consideration and value when acting in the patient’s 
best interests.865  
 
5.4. The patient as a beneficiary in the doctor-patient relationship 
In this section the scope of the rights and entitlements of the patient as a beneficiary in the 
doctor-patient relationship will be considered.  
 
5.4.1. Right or entitlement to a benefit enforceable against the fiduciary 
A patient/beneficiary has a right or entitlement to a benefit enforceable against the 
fiduciary, based upon the fiduciary’s duty to act in the beneficiary’s best interest. While such 
a claim would be unusual in property cases, it may be significant if the doctor were to be 
seen as a fiduciary and it would also be relevant in cases where the patient asserted a right 
to information held or known by the doctor. 866 An example of this can be found in the 
Canadian case of McInerney v MacDonald.867 
 
In this case the plaintiff was treated by a number of physicians over a period of years. When 
one of her doctors advised her to cease a particular treatment which she had received from 
a previous physician, she asked to view a copy of her medical records. The defendant 
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(doctor) agreed with regard to the medical records which she had prepared herself, but 
refused, out of a sense of ethical propriety, to provide the medical records prepared by 
previous treating physicians from the patient’s file. The patient consequently brought an 
action against the defendant, requesting that her complete medical file be made available 
to her. A majority of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that there was an implied 
term in the contract between a doctor and a patient providing the patient with a right of 
access to material in medical records relating to the patient’s treatment or medical advice 
provided to the patient.868 The Canadian Supreme Court, however, described the doctor-
patient relationship as fiduciary in nature and with particular duties arising from this  special 
relationship built on trust and confidence. These duties include the duty of the doctor to act 
with utmost good faith and loyalty, to hold information received from or about a patient in 
confidence, and to make proper disclosure of information to every patient. The doctor also 
has an obligation to grant access to information used in administering a patient’s 
treatment.869  
 
Justice La Forest held that this fiduciary duty is based on the nature of the particular 
patient’s interest in the medical records and the principle that while the doctor is the owner 
of the actual record, the information is actually held in a fashion akin to a trust and is to be 
used by the physician for the benefit of the particular patient. This trust-like beneficial 
interest of a patient in the said information means that the patient’s interest in the 
information continues when the information is conveyed to another doctor, who then 
becomes subject to the duty to afford the patient access to that information. It was 
furthermore held that since the doctor has a duty to act with utmost good faith and loyalty, 
it is imperative that the patient have access to the records to ensure the proper functioning 
of the doctor-patient relationship and to protect the well-being of the patient. Such a 
disclosure, it was held, will reinforce the patient’s faith in the treatment and will enhance 
the trust inherent in the doctor-patient relationship.870 And since the right of access to 
information, according to this judgement, grows out of the doctor’s fiduciary duty of loyalty  
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as a fiduciary, the patient should be permitted to bring a claim against the fiduciary even 
though she was not exploiting the patient.871  
 
But the Canadian Supreme Court was also at pains to limit its ruling, holding that the 
fiduciary duty of the doctor was conceived in and limited to the realm of information. 872 The 
confidential nature of the information as well as the patient’s interest in that information 
triggered the doctor’s fiduciary duty, limited to allowing the patient access to information or 
preventing misuse of the information in breach of the patient’s trust and confidence.873 The 
court furthermore accepted that the right to access to information was not absolute and 
that the fiduciary duty of the doctor as described here did not mean that the doctor should 
grant the patient access to medical records at all times and under all circumstances.874 Since 
the fiduciary duty was to act in the best interest of the patient, the ref usal of access to 
medical records may be justified in certain circumstances. 
 
Justice La Forest’s ruling was  severely criticised in the Australian case of Breen v Williams.875 
The appellant, who had been a patient of the respondent, claimed to have a legal right of 
reasonable access to her medical records kept by the respondent as well as a right to 
inspect and/or copy these records. The appellant submitted that this legal right is based on, 
respectively, the law of contract, property law and the medical practitioner’s fiduciary duty  
towards the appellant as his patient. (The discussion that follows is limited to the appellant’s 
submission that the legal right is based on the medical practitioner’s fiduciary duty towards 
her.) In their judgement Justices Brennan and Gummow accepted that the unique doctor-
patient relationship gives rise to some fiduciary obligations, but stated that there is no 
fiduciary relationship which gives rise to a duty to give access to or to permit the copying of 
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the medical practitioner’s records.876 Justices Dawson and Toohey held that duties of a 
fiduciary nature may be imposed upon a doctor, but that these duties are not confined to, 
nor cover the entire doctor-patient relationship. Dawson and Toohey could therefore not 
find any basis for finding that a fiduciary relationship between a doctor and patient carry 
with it a right of access on the part of a patient to medical records compiled by the doctor in 
relation to that patient.877 Justices Gaudron and McHugh stated that there was no basis 
upon which the court could hold that such a fiduciary duty exists, as the appellant tried to 
impose fiduciary obligations on a class of relationship which has not traditionally been 
recognised as fiduciary in nature and which would significantly alter the already existing 
complex of legal doctrines governing the doctor-patient relationship, particularly in the 
areas of the law of contract and delict. 878 Justice La Forest’s liberal point of view with regard 
to the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the extended scope of the 
beneficiary’s rights and entitlements was not applied in this case. 
 
The English case of R v Mid-Glamorgan F.H.S.A., ex parte Martin879 involved the claim of a 
former psychiatric patient to examine records relating to his confinement in a mental 
hospital. The relevant health authority did not want to provide the patient with unlimited 
access to the records and agreed to disclose the records to a medical adviser nominated by 
the patient. This medical adviser would then determine what information could be released 
without endangering the patient or third parties involved. This judgement is in accordance 
with the judgement in the McInerney880 case. In the Mid-Glamorgan case the fiduciary 
nature of the doctor-patient relationship was recognised and the duties of the fiduciary as 
well as the rights and entitlements of the patient were acknowledged. It was also stated 
that the right to access to information is not absolute and since the fiduciary duty is to act in 
the best interest of the patient, the refusal of such access to medical records may be 
justified under particular circumstances.881 
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5.5. An evaluation of the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship 
“The foundation of the patient-physician relationship is the trust that physicians are 
dedicated first and foremost to serving the needs of their patients.”882 
Many courts have recognised that the unique characteristics of the doctor-patient 
relationship show the hallmarks of fiduciary law and have consequently characterised the 
doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship. This relationship is a moral 
relationship built on trust, equality and respect, which also transcends the arms-length 
transactions of the general marketplace. In the case of Lockett v Goodill,883 for example, the 
doctor-patient relationship was described as a fiduciary relationship of the highest degree, 
and involving every element of trust, confidence and good faith. The overall effect of such 
use of fiduciary principles in health service delivery, especially the doctor-patient 
relationship, is therefore to allow patients to trust their physicians, to entrust their welfare 
to physicians and to minimise the need to monitor physicians’ behaviour in order to ensure 
that the patients’ best interests are served.884 
 
It is submitted that the doctor-patient relationship should be regarded as a fiduciary 
relationship, a special relationship attracting specific fiduciary principles  and values. The 
main reason for this submission is that fiduciary duty analysis begins with a structure of 
inequality within which specific obligations are assessed, and this is especially necessary 
when dealing with unequal relationships like the doctor-patient relationship.885 
Traditionally, three classifications of fiduciaries  exist: the fiduciary as advisor, the fiduciary 
as property holder and the fiduciary as representative.886 Based on the analysis in this 
dissertation so far, it is evident that all three classifications are applicable to the doctor-
patient relationship. Physicians advise patients on their health and appropriate treatment. 
                                                 
882
 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs – American Medical Association; Johnston, Kim Patient Advocates or 
Patient Adversaries? Using Fiduciary Law to Compel Disclosure of Managed Care Financial Incentives San Diego 
Law Review Vol 35 (1998) 951 – 992, 963. 
883
 Lockett v Goodill 430 P.2d 589 (Wash. 1967), 591.  
884
 Mehlman, Maxwell J The patient-physician relationship in an era of scarce resources: Is there a duty to 
treat? Connecticut Law Review Vol 25 (1992 – 1993) 349 – 391, 369. 
885
 Peppin, Patricia Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships Texas Journal of Women and the Law Vol 
3 (Spring 1994) 221 – 263, 260; In Magware v Minister of Health 1981 (4) SA 472 (Z) 475A-B; 476G-H; 477A-B 
the court held that the contractual obligation flowing from taking on a patient is a ‘special relationship’ 
triggering a duty of care. 
886
 Morreim, Haavi E Economic Disclosure and Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care 
Journal of Legal Medicine 12, 275 – 329, 296. 
184 
 
In addition to this advisory capacity, physicians can also influence patients’ money and 
property.887 Physicians have power over the medical costs their patients incur, since they 
recommend diagnostic and therapeutic interventions and also control patients’ access to 
medical institutions and interventions.888 Finally, physicians may also, in particular 
circumstances, act on their patients’ behalf and therefore act as a representative. 889 
 
However, not all scholars agree that the doctor-patient relationship is strictly a fiduciary 
relationship.890 Some suggest that it should rather be viewed as a confidential 
relationship.891 In a confidential relationship the person who claims that a trust, duty or 
loyalty has been breached or abused must show that he/she has in fact placed confidence in 
the other person and that this confidence has in fact been breached or abused. 892 This is 
contrary to the position in the fiduciary relationship where the fiduciary, and not the 
beneficiary, carries the burden of proof to show that he/she did not abuse or breach the 
beneficiary’s confidence or trust. Considering the case law discussed in this and the previous 
chapters, it would seem that the courts prefer to view the doctor-patient relationship as a 
confidential rather than a fiduciary relationship, since the burden of proof always rests with 
the patient to prove that, for example, the physician did not provide all the material and 
relevant information pertaining to a particular treatment. 
 
Justice McLachlin in the case of Norberg v Wynrib indicated that “the foundation of the 
fiduciary relationship is conceptually distinct from the foundation of contract and delict, 
although the doctrines may overlap in their application.”893 Utilising fiduciary law in medical 
case law will capture all the various facets of the doctor-patient relationship under one 
conceptual umbrella and may redress the imbalance of power between doctor and patient 
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where the law of delict or the law of contract fail to provide a fair solution. Fiduciary rules 
redress this imbalance of power in a number of ways: 
• They limit the fiduciary’s freedom of action by prohibiting the fiduciary from using 
superior power to take advantage from the beneficiary. 
• They require the fiduciary to act in the beneficiary’s best interest.  
• While a physician may avoid liability under the law of delict by merely acting 
reasonably, the physician may still be liable for breach of his/her fiduciary duty if 
he/she did not act loyally. 
• Where the beneficiary challenges the contractual agreement or other transactions 
with the fiduciary, the burden of justification is shifted from the challenging party 
to the fiduciary. 
• The fiduciary may be required to do more than merely compensate the patient for 
the loss suffered as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty, and may face punitive 
damages.894 
These fiduciary rules stem from the information disparity between the parties, which 
generally also lowers the probability that a breach of duty will be detected. This is also true 
in the sphere of health service delivery where it is extremely difficult for a patient to identify 
and prove that a physician is acting disloyally.895 Fiduciary rules like these respond by 
increasing the severity of the sanction to deter or undo breach of a fiduciary duty.896 While 
fiduciary law will not replace the current legal framework of South African medical law 
(which is based on the law of delict and the law of contract) it will supplement it and impose 
acceptable standards of conduct on doctors in their dealings with patients.897 Grubb submits 
that utilising fiduciary law in medical case law will also enable courts to give content to 
many of the entitlements which society intuitively feels patients should have but for which a 
legal basis is (still) missing.898  
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Rodwin predicts that the law will continue to address strained physician loyalty within a 
fiduciary framework and will impose limits on or stretch the fiduciary metaphor to reconcile 
doctors’ obligations  towards patients with service to groups and society.899 Bartlett agrees 
with this and suggests that rather than continuing a debate on whether or not the doctor-
patient relationship is a fiduciary relationship, it would be more appropriate to consider 
what equitable obligations within the fiduciary framework already attach, or ought to 
attach, to the doctor-patient relationship in a medical context. 900 This line of thinking has 
been confirmed by various scholars who argue that it is inappropriate to think of the 
application of fiduciary relationships as a class, and that it should rather be viewed as special 
relationships attracting a specific group of fiduciary duties: “One can question whether the 
doctor-patient relationship is fiduciary in itself, thus creating status-based fiduciary duties, or 
whether it is merely a relationship to which a variety of fact-based fiduciary duties attaches, 
but the practical question of the scope of doctors’ equitable duties remains the same .”901  
 
Compared to the situation in Canada and the USA, fiduciary law with regard to health 
service delivery in South Africa is largely underdeveloped.902 However, it should be noted 
that in jurisdictions where the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship is 
recognised, contradicting judgements and the flagrant disregard of these legally imposed 
fiduciary duties persist.903 Carstens and Pearmain contend that, given the approach of the 
South African courts to regard health service delivery strictly in terms of the law of contract, 
the latter is likely to remain this underdeveloped unless the legislature steps in.904 But in the 
constitutional context in South Africa it is not too difficult to recognise, apply and develop 
fiduciary law principles in health care in both the public and private sector. The beneficiary 
in the public health sector holds the right of access to health care services including 
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reproductive health care in terms of section 27(1) of the Constitution. The state’s 
corresponding duty with regard to this entitlement, and according to the Constitution, is to 
protect, promote and fulfil this right. In health service delivery in the public sector, an 
analogy can thus be drawn between the position of a trustee and that of the state.905 In the 
private health care sector in South Africa, where health care delivery is primarily viewed in 
terms of the law of contract, patients depend on the trust, knowledge, professionalism and 
skill of their physician, thus creating a fiduciary res ponsibility on the part of the latter.906 
Such added dimensions to contractual relationships are widely recognised and patients 
consequently have certain rights as a result of this special contractual relationship.907 
Carstens and Pearmain furthermore contend that in some instances, it is even possible for a 
fiduciary relationship to exist between providers of health related services and health 
practitioners due to the nature of the contractual relationship in terms of which the 
practitioner is provided with support services.908 
 
Unfortunately, health professionals in South Africa seem to have lost sight of their historical 
roots with the Hippocratic ethic and the associated qualities and duties inherent in the 
dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship. “The fierce resistance of dispensing doctors in 
South Africa to the legislative introduction of a system of licensing for dispensing doctors and 
other health professionals who wish to dispense medicine in a series of litigation against the 
government is a case in point.”909 The licensing scheme, introduced in sections 18 and 
22C(1)(a) of the Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965, requires that health 
care providers, including medical practitioners such as dentists, not be permitted to 
dispense medicines unless they have  been issued with a licence by the Director-General of 
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the Department of Health.910 The licensing scheme also regulates the premises from which 
medicines may be dispensed and ensures that dispensing health professionals are properly 
qualified. The objective of the scheme is to increase access to medicines that are safe for 
consumption. At its inception this scheme had obvious financial and practical implications 
for all dispensing practitioners. Health care providers also contended, inter alia, that the 
licensing scheme limited the choice of a profession, a right protected in section 22 of the 
Constitution.911 
 
It is very unfortunate that the courts in the cases dealing with the licensing system for 
dispensing medical practitioners in South Africa did not mention or consider the unique 
culture of medical care and the special nature of health service delivery in general and the 
doctor-patient relationship in particular. They did not remind the medical profession of its 
altruistic and fiduciary obligations towards patients in general, nor did they elaborate 
sufficiently on how the licensing scheme will assist in promoting, protecting and fulfilling the 
rights in sections 27(1)(a)912 and 27(3)913 of the Constitution. In addition, if the courts had 
viewed these cases in terms of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship, they 
would probably have recognised that there is a conflict of interest when medical 
practitioners dispense medicines. In no other “market environment” is it possible for a 
vendor to instruct a customer to purchase an item with such persuasive force and from such 
a position of power relative to the customer than in the environment of medical care and 
health service delivery.914 
 
It is even more unfortunate that this example pertaining to the licensing system for 
dispensing medical practitioners in South Africa is not the only instance where the courts 
ignored the opportunity to develop fiduciary law principles in the context of health service 
delivery to promote, protect and fulfil the relevant rights of the Constitution.  Development 
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of such principles is crucial to ensure that medical practitioners do not continue to use their 
patients as a human shield against the state to assist them in their attempts to circumvent 
legislation and to serve their self-interests.915 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Fiduciary relationships and the doctor-patient relationship are extraordinary legal 
relationships because both involve the maintenance of high standards as well as special 
qualities like trust, vulnerability, confidence and loyalty.  The fiduciary’s duties are quite 
distinct from ordinary contractual obligations and delictual duties  of care. They are also 
more extensive and complex since they focus on the benefit of a beneficiary while the 
fiduciary remains an altruistic party in the relationship. The conclusion arrived at in Chapter 
Four was that the doctor-patient relationship can not be regarded as an ordinary 
commercial relationship and that the ordinary principles of contractual and delictual liability 
cannot always be applied to the rather complex relationship between doctor and patient. 
Based on this conclusion, a possible expansion and development of existing fiduciary 
principles applicable to the doctor-patient relationship is both desirable and necessary to 
establish a more equal distribution of power in the doctor-patient relationship. 
“A new model for the allocation of authority between doctors and patients is needed. 
Existing legal protection for medical patients’ autonomy is more limited than has been 
recognised and more deficient than should be tolerated. Protection of patient 
autonomy remains derivative rather than direct, episodic rather than systematic. The 
subtlety of power-sharing in an ideal relationship between doctor and patient must be 
acknowledged. The law is not the only relevant tool for achieving such a relationship 
between doctor and patient. But ultimately the law is about line-drawing, and some 
basic division of authority is essential both for purposes of norm-setting and of dispute 
resolution.”916 
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While fiduciary law in theory provides a basis for consolidating the divergent aspects of the 
doctor-patient relationship and also ensures a more equal distribution of power in the 
relationship, its promise remains unfulfilled.917 This is so because the courts have applied 
fiduciary principles to the doctor-patient relationship only in particular circumstances and 
for limited purposes. The legal treatment of the doctor-patient relationship therefore 
remains governed by different and sometimes conflicting legal doctrines.918 In addition, the 
courts have not paid enough attention to the advantages of the power analysis that 
fiduciary law offers in the context of medical- and health law and the doctor-patient 
relationship. Such analysis has the ability to capture the dynamics of the doctor-patient 
relationship.919 However, care needs to be taken to prevent this fiduciary model from 
becoming the archetypical paternalistic model discussed in Chapter Three. The fiduciary 
model as it stands does not capture the potential for autonomy in the doctor-patient 
relationship; it ignores the element of decision-making control with which the law 
empowers the patient, and it cedes too much power to the physician.920 In the end, it seems 
as though the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship may be a problem of 
putting the question correctly, but still finding that the answer eludes us.921   
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PART C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Present important developments in the arena of health service delivery and medical 
practice will form the foundation of the discussion in this final part. It is important to 
take note of these general developments and how it influences the doctor-patient 
relationship and the power imbalances inherent in the relationship in particular.  
 
 
 
Chapter 6: The doctor-patient relationship in an era of managed care 
 
Chapter 7: Consumerism and the doctor-patient relationship 
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CHAPTER SIX: The doctor-patient relationship in an era of managed care  
 
 
In Chapter Four it was shown that the health care sector is progressively being organised 
and controlled in a manner similar to that found in the corporate environment, with 
competitiveness, major technological advances, impersonal relations and industrialisation as 
prime forces. The health care sector is at present also defined by notions of managed care 
and consumerism.922 Health service delivery as a multi-complex, multi-party operation, can 
therefore not be regarded solely within the paradigm of the individual doctor-patient 
relationship. It is also necessary to consider the power imbalances in the doctor-patient 
relationship in the context of the current multi-organisational mode of health service 
delivery particularly since the institution-patient relationship (as opposed to the doctor-
patient relationship) and its ethical foundations have not been analysed sufficiently in 
research on managed care practices.923 A better understanding of the institution-patient 
relationship is needed, as patients now spend more time talking to institutional 
representatives about their health and treatment options than ever before. In addition, 
young medical practitioners are also being socialised and professionalised into the managed 
care ideology and, not having experienced any other form of medicine, they are unaware of 
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many of the general ethical concepts and principles historically attached to the medical 
profession and described in Chapter Two. 
 
“Put most simply, managed care is a form of health insurance that combines, in some form 
or another, the financing aspects of health insurance with clinical decision-making.”924 In 
South Africa, the Medical Schemes Act925 defines managed health care as “clinical and 
financial risk assessment and management of health care, with a view to facilitating 
appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of relevant health services within the constraints of 
what is affordable, through the use of rules-based and clinical management-based 
programmes.”926 Managed health care is best described as a management process 
instituted once contractual arrangements between health care consumers and health care 
providers take effect.927 Its most important characteristic is that funders have more 
influence over the provision of health care services through intensive auditing and 
management systems.928 Under managed health care, enrolled members or their employers 
pay a set monthly premium to a plan or fund. The plan or fund then contracts with selected 
providers and facilities who agree to provide a comprehensive package of health care 
services to members for a predetermined price.929  
 
In 1995 Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, the Archbishop of Chicago, correctly stated that 
managed care attacks the moral centre of the doctor-patient relationship. Health 
maintenance organisations interfere and constrain the doctor-patient relationship, making 
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the two parties in this relationship no longer accountable to each other, “...all the while 
standing back and claiming that they [health maintenance organisations] have nothing to do 
with medical decisions.”930  While the reality of economics as a constraint on medicine is not 
denied in this chapter, the discussion will aim rather to examine how economics should 
relate to medical ethics in an era of managed care with due regard to the unique dynamics 
of the doctor-patient relationship. The legal issues involved in managed care are countless 
and complex. Only the specific themes in managed care that are relevant to the dissertation 
will therefore be dealt with in this chapter. It is also problematic to do a legal comparative 
analysis in respect of managed care, since legislation pertaining to medical schemes and 
managed care organisations is based on the unique health care system in each country or 
state and differs greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.931 In this chapter, as before, the 
focus will be on the universal qualities pertaining to the doctor-patient relationship; 
qualities independent of a particular setting, and relevant to all doctor-patient relationships 
in modern, western medicine. 
 
Section 6.1. will provide a brief exposition of the history and development of managed care  
in health service delivery and will clarify the most important terms and practices of 
managed care. In section 6.2. the influence of managed health care practices on the doctor-
patient relationship will be considered. The section will commence with a general discussion 
on the different relationships in managed health care. In the sub-sections the particular 
arguments pertaining to the power imbalances and the doctor-patient relationship will be 
assessed against the background of managed care. The chapter will conclude with some 
recommendations and general comments on the power imbalances in the doctor-patient 
relationship identified in the context of managed health care.  
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6.1. The history and development of managed care in health service delivery  
With the rise of the modern hospital in the early 1900s, as well as the advances made in 
medical science and technology, the medical profession continued to protect the 
profession’s autonomy and economic independence, opposing the notion that medical 
practitioners are ordinary employees in a medical marketplace.932 However, the perception 
about hospitals and their role as capital support and technical provider  of health care 
services also changed: hospitals were increasingly regarded as institutions where medical 
practitioners could use the management, infrastructure and technology, capitalised by 
hospitals, to provide a better standard of care.933 Consequently, the role of medical 
practitioners in health service delivery shifted from direct providers to co-ordinators of the 
production of complex services, using the resources provided by hospitals.934 Concomitant 
to these developments in the early 1900s, pre-payment schemes for the provision of health 
care services were also introduced. “The pooling of funds made it possible for people to 
create a form of financial and healthcare security, and to spread their financial burden over 
a period, thus making it an attractive and viable arrangement.”935 
 
In the USA, the passing of the Health Maintenance Act in 1973 marked the official 
recognition of managed care as a new system of affordable quality health care in that 
country.936 From 1973 to 1987 the number of health maintenance organisations increased 
from seventy-two to more than 700.937 In South Africa, the first medical scheme was 
established in 1889 by the De Beers Mining Company.938 The number of schemes had 
increased to seven by 1910 and by the beginning of the Second World War there were forty-
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eight.939 These schemes were created by mutual societies and membership was 
employment based and exclusively for white employees.940 By the late 1960s about 80% of 
whites in South Africa belonged to a medical scheme.941 Legislation in the form of the 
Medical Schemes Act, regulating the relationship between health care providers and 
medical schemes, was introduced, as well as extensive government regulation with the 
Council of Medical Schemes and the Registrar of Medical Schemes.942  
 
The European definition of managed care is “...a process to maximise health gain of a 
community within limited resources by ensuring an appropriate range and level of services 
are provided and by monitoring on a case by case basis to ensure continuous improvements 
to meet national targets for health and individual needs”.943 This definition and rationale 
differs from the South African and American points of view as it promotes a community 
perspective and is seen as a joint task of policy makers, purchasers, providers and receivers 
of medical care.944 European health care systems also differ in the way that they set health 
care priorities, which affects the extent and choice of managed care practices being 
implemented in their systems.945 The NHS of the United Kingdom also shows important 
features of managed care and actively pursues managed care initiatives like clinical 
protocols and standardised guidelines.946 In Europe, Germany was the first to introduce 
Krankenkassen (“sick funds”) and it is said that the above average health service delivery 
available in Germany directly after they lost the Second World War and had to battle with 
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famine and a revolution, was to a large extent, responsible for the relatively good health 
conditions that existed.947  
 
Insurance coverage was and is still provided by either fee-for-service plans or health 
maintenance organisations (HMO). Fee-for-service plans function as a financial intermediary 
between individual members, who pay a periodic premium, and the health care providers. 
Patients covered by a fee-for-service plan normally pay medical practitioners themselves 
and then claim reimbursement from the insurance company. 948 Health maintenance 
organisations, on the other hand, finance and deliver a broad range of health care services 
to their members through money acquired by means of premiums paid by their 
members.949 Health maintenance organisations have an obligation to ensure that all their 
members have access to the services covered by the HMO and that the standard and quality 
of care is at an acceptable level.950 
 
The development of these medical schemes and health insurance plans severed the link 
between medical treatment and its cost in the minds of patients and providers. In the 
medical decision-making process, doctors and patients were mostly unaware of the total 
cost to the medical scheme or insurance plan of providing the medical services patients 
needed and those they received. And if there was an awareness of cost, it was mostly 
perceived as irrelevant.951 This state of affairs encouraged medical practitioners to render 
any service that was potentially beneficial to the patient and this form of health care 
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provision became the norm.952  As it became increasingly possible to have access to health 
care services through such insurance based funding, more funding became available for 
medical research and development. Funding through government expenditure and private 
investments for superior technology and advanced health care facilities were regarded as 
good investments in this fast growing medical marketplace.953 This, together with a growing 
elderly population and increasing public expectations with regard to health service 
possibilities, resulted in the cost of health care services escalating rapidly.954 What followed 
was the implementation of cost-containment practices in response to the escalating cost of 
health care services. These cost-containment practices have influenced the whole health 
care system, as well as some of the most fundamental principles on which the system had 
relied.955   
 
Examples of cost-containment practices to restrain the escalating cost of health care 
services include:  
• fund organisations specifically aimed to serve only a particular group of people, 
like the poor or elderly;  
• practices that place restrictions on certain forms of medical treatment and 
interventions;  
• higher co-payments;  
• reduced benefits;  
• prospective payment plans with contracted, preferred providers; and  
• strict scrutiny of medical bills, payable to providers or members, for possible 
unwarranted claims.956  
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Prospective reimbursement programmes were also implemented by government 
organisations as a cost-containment initiative and allowed health care providers to be paid a 
calculated, average sum for prospective services and capital expenditures in advance.957 
Health care providers receiving such advance payments consequently needed to exercise 
greater control over the utilisation of their assets and services in order to ensure that their 
operations were more cost effective.958 In an attempt to contain the escalating cost of 
health service delivery, prospective reimbursement programmes also placed medical 
practitioners at financial risk for the care they delivered to patients.959 The effect of these 
programmes was twofold: The economic incentive of the providers of health care services 
shifted from the idea that doing more for the patient meant more revenue and profits to 
the idea that doing less for the patient meant more profit. In addition, medical practitioners 
still remained in a position to decide what medical care and treatment their patients 
needed, and they therefore still had a high degree of control over the costs incurred by 
hospitals for the care of patients.960  
 
In 1969, President Richard Nixon referred to the effect of the escalating cost of health care 
as the “health crisis”. This “health crisis”, together with the implementation of the cost-
containment strategies described above, and the new organisational mode of health service 
delivery (where practitioners act as co-ordinators of the production of complex services, 
using the resources provided by hospitals) resulted in a new relationship between health 
service providers and the health insurance companies, called managed care.961 Managed 
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care refers not only to medical aid schemes and other health insurance plans but also to 
organisations that combine the functions of health provider and insurer. The underlying 
concept of managed care is a system of health care that aims to constrain the medical 
practitioner’s management of care in order to achieve some stated purpose. This purpose 
may take many forms, for example, the containment of costs, the welfare of society or 
making profit.962 Managed care, therefore, represents attempts to control costs by 
modifying the behaviour of medical practitioners, although it may do so in different ways.963  
 
In South Africa, managed care did not feature until the late 1990s, as legislation in the 1980s 
and early 1990s prohibited any differentiation between risk-related differences of members. 
Moreover, schemes were required to cover a minimum level of reimbursements for all its 
members.964 By the late 1990s, however, the escalating cost of health care together with 
the implementation of cost-containment strategies also led to some deregulation of the 
medical schemes industry in South Africa, namely the removal of risk-rating for premiums 
and minimum benefit stipulations. The first real possibility for managed health care in South 
Africa came in 1994 when further deregulation allowed for contracting and vertical 
integration between health care providers and medical schemes.965  
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This development in health service delivery heralded a profound shift in thinking about 
health care delivery.966 Instead of the individual patient, the unit of analysis became the 
patient population of the managed care organisation.967 The medical practitioner was no 
longer regarded as the health care provider. Instead it was the managed care organisation 
that provided the health care service. Success was measured by aggregate health indices 
and not individual encounters with patients, and medical practitioners increasingly left their 
solo practices to contract with a managed care organisation as employees of such 
organisations.968 The basic values underlying the success and survival of business 
organisations also became relevant in health service delivery, including the pursuit of profit 
or commercial interest, as well as the associated ideals of efficiency and competitive 
behaviour.969 These changes obviously also influenced bio-ethics, which is based on 
individual rights, as well as the dyadic obligations in the doctor-patient relationship.970 
 
The original allure and objectives of managed care can be summarised as follows: Managed 
care 
• has as its aim to guarantee patients access to a wide range of health care services 
at a standardised price and with nominal co-payment; 
• emphasises “wellness” and preventative services; 
• gives health care providers incentives as the means of  
• providing health care in the most cost effective manner. 971   
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This  is a  brief and simplified exposition of  the history and development of managed health 
care.972 This dissertation will not consider managed care as a development in health service 
delivery in its totality, its advantages, negative consequences, whether it will 
deprofessionalise the medical profession. Since  the main focus of this dissertation  is the 
power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship, only those aspects of managed care 
relevant to  the legal analysis of these power imbalances have been discussed. 
 
6.2. The influence of managed care practices on the doctor-patient relationship  
Presently there is an array of organisations and corporations that implement variations of 
managed care policies.973 These institutions all use basic cost-containment and managed 
health care strategies that influence the way in which different parties relate to one 
another.974 The health maintenance organisation (HMO) is the most common managed care 
organisation.975 Five basic HMO models are relevant to this discussion:976 
• The HMO staff model: Medical practitioners are employed by the HMO on a 
salaried basis with bonus and incentive schemes. The staff model provides a full 
service for its members and does not usually make use of medical practitioners 
who are not employees. Where employee practitioners are unable to provide a 
specific service, the HMO has a contract with other service providers to perform 
the task for their members. Employee practitioners practise in contracted 
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hospitals and/or other contracted facilities . If HMO members make use of non-
contracted practitioners or facilities, the HMO will not pay.977  
• The HMO group model: This HMO does not employ medical practitioners as 
employees, but contracts with a group practice. Medical practitioners are 
employed by a group practice and may only provide services to that particular 
HMO (captive group) or provide services to various organisations and corporations 
(independent group). Reimbursement for services is made on a capitation 978 or 
cost basis.979  
• The network model: This HMO contracts with a range of group practices and/or 
primary care physicians, each providing different services to the members of the 
HMO. The HMO may contract with a limited number of group practices (closed 
panel plan) or with any physician or group practice that meets the HMO’s criteria 
(open panel plan).980 
• The individual practice association (IPA) is an open plan model with medical 
practitioners practising independently, but also as members of an association. The 
IPA is a separate entity that negotiates on behalf of its members and may contract 
with HMOs. The IPA is reimbursed for the collective services rendered by all the 
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medical practitioners, normally on a capitation basis. Because the IPA has a broad 
physician membership, a broad choice of health care services is available to its 
members, but the HMO also has less control over the direct health care providers 
than in the previous three models.981 
• The direct contract model: This HMO contracts directly with individual physicians 
to provide health care services to its members. This model has a broad physician 
base and the HMO members therefore have a broad choice of service providers 
and health care services. While this plan may be more attractive to prospective 
members, the HMO carries the highest financial risk in this model compared to the 
others, since the HMO can not transfer any of the potential risks to the contracted 
medical practitioners. In this model, the HMO has the advantage that they are in a 
much stronger bargaining position than the medical practitioners, but the 
practitioners, on the other hand, enjoy a higher degree of independence. 982 
New cost-containment strategies in these HMO health care plans also include incentives for 
members who contain their own health care expenses. Examples are: savings account 
systems, leisure and lifestyle benefits, financial benefits obtained in the form of rewards, 
health and fitness programmes to improve health, preventative healthcare, medical advice 
hotlines, special disease programmes and proactive management programmes for specific 
diseases like HIV/AIDS.983  
 
Another type of managed care organisation important for this discussion is a medical joint 
ventures which is a business agreement between investors, medical practitioners and a 
health care facility, with a direct or indirect working relationship between the latter two 
parties.984 All the parties in this relationship share the collective financial risks and profits  of 
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the health care services provided. As a result, the medical practitioners within this 
partnership have a responsibility to refer patients to other practitioners within the 
partnership, excluding practitioners from competing facilities.985 Medical practitioners are 
also stakeholders in this partnership, and become part of the managed care plan, that is, the 
corporate identity.986 Patients consequently lose medical practitioners’ advocacy in this 
system, since practitioners are unlikely to advocate a patient’s case against their own 
interests.987 
 
Cost-containment and managed health care strategies in health service delivery, as well as 
managed care organisations like HMOs and medical joint ventures have come a long way 
since the historical concept of health service delivery, the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship, and the lone physician with his black bag making house calls described in 
Chapter Two. The discussion will now turn to an analysis of how these developments in 
health service delivery have influenced the doctor-patient relationship, specifically with 
regard to the distribution of power.  
 
 6.2.1. Access to health care  
For-profit organisations like managed health care organisations may create a moral conflict 
with the social and constitutional obligations underpinning the general right of access to 
health care, as well as the concomitant principle of justice in health care.988 Access to health 
care is obstructed by managed care practices in the following ways: 
• Managed care organisations target only the most lucrative market segments in 
health care, for example the young and healthy population groups. 
• Managed care organisations employ more primary care physicians than specialists, 
and this, together with the restriction plans to discourage their members from 
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seeking care from non-participating physicians and specialists, places specialists at 
a particular risk.989  
• Managed care organisations consequently only locate in areas considered to have 
the highest potential return on investment, for example in cities rather than rural 
areas. 
• There is a tendency to concentrate on the provision of those health care services 
that provide the best return, relative to the cost of supplying the particular 
services.990  
These characteristic undertakings of managed care organisations restrict access to health 
care for those who cannot afford the premiums required of its members, and even if 
patients can afford the organisation’s services, the facilities are usually situated in areas not 
accessible to them, such as cities, and not in rural areas.991 Managed care organisations also 
restrict patients’ access to health services in another way: medical schemes and other 
health insurance plans have the authority to decide which treatments will or will not be 
covered by the scheme. They may also apply conditions, exclusions and/or other 
administrative requirements for particular treatments or medical interventions. Due to the 
considerable cost of health care services, which generally does not fall within the average 
person’s financial abilities, such a decision by a medical scheme or health insurance plan 
inevitably restricts patients’ access to health care services.  
 
The case of MH v Discovery Health Medical Scheme992 illustrates this. Discovery Health 
imposed a twelve month waiting period993 upon the appellant, who had applied for 
membership to the plan, in respect of medical treatment related to a brain tumour. The 
imposition arose from the appellant’s disclosure of his medical history  during the 
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application process, which included previous surgery for a brain tumour as well current 
physical symptoms which were probably also related to the brain tumour. The appellant was 
informed of this condition-specific waiting period when the respondent accepted his 
application for membership. According to the appellant, the true grievance and reason for 
this appeal case was not that a waiting period had been imposed in the specific 
circumstances, but that medical schemes in general have the power to impose such waiting 
periods at all. The Council for Medical Schemes Appeal Committee found that there was no 
basis for a complaint against the respondent, since it is trite that the law of contract governs 
the relationship between medical schemes and its members, the imposition of condition 
specific periods has long been accepted in the South African system of medical insurance 
and Discovery Health’s practices in this regard were no different from those of other 
medical schemes. 
 
In a similar case, JP v Discovery Health Medical Scheme,994 the appellant complained that 
the three-month waiting period imposed on him when he joined Discovery Health was not 
revealed to him prior to his application for membership. The appellant also stated that he 
did not expect any concrete relief, but merely wished to expose the allegedly inefficient and 
corrupt practices perpetuated by the respondent. The Council for Medical Schemes Appeal 
Committee held that if the appellant had been unhappy with the imposition of the three-
month waiting period, he could have chosen to abandon his application for membership to 
Discovery Health. The Appeal Committee could furthermore not find any evidence to make 
a ruling censuring the respondent for its conduct.  
 
The two cases above illustrate the frustration and powerlessness of medical scheme 
members when it comes to the impossibility of negotiating the terms of the contract 
between themselves and the medical scheme involved. The two cases also show how the 
conditions and requirements imposed by medical schemes  on their members can restrict 
their access to health care. While it is trite that the law of contract regulates the relationship 
between medical schemes or health insurance plans and their members, and that members 
are therefore free not to take up membership with a particular scheme/plan if they are not 
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content with the conditions and requirements, it should also be note d that members do not 
contract with schemes from a position of equal strength. To state that patients can always 
switch to another health insurance plan if their current plan does not deliver the quality of 
care they need assumes that there is competition and free choice in health service delivery. 
This is rarely the case as employers usually provide a very limited choice of plans to their 
employees.995 
 
The following two examples illustrate this. In the case of Cannon v Group Health Service of 
Oklahoma996 the appellant, a leukaemia patient, was denied a bone marrow transplant by 
her health insurance who argued that the treatment was experimental after the first 
remission of leukaemia. The appellant chose the particular health insurance plan from the 
three options which her employer provided to employees.  And in Corcoran v United 
Healthcare Inc997 the unborn child of the appellants died after their employee disability plan 
determined that hospitalisation of the mother was not necessary. To submit that patients 
have a free choice between health insurance plans  and can move freely between these 
plans is not only untrue, but also insufficient to ensure the realisation of the rights of 
patients in managed care plans, as well as the improvement of the quality of care.998 
 
In the case of McGraw v Prudential Insurance Company of America999 the appellant was 
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Due to the seriousness of the appellant’s disease as well 
as the complications posed by her symptoms, her physician ordered additional outpatient 
therapy to improve her strength, endurance and mobility. Various episodes of intensive 
inpatient physical therapy were also required. On receiving the claims for the inpatient care, 
the  respondent denied each claim under the policy’s general exclusion of services deemed 
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not to be medically necessary.The health plan, administered by Prudential, expressly gave 
the insurer the discretion to determine what constitutes medically necessary treatment and 
Prudential viewed the physical therapy in this particular case as medically beneficial but not 
medically necessary.1000 The court considered expert evidence from various physicians 
indicating that while MS is not curable, treatment in the context of MS concentrates on 
whatever symptoms are currently present and therefore, in the case of MS, “not getting 
worse” was correctly described as a form of medical improvement. The court ultimately 
held that Prudential made “the discretionary decision to ‘give up on’ the appellant”.1001 The 
decision was not based on a review of medical records or a close case analysis, but rather on 
what was regarded as profitable to the company. The court consequently held that the 
denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious.  
 
The McGraw decision is of particular significance, since it demonstrates that courts are 
willing to take on managed care authorisation decisions that place economic gain and cost-
containment ahead of patient well-being.1002 In the cases of Wickline v State1003 (discussed 
in Chapter Four, section 4.3.1.) and Wilson v Blue Cross of Southern California1004 it was 
recognised that treating physicians have the ultimate responsibility for their patients’ care in 
a managed care setting and that they should not simply accept the HMO ’s administrative 
resolutions. However, it is said that most courts accommodate and protect managed care 
practices as an important stage of “industrial development” in health care, much the same 
as they shielded railroads from litigation in the nineteenth century. 1005 According to 
Jacobson courts presently treat the health care field as they would any other industry and 
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show no inclination to overturn market decisions.  This amounts to deference to prevailing 
market principles in health care delivery.1006 
 
Based on dicta of the Constitutional Court in the recent decision of Barkhuizen v Napier1007 it 
is submitted that courts should develop the common law and relevant legislation with 
regard to medical scheme membership agreements and patients’ access to health care  in 
terms of section 8(2)1008 and 8(3)(a)1009 and based on section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.1010  
Justice Cameron in the Barkhuizen case found that contractual terms are subject to 
constitutional rights and that the Constitution will impact on contract law through public 
policy.1011 Public policy derives from the founding constitutional values, which include 
dignity, equality and the advancements of human rights and freedoms. 1012 And while 
freedom of contract should be respected, since “constitutional values allow individuals the 
dignity and freedom to regulate their affairs”, agreements “even if freely struck, could not be 
inimical to equity and fairness as sourced from the Constitution”.1013 The fairness of 
agreements is therefore paramount.  
 
But “decisions must be made in terms of the best interests of the patient and the group, 
(own emphasis) and not just the entity as a financial enterprise.”1014 Thus, in order to decide 
on the fairness of a particular agreement in managed health care, a distinction should be 
made between the following moral concepts of justice: 
                                                 
1006
 Jacobson, Peter D Strangers in the Night: Law and Medicine in the Managed Care Era  Oxford University 
Press 2002; Jacobson, Peter D & Pomfr et, Scott D Establishing new Legal Doctrine in Managed Care: A Model 
of Judicial Response to Industrial Change Michigan Journal of Law Reform Vol 32 (1998 – 1999) 813 – 862. 
1007
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC); In this case the constitutionality of a time limitation in a short 
insurance contract was considered. 
1008
 Section 8(2): “A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it 
is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right”. 
1009
 Section 8(3)(a): “When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or a juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2), a  court – in order to give effect to a  right in the Bill must apply, or if  necessary d evelop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right”. 
1010
 Section 27(1)(a): “Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive 
care”. 
1011
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC), para 6 - 8. 
1012
 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 11; Sutherland, PJ Ensuring Contractual Fairness in Consumer 
Contracts after Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) Part 2 Stellenbosch Law Review 2009 1 50 – 73, 51. 
1013
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC), para 104; Sutherland, PJ Ensuring Contractual Fairness in 
Consumer Contracts after Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) Part 2 Stellenbosch Law Review 2009 1 50 – 
73, 52. 
1014
 Jendusa, Jennifer M The denial of benefits quandary and mana ged care: McGraw v Prudential Insurance 
Company DePaul Journal of Health Care Law (1999) Vol 3, 115 – 142, 140. 
211 
 
• Distributive justice in health care and within this particular context of access to 
health care emphasises the needs of vulnerable patients, focussing on those who 
lack basic access to care and attending to particular individuals who are denied 
access to some specific medical intervention. 
• Formal justice emphasises that what is done for one person is owed to a ll others in 
similar circumstances. 
• Contractual justice advocates enforcement of fair agreements.  
• Contributive justice observes the legitimate expectations of the many whose 
contributions create the common resource pool. 1015 
A distinction between these moral concepts of justice is necessary, since managed health 
care organisations run on a fixed budget each year, so that money spent on one patient is 
directly unavailable for other members of that particular health plan. 1016 Justice that 
therefore only focusses on the health care needs of one individual may have adverse, 
though often hidden, implications for the other members of the health plan.1017 
 
Morreim is of the opinion that each of these four notions of justice in health care is equally 
important and that no “tidy formula” exists to resolve conflicts with regard to managed care 
practices and access to health care.1018 One reason, though, to emphasise distributive 
justice in the context of managed health care is that patients typically have very few choices 
available in health service delivery dominated by managed care practices. The other forms 
of justice identified above can only be honoured once patients have real choices with regard 
to their choice of health insurance plans and available treatments.  
 
 6.2.2. The new role of the physician in the doctor-patient relationship 
Managed care organisations directly challenge the traditional role of the physician in the 
doctor-patient relationship. The role and behaviour of medical practitioners in the doctor-
patient relationship in an era of managed care requires that practitioners act as economic 
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agents in addition to rendering their traditional professional services.1019 This was confirmed 
in the discussion in Chapter Four, section 4.3.1., and is also evident from section 6(1)(c) of 
the National Health Act 61 of 2003 — medical practitioners have a duty to disclose and 
assist patients with regard to their economic responsibilities in health care. In the present 
era of managed care the fiduciary obligations of medical practitioners (discussed in Chapter 
Five) will also come under pressure as the financial success of practitioners now not only 
depends on their clinical skills, but also on their ability to manage the financial interests of 
the managed health care organisation.1020  
 
Yet the application of managed care interventions also holds advantages for the patient in 
the doctor-patient relationship. Managed care principles, including prescribed requirements 
of pre-authorisation, case-management, provider profiling and peer reviews all promote 
cost-consciousness with all the parties involved.1021 This translates into the elimination of 
unnecessary practices, the effectiveness of medical practice and a corresponding concern 
for the quality and quantity of care. 1022 Patients, for example, now stay in hospital for fewer 
days, many surgical procedures previously requiring hospitalisation are now safely 
performed in day surgery, more attention is given to preventative care, many medical 
practices have been standardised to produce better outcomes, and satisfied patients have 
become an explicit goal.1023  
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However, the realisation of more efficient medical practices should not be achieved at the 
expense of quality of care. And to ensure that quality of care is not compromised, desirable 
goals should be identified and matched with appropriate medical interventions to achieve 
them.1024 This involves a consideration of the medical utility of the intervention, the medical 
contradictions of the intervention, and non-clinical factors such as inconvenience and 
cost.1025 The patients’ interest is consequently weighed up against the obligation of justice 
and that of the larger society — a value consideration which also challenges the physician’s 
fiduciary obligations towards the particular patient.1026 There are a number of regulations 
and standards pertaining to decision-making by managed health care organisations affecting 
funding for their members in South Africa.1027 The regulations stipulate that qualified health 
care professionals must administer the managed health care programmes and oversee all 
funding decisions, and that the appropriateness of such decisions must be evaluated 
periodically by clinical peers.1028  
 
However, like most complex organisations, managed care organisations are vulnerable to 
organisational pathologies.1029 While complex organisations can perform complex tasks 
efficiently and institutionalise memory despite changes in staff, such large organisations can 
also become unresponsive and limit the appropriate use of discretion by professionals.1030  
The law has taken for granted that medical practitioners’ clinical judgements are based on 
sound scientific evidence and are always made in the best interest of the patient. Managed 
care organisations have changed this perception, revealing the variability in clinica l 
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practice.1031 Individual physician behaviour and organisational behaviour should therefore 
interrelate in a broader system of health care delivery. The roles of medical practitioners as 
patient advocates and as managers of corporate and community resources have to be 
reconciled.1032 
 
 6.2.3. Trust in the doctor-patient relationship and trust in managed care institutions 
Much has so far been said about the role of trust in the doctor-patient relationship. In 
Chapter Three, the ideal doctor-patient relationship was described as a moral relationship  
built on trust, equality and respect.1033 In this context, trust is synonymous with autonomy 
and reinforces patients’ confidence in physicians, the authority of the medical profession in 
general and also improves the quality of both patients’ and physicians’ treatme nt decisions. 
In Chapter Four, the erosion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship due to the adoption 
of a business ethic in health service delivery was considered. 1034 It was submitted that the 
success of medical care ultimately depends on patients’ trust in their physicians. And in 
Chapter Five, the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship was analysed and the 
special place of trust in this fiduciary relationship highlighted. 1035 Trust in managed care 
organisations is also relevant because it can influence trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship, and also be influenced by the level of trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship.1036 
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Managed care practices create a conflict of interest for medical practitioners in the doctor-
patient relationship, which may lead to the erosion of trust.1037 In the realm of managed 
care, two types of conflicts of interest in the doctor-patient relationship may arise:  
• conflicts of commission refer to the practice according to which physicians receive 
financial incentives to provide more services; and 
• conflicts of omission refer to situations where physicians receive financial 
incentives to provide fewer services.1038 
Most managed care plans make use of these financial incentive practices and studies have 
indicated that the majority of these plans regard financial incentives as the single most 
effective technique to control costs.1039 Yet an ethical evaluation of both of these conflicts in 
the doctor-patient relationship show that managed care practices like these are wrong, 
because they elevate the personal interest of the medical practitioner above that which 
ought to be the primary interest in health care, namely the health and well-being of the 
patient.1040 Pellegrino submits that the managed care system creates ethical conflicts of 
interests of such magnitude that many medical practitioners feel forced to compromise 
their own personal integrity in order to survive. 1041  
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In the cases of Shea v Esensten1042 and Nead v Portes1043 it was alleged that the financial 
incentive fund controlled by the respective patients’ health plans and allegedly g iving the 
respective treating physicians a financial incentive to limit treatment ultimately led to the 
death of both patients.1044 Both courts held that there is a fiduciary duty to disclose material 
information to patients about such incentive programmes. Unfortunately the courts did not 
indicate with whom this fiduciary duty lies solely with the physician or also with the 
particular health insurance plan. In the case of Pegram v Herdrich1045 the court also had to 
decide whether treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organisation, acting 
through its physician employees, were fiduciary acts. In this case the patient, Herdrich, was 
experiencing pain in the midline area of her groin. On examination the physician found a six 
by eight centimetre inflamed mass in the patient’s abdomen. The physician, however, did 
not order an ultrasound diagnostic procedure at the local hospital — which would have 
been the standard procedure — but, based on the health maintenance organisation’s 
guidelines and incentive scheme, decided that the patient had to wait eight days for an 
ultrasound to be performed at a facility staffed by the health maintenance organisation 
about fifty miles away. Before the eight days had passed, however, Herdrich’s appendix 
ruptured and caused peritonitis. It was clear in this case that the physician’s interest in 
limiting the particular health maintenance organisation’s expenses had blinded her to the 
need for immediate diagnosis and treatment.  
 
In this dissertation, the conflicts of interest that medical practitioners may be confronted 
with in the doctor-patient relationship have been discussed and analysed from various 
perspectives.1046 It is evident from the discussion that various structures exist to counter the 
conflicts of interest that may arise in managed care practices: 
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• professionalism, with its ideal that the medical practitioner’s primary goal is the 
welfare of patients; 1047 
• disclosure and the doctrine of informed consent  to reveal these conflicts of 
interest;1048 and 
• the central role of trust and the medical practitioner’s fiduciary obligations 
towards the patient.1049 
 However, one ordering principle is the sine qua non with regard to conflicts of interest and 
managed care: the moral obligation of medical practitioners to act in the best interest of 
their patients and the patients’ corresponding trust in their physicians.1050  
 
But should managed care organisations, like health maintenance organisations, be treated 
as fiduciaries to the extent that they make mixed eligibility1051 decisions when acting 
through their physicians? The court in Pegram rejected the notion that health maintenance 
organisations should be treated as fiduciaries . This posed a fundamental challenge to the 
health delivery systems that have come to dominate American health care. Instead, the 
court relied heavily on economic analysis and held that a health maintenance organisation 
cannot be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting 
through its physicians.1052 One of the main reasons cited for this decision was that incentive 
programmes are an integral part of the health maintenance organisation’s functions . These 
incentive programmes are necessary to ensure cost-containment which is a primary goal of 
health maintenance organisations. The second reason was that physicians continue to play 
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the dominant role in determining the care that patients receive: it is physicians’ orders and 
not the actions of health maintenance organisations that effect admission or discharge of 
patients from hospital, while diagnostic and therapeutic procedures are also performed 
pursuant to a doctor’s instructions and not as a result of a directive of a health maintenance 
organisation. 
 
Yet managed care organisations do have a fiduciary duty towards patients/members to 
disclose all material information, including incentive schemes or other rationing practices. 
Health care delivery is a moral endeavour, whether undertaken by an individual medical 
practitioner or by an institution. 1053 And while managed care organisations — as integrated 
delivery systems contracting to provide and pay for health care services to a population with 
limited and prepaid resources — clearly have responsibilities beyond the facilitation of  
moral relationships between physicians and their patients, their moral responsibilities in 
health service delivery do not fall away.1054 The conflicts of loyalty described above are built 
into managed care to achieve its end, namely cost-containment.1055 As providers, managed 
care organisations should, however, have a trust-based relationship with all its members 
since they have moral obligations towards these members. These moral obligations stem 
from the same high moral and ethical standards that apply to medical practitioners, since 
managed care organisations also have extensive power and authority in health service 
delivery.1056 Honesty is a vital part of this relationship and enables an informed and 
justifiable choice to trust.1057 Trust is therefore a very important quality in the institution-
patient relationship just as it is important in the doctor-patient relationship, especially since 
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nowadays it may be more likely for patients to develop an ongoing relationship with their 
health insurance provider than with an individual medical practitioner. 
 
 6.2.4. Informed consent in an era of managed care 
“Is the doctor-patient dialogue, required by the doctrine of informed consent at the 
point of treatment, diminished by prior or presumed consent to certain treatment 
limitations or allocation rules at the point of subscribing to the health plan?”1058 
To put it differently: When patients sign their health plan contracts, they agree to certain 
limitations, exclusions, conditional inclusions and other requirements which may exclude all 
sorts of coverage. Some argue that such a patient’s subscription to a health plan profoundly 
modifies the informed consent requirements at the point of treatment. 1059 Hall, for 
example, submits that patients in such situations have waived their right to information 
about excluded treatment or have given prior consent to a certain cost-containment system 
and should consequently be held to the deal.1060 This line of reasoning, however, presents a 
truncated version of a more complex and systematic problem unfolding over time. 1061 
 
In managed care, various role players are involved and a patient’s treatment options and 
ultimate treatment decision depend on past actions, information and decisions.1062 For 
example, most employees can only choose from a limited menu of health plan options— or 
are sometimes only presented with one option.  Most employees do not select employment 
based solely on the health plans available at the workplace and the implicit health care 
choices which they will be making when accepting the position although this may ultimately 
be to their detriment.1063 Similarly, other patients signing up with a particular health care 
plan also cannot foresee how particular limitations, conditions, exclusions and conditional 
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inclusions will affect their health treatment decisions in future, and in some cases they are 
not even aware of these particulars until ill health and the necessity of particular treatment 
plans cause these obstacles.  Thus, while the familiar doctrine of informed consent  
(discussed in Chapter Three) is normally only applied at the point where a patient presents a 
health problem to a physician and requests  a treatment decision, information relevant to 
treatment decisions is actually being given or withheld at every stage of the managed care 
process.1064 Few patients therefore know the full range of facts material to medical decision-
making.1065 
 
But should patients be informed of these particulars at the various decision points in the 
managed care process? And, if so, would be the justification for such an expanded duty of 
informed consent?1066 The employer’s fiduciary obligations towards the employee as an 
organisational health care provider include the duty to provide enough information in this 
regard, and to be effectively held accountable.1067 (The employer’s fiduciary duty towards 
the employee in this context does not fall within the ambit of this research.) The doctor’s 
fiduciary duty to provide all information to the patient has already been dealt with 
extensively in Chapters Three to Five.  Regarding the disclosure of information pertaining to 
the patient’s health plan and economic considerationsitwas argued in Chapter Four section 
4.3.1. that patients should be informed of all the alternative treatments, with their risks and 
benefits, as well as the costs involved. This is also confirmed in section 6(1)(c) of the 
National Health Act 61 of 2003. And, at the very least, physicians who due to economic 
reasons cannot make use of the necessary medical resources that they believe their patients 
need, should have an affirmative professional obligation to inform their patients of the fact 
that potentially beneficial treatment cannot be utilised for economic reasons.1068  
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A patient and the health insurance provider enter into a contract for health coverage and 
care on certain conditions and the health insurance provider consequently has an obligation 
to provide the necessary information to support an informed and enforceable contract with 
the patient.1069 But how much information and what type of information should be 
conveyed by the health maintenance organisation or health insurance providers? Health 
insurance providers do not usually make a full, detailed contract to a patient who 
subscribes. The health plan information is summarised in brochures and/or other 
documents instead and may omit information critical to an individual’s specific health 
needs.1070  
 
In addition, no information about rationing and financial incentives is included in these 
summaries made available by health insurance providers. In the USA some states now have 
legislation requiring that health plans reveal those financial incentives which they offer 
physicians to practise cost-conserving care.1071  The American Medical Association’s (AMA) 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has also argued that health plans have a duty to reveal 
information about financial incentives and rationing.1072 By requiring health insurance 
providers to furnish this type of information, the fiduciary duty of the doctor-patient 
relationship is extended to the organisational realm and a fiduciary obligation consequently 
binds health insurance providers. The fiduciary duty of health insurance providers is based 
on the patient’s dependence on the plan and the comparative lack of insight into the 
particulars of the plan.1073  
 
Many believe that the disclosure of these limitations, conditions and economic 
considerations of health insurance plans remains the sole responsibility of the health 
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insurance providers and should not be extended to physicians involved, since such 
disclosure by physicians would undermine patient trust. 1074 It has been pointed out by Katz 
and others that such disclosure of financial interests or incentives, which might have a 
bearing on medical decision-making, may also have a down-side: They can undermine 
physician-patient trust, which is the cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship and also 
the aim informed consent has been designed to foster.1075  However, not all health 
insurance plans engage in full and comprehensive disclosure of rationing schemes at the 
time of subscription, and many individuals do not have a meaningful choice between health 
insurance plans offered by their employer. Nor do they have any negotiating power to craft 
an individual deal with insurers. It is therefore difficult to argue that the prior consent or 
waiver was freely given and that physicians, as fiduciaries in the doctor-patient encounter, 
should respect that and need not provide full and detailed information on relevant aspects 
pertaining to the health insurance plan, economic considerations and available 
treatments.1076 
 
In the present era of managed care, it is consequently important to take special cognisance 
of the true complexity of a managed care system with regard to informed consent, of how 
the system extends over time and features multiple influences on the medical decision-
making process.1077 The usual analysis of the doctor-patient relationship and the doctrine of 
informed consent underestimate the number of actors and interests involved. 1078 Moreover, 
when a patient subscribes to a health insurance plan with limitations, exclusions and 
conditions, it does not mean that the patient has given up the right to information about the 
full range of relevant treatments and all the economic considerations involved. “ It also does 
not mean the individual has given up the kind of doctor-patient relationship in which the 
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physician reveals the truth about the diagnosis and options, serving the familiar role of 
fiduciary, expert educator, and counselor.”1079 And even if an individual were willing to 
follow that route, there would be numerous obstacles in enforcing such an agreement, since  
• it is contra bones mores to agree to give up unknown information of potentially 
great significance in a contractual agreement;  
• it is impossible to predict what information will be relevant and significant as the 
health problem and concomitant treatment issue may not yet be apparent; and  
• by giving up a doctor-patient relationship where the doctor has a fiduciary duty to 
provide the patient with all relevant and material information, the patient would 
be completely dependent on a physician whose rationing decisions cannot be 
monitored or challenged and whose advice the patient cannot trust to be 
complete.1080 
 
Thus, in the context of a complex managed health care system, patients need full disclosure 
even more. But they do not only need disclosure, they also need advocacy and they cannot 
rely on their physicians to advocate for them due to the close allegiance that exists between 
managed care organisations and the health care providers.1081 Patients consequently lose 
not only their ability to participate in medical decision-making, but also their confidence 
that someone else will have their best interest at heart when making decisions regarding 
their medical care.1082 
 
 6.2.5. Patient advocacy in an era of managed care 
“Providing patients, who depend on their physicians for expert advice, with an effective 
voice is a long-standing problem that has been highlighted, but not caused, by 
managed care.”1083 
                                                 
1079
 Wolf, Susan Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care Houston Law Review Vol 35 
(1999) 1631 – 1681, 1674. 
1080
 Wolf, Susan Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care Houston Law Review Vol 35 
(1999) 1631 – 1681, 1674. 
1081
 Wolf, Susan Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care Houston Law Review Vol 35 
(1999) 1631 – 1681, 1666 – 1668; Cerminara, Kathy L The Class Action Suit as a method of Patient 
Empowerment in the Managed Care Setting American Journal of Law and Medicine Vol 24 (1998) 7 – 58, 24. 
1082
 Cerminara, Kathy L The Class Action Suit as a method of Patient Empowerment in the Managed Care 
Setting American Journal of Law and Medicine Vol 24 (1998) 7 – 58, 24. 
1083
 Annas, George J Patients’ Rights in Managed care – Exit, Voice, and Choice New England Journal of 
Medicine (1997) Vol 337, No 3, 210 – 215, 210. 
224 
 
The concern for the vulnerability of patients in managed care, and the endeavour to 
empower patients and provide them with an effective voice, provides an opportunity to 
develop meaningful options for them.1084 More attention should consequently be paid to 
dispute resolution, grievance mechanisms and appeal procedures in managed care and 
health maintenance organisations. Such fair procedures for the resolution of disputes are 
critical in the context of managed care, since it is difficult to make an impartial decision 
when there are financial incentives not to provide treatment.1085  
 
In addition, some scholars suggest that physicians can no longer be advocates for their 
patients, since the traditional doctor-patient relationship is no longer financially feasible in 
the era of managed health care.1086 This leaves patients without help and vulnerable to 
advocate for themselves if they believe that they require a particular medical treatment not 
covered by their health insurance plan or not mentioned by their treating physician.1087 
Moreover, for patients to be their own advocates, user-friendly appeal mechanisms are 
necessary as well as complete information on all available and alternative treatment plans 
linked to the patient’s specific illness. Mehlman and Annas, on the other hand, believe that 
a new, independent profession of medical advocates is needed to ensure that adequate 
representation and assistance are available to patients.1088 In light of the changing nature of 
medical practice and the pervasive pressure on the traditional doctor-patient relationship, 
their idea seems appealing.1089 However, introducing a third party to the doctor-patient 
relationship will imply accepting that the unique nature of this historical relationship and its 
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distinctive dynamics no longer exist, and that physicians no longer owe any fiduciary duties 
to their patients.  It is evident from the discussion thus far that such disregard for the 
historical attributes of the doctor-patient relationship and the nature of medical care is not 
an option, especially since it will undermine trust in the relationship.  
 
It is recommended that independent administrative review procedures, including dispute 
resolution, grievance mechanisms and appeals procedures in managed care organisations 
and health maintenance organisations be developed as a system for screening and 
controlling litigation. Such procedures will also empower patients and provide them with an 
effective voice in health service delivery. Sage is also a proponent of this idea and submits 
that such independent administrative review procedures will function as an extension of 
health care regulation mechanisms and will offer a standard process for resolving socially 
contentious entitlement issues that build public values.1090 And since public trust in the 
health care system has collective importance, a fair and deliberative procedure s uch as an 
independent administrative review will reassure patients that health plans always aspire to 
find a reasonable balance between access and quality of health care and its cost.1091 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
The rapidly changing health care marketplace — once a fragmented, professionalised and 
charitable endeavour and now an industry-dominated, profit-oriented corporate entity —
continually generates new issues for lawyers, judges and legislatures.1092 But due to the 
regulatory history of medical practice as well as the tradition of deference to professional 
judgment, the law has difficulty in responding to concerns in the managed care 
revolution.1093 The complexities of managed care litigation include matters relating to the 
interpretation of health plan language and the dichotomy between benefit determination 
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decisions and medical necessity.1094 To safeguard patients’ interest in a managed care 
environment in South Africa, policy makers should also consider the following issues: 
freedom of choice with regard to health insurance plans ; 
• disclosure of all material information, including incentive schemes, exclusions  and 
limitations;  
• quality of care, since the inappropriate utilisation of services in a managed care 
administration may result in poor quality care;  
• confidentiality of medical information; and 
• financial security – once a member (or employee) has contributed financially to a 
medical scheme, payment for the services received within that system should be 
guaranteed.1095 
 
In this chapter, it was argued that managed health care organisations have a duty to 
introduce managed care intervention strategies to address the current economic challenges 
in health service delivery.1096 Just as the traditional ideals of the doctor-patient relationship 
were based on the best interest of the patient, so can managed care practices also work to 
the patient’s advantage. However, the manner in which managed care organisations 
currently perform their functions is morally questionable. Current managed care practices 
alter the doctor-patient relationship and the ethos upon which it is founded and present 
serious concerns with regard to the distribution of power in health service delivery.1097  
 
Although managed care organisations are businesses, they are businesses involved in health 
service delivery and both the unique nature of medical practice, as well as the needs of 
patients as consumers, require that the ethical responsibility for patient care not only be 
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placed on physicians, but also on managed care organisations.1098 It is clear from the case 
law discussed in sections 6.2.1. and 6.2.3. that the law still regards physicians and medical 
practitioners in general as the primary responsible entity in medical decision-making. While 
this may be true, the contributory force of managed care organisations in health service 
delivery and managed care practices in medical decision-making cannot be ignored. Trust is 
therefore an important quality in the institution-patient relationship and not only relevant 
to the dynamics in the doctor-patient relationship. Managed care can only be a morally 
creditable enterprise in health service delivery if it is designed to serve the needs of all those 
who are or will be ill.1099  
 
While some may argue that such reasoning threatens the essence of the medical care 
industry at present, it must be remembered that patients do not relinquish all rights when 
becoming members of a health insurance plan. Patients’ rights should rather be protected 
without fear of decreasing the efficiency of managed health care interventions. Protecting 
patients’ rights, however, requires returning medical decision-making power to the patient 
and a legal redefinition of the doctor-patient relationship.1100 As one commentator 
remarked: “managed care has reduced the once-hallowed physician-patient relationship...to 
mere sound bites exchanged during hurried office visits, while therapeutic words of empathy  
have been replaced with Prozac scripts”.1101 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Consumerism and the doctor-patient relationship 
 
 
“The evidence about what patients seek in medical relationships has been quite 
consistent over many years, despite massive changes in the medical information 
available: patient sophistication in accessing it, and a growing trend toward 
consumerism and patient activism. Their [the patients’] relationships with health care 
plans have taken on increasing importance, but most patients still view their medical 
care in terms of their relationships with a limited number of physicians.”1102 
 
As noted in Chapters Four and Six, the market paradigm in health service delivery developed 
in response to a general commercialisation, de-professionalisation and proletarianisation of 
the medical profession, as well as the escalation of costs in health service delivery. It was 
also evident from the discussion in these chapters that the influence of the market 
paradigm in health service delivery has been pervasive. While the main objective of 
managed care initiatives have been to contain and lower the rapidly escalating cost of 
health care, this cost has again begun to rise rapidly in recent years.1103 In this post-
managed care era, market advocates are now endorsing consumer-driven health care, 
“which seeks to increase consumer sensitivity to cost and effectiveness by making people 
spend their own money for health care”.1104 Consumer-directed health care, however, not 
only aims to control costs in the health care market, but also endeavours to enhance 
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consumer control and choice “...by combining financial incentives with information to help 
consumers make more informed health care decisions and to appreciate the economic trade-
offs of those decisions”.1105  
 
A consumer is willing to make independent decisions and to seek out alternative sources of 
information.1106 The increased emphasis on cost containment policies also prompts 
consumers to view cost as a relevant factor in the medical decision-making process.1107 
Haug and Lavin define consumerism in health care in terms of the power relationship 
between doctor and patient: “In simple terms, consumerism in medicine means challenging 
the physician’s authority to make unilateral decisions, demanding a share in reaching closure 
on diagnosis and working out treatment plans. A consumer stance constitutes authority 
challenge...”1108  
 
Although there are significant differences between managed care  and consumer-driven 
health care, there are important similarities.  Both managed care and consumer-driven 
health care:  
• seek to reduce the cost of health care by reducing the use of health care services 
aim to make parties more aware of the cost of health care services rendered; 
• emphasise the sanctity of freedom of contract for patients, as well as private 
agreements between parties as an essential tool for enabling competition; 
• deny individual patients health benefits in order to lower the cost of health care. 
(Managed care practices deny some patients benefits in order to maximise the 
economic good of a particular health plan, while consumer-driven health care 
                                                 
1105
 Axtell-Thompson Linda M Consumer Directed Health Care: Ethical Limits to Choice and Responsibility 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Vol 30 (2005) 207 – 226, 207; “Consumer-driven plans combine high-
deductible insurance coverage – often in the form of a preferred provider organisation – with a personal 
spending account controlled by the consumer.” Jacobi, John V After Managed Care: Gra y Boxes, Tiers and 
Consumerism Saint Louis University Law Journal Vol 47 (2003) 397 – 410, 405; Rosoff, Arnold J Consumer-
Driven Health Care Journal of Legal Medicine Vol 28 (2007) 11 – 36; For a complete study on the subject see 
Herzlinger, Regina E (ed) Consumer-Driven Health Care: Implications for Providers, Payers and Policymakers  
John Wiley & Sons 2004.   
1106
 Hibbard, Judith H & Weeks, Edward, C Consumerism in Health Care: Prevalence and Predictors Medical 
Care Vol 25, No 11 (1987) 1019 – 1032, 1020. 
1107
 Hibbard, Judith H & Weeks, Edward, C Consumerism in Health Care: Prevalence and Predictors Medical 
Care Vol 25, No 11 (1987) 1019 – 1032, 1020. 
1108
 Hibbard, Judith H & Weeks, Edward, C Consumerism in Health Care: Prevalence and Predictors Medical 
Care Vol 25, No 11 (1987) 1019 – 1032, 1021. 
230 
 
sensitises individuals to the cost of health care services so that they only use the 
care they actually need, thereby reducing the cost of health care to society as a 
whole.)1109 
 
It is important to note that there is presently no parallel to consumer-directed health care 
initiatives in the United Kingdom or in most European countries.  The primary international 
model that consumer-driven health care advocates usually refer to that of Singapore.1110 
The use of consumer-directed health care initiatives in South Africa are also often cited in 
support of the general expansion of consumer-driven health care.1111 China is also rapidly 
adopting health care policy and financing vehicles that resemble the consumer-directed 
health care initiatives of the USA, and Switzerland has also been held up by some as a 
consumer-driven health care model.1112 Unfortunately, most of the information available on 
managed care and consumer-directed health care initiatives in South Africa comes from one 
source, Shaun Mattisonn, the executive vice president of Discovery Health, one of the 
largest insurance administrators in South Africa.1113 This is regrettable for the obvious 
reason that a truly objective viewpoint, which would also include research and statistics on 
the influence of these initiatives on the public health care sector in South Africa, is not 
reflected in Mattisonn’s  writings. Since about 85% of South Africans were dependent on the 
country’s public health care system in 2005, a more objective view is crucial.1114  
 
Currently there is a growing recognition of the potentially potent force that patients, as 
consumers, can be in bringing about change in the health care sector.1115 As consumers, 
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patients have, for example, an important and active role to play in improving the quality of 
their own care, as well as the quality of care delivered in the health care system as a 
whole.1116 This chapter will consider the critical role patients, as consumers of health care 
services in a post-managed care era, have in ensuring a more equal balance of power in the 
unique doctor-patient relationship. As the doctor-patient relationship becomes more 
impersonal and distant, patients can rely less on medical practitioners to look after their 
health interests and need to become more involved in their personal and family health 
care.1117 In addition, more attention should be focussed on patients’ perspective to make 
the doctor-patient relationship and interaction more costumer orientated, thereby 
facilitating behaviour and compliance that positively affect the therapeutic outcome. 1118  
 
Another fundamental enquiry into the practice of consumer-directed health care is whether 
thinking of a patient as a knowledgeable consumer could ever make complete sense in the 
face of complicated, emotionally charged illnesses and complex decision-making 
situations.1119 Consumer-directed health care initiatives are yet another example of the 
commodification of health care first discussed in Chapter Four. Consumer-directed health 
care rests on the premise that health care can successfully be treated the same as any other 
commodity.1120 It was established in Chapter Four section 4.2. that health care can not be 
regarded as an ordinary commodity. This matter will not be debated any further, except to 
mention the features Callahan identified in his paper on consumer-directed health care in 
support of his argument that health care is different from other areas of economic activity. 
Callahan submits that health care is not an ordinary commodity since  
•  the nature and demand for health care is irregular and unpredictable;  
•  lacking knowledge and experience, the patient is forced to trust his/her physician;  
                                                 
1116
 Hibbard, Judith H Engaging Health Care Consumers to Improve the Quality of Care Medical Care Vol 41, No 
1 (2003) I-61 – I-70, I-61. 
1117
 Roth, Martin S Enhancing Consumer Involvement in Health Care: The Dynamics of Control, Empowerment 
and Trust Journal of Public Policy and Marketing  Vol 13 (1) (1994) 115 – 132, 115; Gould, Stephen J Consumer 
Attitudes Toward Health and Health Care: A Differential Perspective The Journal of Consumer Affairs Vol 22, No 
1 (1988) 96 – 118, 115. 
1118
 Roth, Martin S Enhancing Consumer Involvement in Health Care: The Dynamics of Control, Empowerment 
and Trust Journal of Public Policy and Marketing  Vol 13 (1) (1994) 115 – 132, 118. 
1119
 Callahan, Daniel Consumer-Directed Health Care: Promise of Puffery? Health, Economics, Policy and Law 
(2008) Vol 3, 301 – 311, 301. 
1120
 Callahan, Daniel Consumer-Directed Health Care: Promise of Puffery? Health, Economics, Policy and Law 
(2008) Vol 3, 301 – 311, 302. 
232 
 
•  recovery from disease is as unpredictable as its incidence; and  
•  entry into the field of health care is limited by professional and licensing 
restrictions.1121  
However, supporters of consumer-driven health care initiatives submit that to judge health 
care as “different” would block many management techniques that could be effectively 
used in health care organisations.1122  
 
In section 7.1. consumer choice, as one of the main objectives of consumer-directed health 
care initiatives, will be discussed. How consumer choice contributes to the realisation of 
patient autonomy in the medical decision-making process, and the ethical limits of such 
extended consumer responsibility, will be highlighted. Consumer protection in the doctor-
patient relationship will be considered in sections 7.2. and in section 7.3. Recommendations 
will be made on how to enhance and develop consumer empowerment in health service 
delivery.    
 
7.1. Consumer choice, patient autonomy and the ethical limits of consumer responsibility 
As indicated, consumer-directed health care has as aim to inform patients (consumers) 
properly about health care spending in order to contain the escalating cost of health care 
services. It also provides consumers with more control and responsibility in medical 
decision-making by giving them incentives to consider both the cost and quality of 
considerations when making a health care decision.1123 Thus, while managed care initiatives 
control the cost of health care services by placing health providers at financial risk for their 
decisions, the managed care backlash focuses incentives on patients.1124 However, while 
consumer-driven health care is gaining in popularity in the health care market, various 
concerns with regard to its effectiveness and suitability to contain cost and enhance 
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consumer choice have come to the fore.1125 In this section, the emphasis on consumer 
choice in health service delivery and how it influences the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship will be considered.  
 
“The era of the consumer has been declared, with patients seen as the new locus of 
decision making in the health care system.”1126 
Consumer-directed health care imposes on consumers the responsibility to choose when 
and from whom they obtain treatment. 1127 This emphasis on consumer choice implies that 
patient autonomy and self-determination are now being served in the medical decision-
making process. However, this emphasis and reliance on consumer choice also presupposes 
that 
•  patients are rational; 
•  patients have sufficient information to make important decisions about their 
health care;  
•  patients are capable of utilising the information provided; 
•  patients  are certain of the outcome of their decisions; and 
•   a person is the best judge of his/her own welfare.1128  
 
The relationship between the availability of material and relevant information and patient 
autonomy in the medical decision-making process have already been considered. In Chapter 
Three section 3.5.4. it was argued that the doctrine of informed consent as a legal 
instrument in the medical decision-making process does not always guarantee patient 
autonomy and self-determination. In Chapter Four section 4.3.2. a more rights-based 
approach (in contrast to a more paternalistic approach) in health service delivery was 
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considered and found not always to provide the necessary security for the patient in the 
medical decision-making process. (In fact, the analysis in this chapter showed that the 
greater the emphasis on patient autonomy, the more vulnerable the patient actually 
becomes.) And, in Chapter Six sections 6.2.1. and 6.2.4., it became evident that different 
types of information are required at various points in the medical decision-making process 
to enable the patient to make an informed decision which will directly affect his/her health 
care options. With regard to all these limitations placed on consumer choice and patient 
participation in the medical decision-making process, Henry Ford’s remark that customers 
could have his model T in any colour they prefe rred as long as it was black, seems 
particularly apt.1129 
 
Access to sufficient information (propagated by the emphasis placed on consumer choice in 
consumer-directed health care) therefore does not guarantee that autonomy will be the 
ruling ethical principle in medical decision-making and that the process will be in the 
particular patient’s best interest and to his/her advantage. In fact, too much information 
can be just as unenlightening as too little information. 1130 Consumers do not always 
understand or utilise information, and too much information, or the wrong information, can 
hamper real knowledge and understanding.1131 In addition, the intent to enhance consumer 
choice can not be dealt with in such a simple and straightforward manner as suggested by 
current consumer-directed health care initiatives, especially in a diverse multi-cultural 
country like South Africa. Not all consumers are alike, different consumers will have 
different needs and varying capacities for handling information and for taking responsibility 
to attend to these available health care choices.1132 Furthermore, the reality of consumer 
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choice and responsibility for health care can exacerbate current disparities in health care, an 
issue which is already critical in South Africa. 1133 The underprivileged and cost-conscious 
consumer, for example, is notoriously poor at differentiating between dispensable 
treatments and those necessary to preserve life and death. The underprivileged and needy 
would also rather avoid financing expanded choice in health service delivery. Increased 
consumer cost-sharing will consequently lead to reduced levels of health insurance for the 
working poor.1134 There is considerable evidence that an inf ormed and questioning 
consumer procures better quality services.1135 
 
To address the ethical limitations to consumer responsibility in medical decision-making 
Axtell-Thompson suggests that the principle of beneficence must receive greater status in 
order to temper autonomy and protect consumers from the unintended consequences of 
uninformed decisions.1136 This notion corresponds with the Pellegrino-Thomasma 
beneficence model,1137 which suggests that beneficence supersedes both autonomy and 
paternalism in medical decision-making, but that the beneficence model can be 
reconstructed to accommodate concerns from the autonomy model. A similar argument is 
offered by Sunstein and Thaler who note that “libertarian paternalism” should follow 
naturally as legitimate public policy in order to ensure that consumers make truly informed 
and advantageous decisions. They submit that “libertarian” in this context means that 
consumers should be able to opt out of certain arrangements and that “paternalism” refers 
to institutions, both public and private, capable of designing such arrangements to influence 
individuals’ choices to the institutions’ benefit.1138 On the other hand, the theory of 
Beauchamp on autonomy and beneficence in medical practice, on the other hand, suggests 
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that autonomy should always be the starting point in medical decision-making, but that 
principles from both the autonomy and beneficence models should be adopted to ensure 
that the patient’s best interests are served, and that such a combined model will not 
necessarily result in inconsistency.1139  
 
The principlism approach to bioethics requires that the ethical principles of beneficence and 
autonomy be carefully weighed and balanced in consumer-directed medical decision-
making.1140 From the discussion in the previous chapters it is evident that dominance among 
these principles has shifted over time and that different stakeholders have different views; 
whether it be the point of view of the medical practitioner, the patient, or a third party 
involved in health service delivery.  It is submitted in this dissertation that autonomy should 
always be the point of departure in medical decision-making, but that principles of 
beneficence can and should also be adopted to ensure that a patient’s best interests are 
served. Axtell-Thompson rightly states that the interest in allowing people to make their 
own choices — which is reiterated in the Constitution in section 12(2) and in the values 
underlying the Constitution, including dignity,1141 integrity,1142 individuality,1143 
independence,1144 responsibility and self-knowledge1145 — should be balanced against the 
interest in protecting people from the potentially bad consequences of their choices  due to 
the impossible expectations and burdens imposed on the decision-making capabilities of 
consumers of health care. In other words, the traditional ethical obligations of medical 
professionals with regard to beneficence (discussed in Chapter Two) should not be 
discarded, but should rather be encouraged for the benefit and in the best interests of the 
patient. In consumer-directed health care, beneficence should be utilised to temper 
autonomy in order to protect consumers from the unintended consequences of their own 
uninformed decisions. 
“While greater consumer choice is desirable, consumer-driven health care plans should 
be designed so that consumers are not simply abandoned to all potential 
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consequences if their autonomous choices are tainted by missing or inadequate 
information, comprehension, or decision capability.”1146 
 
However, consumers of health care services should generally be held accountable for their 
choices to prevent an increasingly unsustainable health care system. The protection of 
individual autonomy advocated in this dissertation naturally demands that the greater 
responsibility placed on each individual, especially in the context of consumer-directed 
health care, be recognised.1147 
 
7.2. Consumer protection in the doctor-patient relationship 
 Consumers’ concerns with regard to the quality of and access to adequate health care 
services have attracted much attention since the incorporation of managed health care  
initiatives discussed in Chapter Six. In the USA, ex-president Bill Clinton made consumer 
protection a cornerstone of his health policy agenda in the late 1990s, introducing measures 
for the disclosure of benefits and coverage, the utilisation review of health plan decisions 
and extensive requirements for grievance and appeal procedures, particularly in emergency 
situations.1148 It is said that managed health care initiatives have generated this exuberant 
concern about consumer protection largely because of the way in which managed care 
organisations employ and pay physicians, which also encourages physicians to limit care.1149 
In this section, it will be argued that the current legal instruments for identifying and 
resolving consumer concerns in health care are incomprehensible and inaccessible to most 
consumers, particularly those without any health insurance. 1150 In addition, the limitations 
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to the empowerment of patients that the biological exigencies of illness and injury impose 
require special protection for consumers of health care.1151 
 
According to Du Preez, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 lays the foundation for an 
era of consumers in South Africa by introducing a single, comprehensive legal framework for 
consumer protection.1152 The act focuses exclusively on consumer protection by aiming to 
“...promote a fair, accessible and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and 
services, and for that purpose, to establish national norms and standards relating to 
consumer protection...”.1153 The purpose of the act, according to section 3(1) is mainly to 
promote and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers in South Africa.1154 The 
act also contains far-reaching provisions which will fundamentally affect the way business is 
conducted in South Africa. Some of the provisions applicable to the health care market 
include section 22, which makes provision for the right to information in plain and 
understandable language: section 35 which relates to customer loyalty programmes; section 
48, in which the right to fair, reasonable and just terms and conditions is confirmed and 
section 13, which relates to the consumer’s right of choice.1155  The provisions of this Act 
apply to service providers in the health care sector as well as providers of professional 
services like medical practitioners.1156 
 
Consumer concerns with regard to health service delivery vary greatly but pertain primarily 
to three issues: quality, cost and adequate access.1157 These three issues and how they 
relate to the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship have been dealt with 
extensively in this dissertation. The insight that multiple factors, including socio-economic 
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considerations, cultural influences, the social dynamics of the particular doctor-patient 
relationship and the general approach to health service delivery determine whether 
consumers will present claims to legal institutions for resolution is crucial, especially in a 
non-litigious society like South Africa.1158 Other factors include the complexity of the health 
care system and the debilitating effects of illness.1159 In Chapter Six section 6.2.5. it was 
submitted that more attention should be paid to developing meaningful options for 
patients, including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, grievance mechanisms and 
appeal procedures in managed health care plans and organisations. In consumer-directed 
health care, where patients are accorded more responsibility in the health care process, and 
are required to advocate for themselves, user-friendly appeal mechanisms are crucial. 
 
Extra-legal methods for the resolution of consumer concerns include quality assurance and 
improvement programmes, risk management programmes, provider ethics committees and 
customer relations, and ombudsman programmes.1160 Non-judicial legal regimes for the 
resolution of consumer concerns include internal review within health care plans and 
external review by an administrative agency or other entity. 1161 Judicial review of decisions 
made by health care plans and traditional methods of legal recourse are  also available to 
consumers of health care services. However, not all consumer concerns in health care fit 
neatly into the available courses of action.1162 Kinney submits that all these available 
systems for the resolution of consumer concerns in health care are uncoordinated, 
inaccessible, inequitable and non-inclusive. “Even when consumers recognise that they have 
legitimate concerns about their health care, obtaining remedies is difficult and relief is not 
always available.”1163  
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The following are major obstacles to the resolution of consumer concerns in health care: 
•  Providers of health care services and health care plans rarely have a systematic 
mechanism in place for the identification of consumer concerns , or an informal 
forum where consumers can voice their concern and get relief. 
•  Consumers of health care services are greatly disempowered vis-à-vis health care 
providers and health care plans, which have comparatively more power in terms 
of medical knowledge, control of the process and general resources .1164 
•  Existing legal doctrines are inadequate to assure accountability of public and 
private health plans for their treatment of consumers and their concerns. 
•  Mechanisms for the resolution of consumer concerns are fragmented and 
incomprehensible from the perspective of consumers.   
•  These mechanisms usually also exclude uninsured consumers.  
•  Existing procedures do not always ensure that consumers are able to discover, 
develop and present all relevant facts and arguments in adjudicative proceedings 
and obtain unbiased and fair consideration.1165 
 
As a result, the focus should rather be on how consumers can be empowered in order to 
ensure that they are adequately protected in health care disputes. Some suggestions for 
consumer empowerment include  
•  greater consumer involvement in the governance and policy making of health 
plans; 
•  addressing the power disparities between consumers and plans and/or providers;  
•  simplifying and consolidating dispute resolution processes to enhance 
accessibility;  
•  empowering physicians as advocates on behalf of patients;  
•  enhancing legal advocacy;  
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•  ensuring sufficiency of legal accountability of public and private health plans; and  
•  pursuing other strategies that provide consumers with a greater “voice” in 
expressing their concerns about health care.1166 
 
A discussion of all of these suggestions to enhance and develop consumer empowerment  
does not fall within in the ambit of this dissertation. The following section will therefore only 
focus on selected topics relating to consumer empowerment and the doctor-patient 
relationship, with special emphasis on the power imbalances inherent in this relationship. 
 
7.3. Consumer empowerment and the doctor-patient relationship 
Consumer-directed health care is essentially based on the empowerment of patients to 
enable them to collaborate fully with their health care team in managing their health.1167 
Such health care has real potential to empower patients in the medical marketplace with 
the availability of information about their health. Patients’ newly found empowerment is 
part of the backlash against managed care practices (discussed in Chapter Six) and the 
overall negative reaction to being controlled by the managed care system.1168 The 
traditional HMO model described in section 6.2. of Chapter Six, for example, is said to be 
based on patient ignorance; making health care free at the point of consumption and 
controlling costs by having physicians make rationing decisions.1169 However, the troubling 
question remains what effect this shift in the market of health care will have on those who 
are not able to play the demanding role of knowledgeable, empowered consumers.1170 It is 
submitted that the unique social dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship and the special 
role of the physician in this relationship may assist with patient empowerment in this new 
age of consumer-directed health care. 
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Roth suggests a value-based analysis of consumer involvement in health care in general, and 
the doctor-patient relationship in particular.1171 In a qualitative study he conducted, the 
dynamics of control, empowerment and trust in the doctor-patient relationship were 
identified as imperative for healthy doctor-patient interactions and a more equal 
distribution of power in the doctor-consumer relationship. “*P+hysician understanding and a 
communicative atmosphere created by physician availability, personality and respect were 
perceived to facilitate better treatment, leading to peace of mind, acceptance and 
compliance, as well as a sense of patient empowerment”.1172 Patients derive control and 
power  from the medical knowledge and information provided to them.1173 Empowerment, 
on the other hand, is facilitated when consumers have not only a comprehensive 
understanding of a health issue, but also believe that they can engage in meaningful 
dialogue with their physicians and suggest a relevant course of action alone or in 
conjunction with their physician.1174 A balance of information content and communication 
environment is also required to ensure that the patient-physician exchange induces 
consumer trust.1175  
 
Kapp suggests that health professionals should take on an educational role that assists their 
patients to partake fully of the rights and responsibilities associated with consumer-driven 
health care.1176 This is also the recommended mode of patient empowerment  supported in 
this dissertation. Since not all patients are the same, no single empowerment approach is 
likely to work for everyone.1177 However, one constant remains in this revolution of medical 
practice: the doctor-patient relationship. And the physician remains the most important role 
player in health service delivery to provide consumers with exactly the kind and amount of 
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information that they want and need, as well as the means to become further informed and 
empowered to take full responsibility for their own health care.1178 
 
In addition to the pivotal role that medical practitioners can play in the doctor-patient 
relationship to empower the consumer-patient, consumer interests also need to be 
organised, as consumer empowerment can also only be effective in its outcomes when 
there is organised advocacy.1179 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
In this dissertation the historical development of the doctor-patient relationship has been 
traced from its early origins with physicians as the primary decision-makers to the new 
medical marketplace with patients now the new locus of decision-making in health care.1180 
This change, although not widespread, has become socially desirable.1181 While much of this 
dissertation has advocated more patient autonomy and self-determination in order to 
ensure a more equal distribution of power in the doctor-patient relationship, the discussion 
in this chapter argued for a more cautious approach in consumer-directed health care. 
 
“Consumer-directed health care appears to be a good fair-weather friend, up to 
dealing with a small squall, but not really bad weather.”1182 
While consumer-directed health care has the potential to ensure that   patients have greater 
autonomy and control in medical decision-making, it may also exacerbate current 
disparities. Research indicates that consumer-directed health care initiatives cause patients 
to avail themselves of fewer health care services, even when that care is essential, and that 
lower-income individuals and those with serious health concerns are particularly at risk.1183 
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Consumerism in health care is furthermore inconsistent with the traditional relationship of 
authority between the medical practitioner and patient (described in Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three) as it challenges traditional physician authority. 1184 It is said that these 
traditional conceptions of professional authority are being challenged by a more educated 
and egalitarian society.1185 And while conventional practices suggested that patients are ill 
equipped to judge the merits of medical practice and that physicians should act as patients’ 
agents in this regard, business leaders and public officials now overturn these conventional 
practices by motivating patients to take charge of their own care.1186 
 
The overly individualistic approach of consumer-directed health care furthermore discounts 
the social dimension of medical care, ignoring the clinical realities and impact of illness and 
disease on vulnerable patients as well as the complex nature of health service delivery. The 
health care consumer of today is faced with a bewildering set of choices and an equally 
bewildering barrage of information.1187 In addition, the ability to engage in a rational 
medical decision-making process may also wax and wane from time to time for most 
individuals, depending on the type of choice they are confronted with at a particular 
time.1188  
 
Probably the most worrisome consequence of consumer-directed health care in the South 
African context is that those least able to navigate through the health care system – typically 
the least educated and least prosperous – will probably fare the worst in this 
environment.1189 And Bloche suggests that those most marginalised by language and 
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cultural barriers, geographic separation, and persisting racial and ethnic bias will have 
greater difficulties than others with similar incomes.1190 
“Medical coverage is more than a business proposition; it is an expression of our 
commitment to each other. Cost sharing that renders high-value care unaffordable 
breaches this commitment. It gives some of us less of a stake in our common civic life. 
Health policy that disregards people in this fashion is not merely indecent; it puts social 
peace, and opportunity for all, at risk.”1191 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: A proposed re-conceptualisation of the doctor-patient 
relationship to redress power imbalances 
 
 
 
This study has provided a comprehensive — including a historical (Chapter Two) — 
perspective on the doctor-patient relationship duly accounting for various approaches to 
health service delivery, namely: a paternalistic approach (Chapter Three), a market-oriented 
model of health service delivery (Chapter Four) present notions and developments in health 
service delivery pertaining to managed care initiatives (Chapter Six) and consumer-directed 
health care (Chapter Seven). In Chapter Five, an alternative to or a re-conceptualisation of 
the doctor-patient relationship was also considered in terms of fiduciary law principles. In 
this concluding chapter some of the arguments and conclusions presented in the previous 
chapters will be revisited, specifically with regard to the following research question which 
initiated and guides this research:  
Are there power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship and if so, can this 
relationship be re-conceptualised, from a legal perspective, to address those 
imbalances? 
 
 
 
8.1. Are there power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship? 
8.2. Can the doctor-patient relationship be re-conceptualised, from a legal perspective, to redress the 
power imbalances inherent in the relationship? 
8.2.1. The role of autonomy, dignity, self-determination and beneficence in the doctor-patient 
relationship 
8.2.2. The doctrine of informed consent and the power imbalances in the doctor-patient 
relationship 
8.2.3. The fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the power imbalances inherent to 
the relationship 
8.2.4. The role of trust in the doctor-patient relationship 
8.3. Concluding remarks 
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8.1. Are there power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship? 
Every system of health service delivery is embedded in a culture.1192 It is evident from the 
discussion in Chapter Two that the culture of medical care refers to a set of ideas about 
what medicine is; how it ought to be practised and distributed; different notions about the 
causes of illness; the nature of healing; the responsibility of illness and health; the role of 
private and public institutions in providing medical care; and most importantly, the 
understanding of the role of healers and the relationship between healers and those who 
are ill.1193 The importance of this culture of medical care and the social context of medical 
practice therefore need to be considered in a study on the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship. 
 
The exposition of the historical development of the doctor-patient relationship provides 
some insight into the continuously changing role of physicians and the relationship between 
physicians and the ill.1194 It is evident that, since good health is a universally valued 
condition, the physician in any particular community has always played an important role 
and has, since ±600 – 100 BC, has been accorded a special status in society.1195 This 
dependency of people, vulnerable due to illness, on physicians with their expert knowledge 
and skill, has created a power imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship. From medieval 
times, the practice of medicine started to evolve and attain its present status as a 
profession.1196 The unique characteristics associated with a profession create a complex 
interplay of power, regulation and control of the doctor-patient relationship. It is due to the 
status of medical practice as a profession that further power imbalances inherent in the 
doctor-patient relationship can be identified. These power imbalances include the following: 
•  The medical profession has a monopoly over an esoteric and difficult body of 
knowledge not accessible to laypersons who, in their turn, depend on this 
knowledge for good health. 
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•  Members of the medical profession form an exclusive social group based on their 
professional activity.  
•  The medical profession disciplines its own members, thereby securing their 
independence. 
•  The medical profession determines its own standards of education, ethical codes, 
licensing, admission, norms of practice and other matters of control and 
regulation, thereby asserting its independence.  
•  The profession is therefore relatively free from lay evaluation and control.  
•  Every physician is not only trained in the skills and knowledge of the medical 
profession, but also in its values and attributes, thereby reinforcing a particular 
culture of medical care. 
 
In addition to the power and authority that the status of professionalism confers on the 
members of the medical profession, the manner in which both the medical profession and 
the ill view their respective roles in the doctor-patient relationship also contributes to the 
inherent power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship.1197 These expectations and 
qualities attributed to the physician role and the sick role are internalised and influence the 
actions and attitudes of both patients and physicians. The physician role is also associated 
with status and is a source of power in the doctor-patient relationship as it presupposes a 
set of rights and duties associated with this status. 
 
The general approaches to health service delivery discussed in this dissertation to facilitate 
and structure the analyses of the doctor-patient relationship also assist in identifying 
particular power imbalances in this relationship. It is evident from the discussion in Chapter 
Three that the doctor-patient relationship in a paternalistic setting is especially problematic 
with regard to the medical decision-making process, as the power imbalances inherent in 
this relationship can influence this critical moment in the doctor-patient interaction 
significantly and most often adversely. In a medical decision-making process in a 
paternalistic setting, a patient’s rights to autonomy, dignity and self-determination are 
disregarded while the physician’s altruistic and beneficent actions and intentions triumph.  
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While it is said that medical practice is no longer conducted in such a paternalistic way and 
that the use of particular legal instruments, like the doctrine of informed consent, addresses 
the problems associated with paternalism sufficiently, it is submitted that the paternalistic 
approach in medical practice is still very much alive in health service delivery today and that 
historically this approach roots so deeply in a general culture of medical care that it will 
always influence medical practice to some extent. 
 
In addition to this continuing influence of historical and traditional perspectives on medical 
practice and the doctor-patient relationship, the present influence of market-orientated 
principles on health service delivery and the doctor-patient relationship also results in the 
formation (and prevalence) of additional power imbalances in this relationship. In Chapter 
Four the doctor-patient relationship was analysed in the context of the medical 
marketplace, where the relationship is regarded as an economic and juridical relationship 
made up of rights and duties. In terms of the business model of health care, the doctor and 
the patient are regarded as contracting equals and health service delivery itself is regarded 
as an ordinary commodity in the marketplace. But this alternative conceptualisation of the 
doctor-patient relationship does not address the power imbalances inherent in the 
relationship and, instead, gives rise to further power imbalances as was indicated. 
 
The business model of health service delivery results in an overwhelming concern for rights 
and overestimates patient autonomy. Although the initial reaction might be that such a 
right’s ethic and an increased focus on patient autonomy and self-determination may serve 
as a mechanism to realise patient self-rule and address the power imbalances in health care, 
it actually does not provide the necessary security for the patient in the medical realm.1198 In 
addition, the business model also reconfigures the place of money and the role of the 
physician in medical practice.1199 While financial considerations traditionally had no bearing 
on doctors’ clinical judgement, economic and price considerations are now central to 
medical decision-making. Medical decisions are no longer purely clinical, but are based, at 
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least in part, on economic principles and potential economic consequences.1200 This 
development adds another power dynamic to the doctor-patient relationship. Moreover, 
the physician has evolved as a businessman and entrepreneur in this medical marketplace, 
leaving little place for traditional values and moral obligations patients usually associate 
with the medical profession. These developments have resulted in patients now being more 
vulnerable than ever before.  
 
The commercialisation of medical practice is a pervasive and inevitable development and 
the discussion in Chapters Six and Seven has shown that the ongoing economic re-
organisation of health service delivery is not only reshaping medical practice, but is also 
contributing to the existing power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship. Medical 
decisions are now not only based, at least in part, on economic considerations, but 
economic consequences also influence medical decisions by translating them into financial 
incentives for both physicians and patients.1201 Hand in hand with this cultural reassessment 
of the role of commerce in medical practice is a change in the way in which health service 
delivery is perceived as a social system.1202 The patient is now the consumer and the doctor 
the provider of services and the intricacies of this pure market relationship are decided on 
by managed care organisations and health care insurers. In this era of managed care and 
consumer-directed health care neither the patient nor the physician, as parties to the 
doctor-patient relationship has exclusive power and control.  
 
Clearly, then, power imbalances have continued to exist in the doctor-patient relationship. 
Moreover, these power imbalances are both critical and objectionable from an ethical and 
legal point of view. 
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8.2. Can the doctor-patient relationship be re-conceptualised, from a legal perspective, to 
address the power imbalances inherent in the relationship? 
In Chapters Three to Seven a different approach to health service delivery was discussed in 
order to facilitate the discussion on the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship 
and to provide a framework for the overall analyses. For each of these approaches the 
relevant legal instruments used and the efforts made to address the power imbalances were 
also considered and fully assessed. The aim here is therefore not to comment on the 
arguments presented in previous chapters, but rather to provide a broad and feasible re-
conceptualisation of the doctor-patient relationship based on the discussion in these 
chapters. 
 
8.2.1. The role of autonomy, dignity, self-determination and beneficence in the 
doctor-patient relationship 
Any attempt to address the power imbalances inherent in the doctor-patient relationship 
should pay special attention to the role of autonomy, dignity, self-determination and 
beneficence. In this dissertation the importance of these values in health service delivery 
have been highlighted throughout.1203 In sum it can again be emphasised that individuals 
have sovereignty over their life and also the right to make decisions without interference by 
others.  
 
Both autonomy and self-determination are recognised in the Constitution in the provisions 
regarding the right to bodily and psychological integrity,1204 the right to privacy,1205 the right 
to life,1206 the right to freedom of movement,1207 and the right to freedom of religion and 
belief.1208 In addition, the values of dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility and self-knowledge constitute the foundation of a person’s right to autonomy. 
Among these values, dignity is singled out as being particularly closely connected with a 
person’s health. Health is seen to be essential for life. Human dignity is also a founding value 
of the Constitution and is furthermore protected as a fundamental right in the Bill of 
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Rights.1209 Moreover, autonomy and self-determination are also recognised in the National 
Health Act 61 of 2003.1210 It is thus evident that autonomy, dignity and self-determination 
are values central to health service delivery in general and the doctor-patient relationship in 
particular. 
 
The importance of beneficence in health service delivery has also been highlighted in this 
dissertation. Beneficence is regarded as the raison d’être of the medical profession, and is 
recognised in the provisions of the Constitution, which state that everyone has the right to 
life,1211 access to health care within available resources1212 including reproductive health 
care,1213 that children have a right to basic health care services,1214 and that everyone has 
the right to information necessary to exercise or protect their rights.1215 It is evident from 
the analyses in the previous chapters that the altruistic and beneficent commitment of 
medical professionals should not simply be disregarded in preference to a more rights’ ethic 
approach, as the moral obligations of health care professionals can serve the best interest of 
patients— especially in the current commercialised medical marketplace.1216  
 
Principles of both the autonomy and beneficence models of health service delivery should 
therefore be given their rightful place in a re-conceptualisation of the doctor-patient 
relationship. It will, however, not be easy to find a balance between these sometimes 
conflicting principles and values. It is therefore also necessary to recognise the limits of both 
beneficence and autonomy in medical practice: Excessive claims by patients dictating 
treatment cannot be justified in the name of patient autonomy, but at the same time 
physicians cannot be allowed to decide exclusively and unilaterally. Physicians, on the other 
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hand, can also not withhold their guidance, lest patients forfeit the benefit of professional 
expertise in medical decision-making. 
 
The principles of the autonomy model should thus always serve as the foundation of any 
enquiry concerning the power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship, with the 
principles of the beneficence model adopted and adapted where necessary to serve the 
best interest of the patient.  
 
8.2.2. The doctrine of informed consent and the power imbalances in the doctor-
patient relationship 
At present, the doctrine of informed consent as a legal mechanism to address the power 
imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship — specifically with regard to medical decision-
making — is ineffective. While the dominant rhetoric of this doctrine is patient autonomy 
and self-determination, it is definitely not the dominant real value being served. Possible 
reasons for this failure of the doctrine of informed consent to ensure patient-centred 
decision-making and patients’ freedom of choice include 
•  the diverse perceptions of the doctrine;1217 
•  the different (and sometimes conflicting) standards of disclosure applied by 
courts;1218 
•  the historical attributes associated with the sick role and the physician’s role that 
still influence physician and patient behaviour;1219 
•  the great disparity between the theory of informed consent and the practical 
application of these theoretical principles;1220 and 
•  the general inefficiency of the doctrine in practice.1221 
 
The traditional doctrine of informed consent is also ill equipped to address non-disclosure 
due to financial and other considerations with regard to medical decision-making that may 
arise in the era of commercialised health service delivery. For example, the business model 
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of health service delivery assigns a more prominent place in the medical decision-making 
process to other role players with sometimes competing interests. Such new role players 
certainly influence the doctor-patient relationship in general, as well as  the power 
imbalances inherent in that relationship. In addition, there are various stages at which 
decisions are made and at each of these stages a different level of information is required. 
For this reason, there can not be a single moment of informed consent and decision-making 
in medical practice.  
 
It is submitted that the protection of patient autonomy and self-determination, and the 
assurance that patients will still receive the maximum benefit from professional expertise 
and guidance, can only be achieved though a more honest relationship between doctor and 
patient, a moral relationship built on trust, equality and respect. Such a humanised 
relationship will reinforce patients’ confidence in physicians and the authority of the 
medical profession, while improving the quality of both patients’ and physicians’ treatment 
decisions. Such a relationship can, however, only exist if physicians learn to communicate 
with their patients effectively and to assess whether patients have been informed to their 
satisfaction. It is also suggested that courts should place more emphasis on the quality of 
choice and the extent to which decisions made by patients exhibit understanding, rather 
than focussing solely on whether there was consent in a particular case. 
 
In this sense, the rebuilding of patient autonomy and self-determination in medical 
decision-making in order to ensure a more equal distribution of power in the doctor-patient 
relationship is actually the responsibility of the medical profession as well as the judiciary. 
 
8.2.3. The fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the power 
imbalances inherent in the relationship  
Fiduciary law plays a significant role in protecting vulnerable people. The fiduciary nature of 
the doctor-patient relationship and the suitability of fiduciary principles  to doctor-patient 
interactions were discussed in Chapter Five. It is evident that the doctor-patient relationship 
displays many hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship. Moreover, the idea that physicians are 
or should be fiduciaries for their patients has been a dominant metaphor in medical- and 
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health law and ethics for some time and is presumed by much of the legal and ethical 
analysis on physicians’ conflict of interest. 
 
According to Birks, fiduciary law is a vehicle for exporting incidents of express trust by 
analogy, and it is characterised by the high degree of altruism required of a fiduciary.1222 In 
support of Birks’s argument, Rainbolt suggests that a normal fiduciary ethic for the doctor-
patient relationship is morally preferable as such an ethic also encompasses the contractual 
ethic (discussed in Chapters Four, Six and Seven). To this he adds another requirement, the 
acts and the advice of the fiduciary, which can be equated with the traditional ethic of 
health service delivery (discussed in Chapters Two and Three).1223  
 
A fiduciary framework for the doctor-patient relationship can resolve the competing 
demands on physicians, specifically with regard to medical decision-making. A further 
advantage of the fiduciary metaphor is that it provides courts with an increased flexibility to 
extend obligations beyond the traditional fiduciary situations to offer specific equitable 
remedies in a range of situations that may arise in health service delivery.  
 
The fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of a patient springs from the trust and 
confidence reposed by one party in another, who by reason of a specific skill, knowledge, 
training, judgement or expertise is in a superior position to advise or act on behalf of the 
party bestowing the trust and confidence on him/her. However, a doctor’s obligation is not 
only to act in the best interest of a patient, but also to act with respect, as the doctor-
patient relationship is a moral one built on trust, equality and respect.  
 
It is submitted that the doctor-patient relationship should be regarded as a fiduciary 
relationship, as the fiduciary duty analysis always commences with a structure of inequality 
within which certain obligations are assessed. This is crucial when dealing with an unequal 
relationship like the doctor-patient relationship. Fiduciary principles furthermore redress 
the imbalance of power in the doctor-patient relationship in a number of ways: 
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•  They limit the fiduciary’s freedom of action by prohibiting the fiduciary from using 
superior power to take advantage of the beneficiary.  
•  They require the fiduciary to act in the beneficiary’s best interest. 
•  While a physician may avoid liability under the law of delict by merely acting 
reasonably, the physician may still be liable for breach of his/her fiduciary duty  if 
the physician did not act loyally. 
•  Where the beneficiary challenges the contractual agreement or other 
transactions with the fiduciary, the burden of justification is moved from the 
challenging party to the fiduciary.  
•  The fiduciary may be required to do more than merely compensate the patient 
for the loss suffered as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty as punitive damages 
may also be imposed.1224 
 
 8.2.4. The role of trust in the doctor-patient relationship 
The importance of trust in the doctor-patient relationship has been emphasised throughout 
this dissertation.1225 This present section will consider how trust can address the power 
imbalances inherent in the relationship. For the purposes of this dis cussion trust refers to 
 “...the expectations of the public that those who serve them will perform their 
responsibilities in a technically proficient way (competence), that they will assume 
responsibility and not inappropriately defer to others (control) and that they will make 
patients’ welfare their highest priority (agency). Implicit in these criteria are the further 
expectations that responses will be sensitive and caring, that they will encourage 
honest and open communication, and that rules of privacy and confidentiality will be 
respected.”1226 
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It is suggested that professionalism underpins the public’s trust in health care practitioners 
and the practice of medicine:1227 While the purpose of health service delivery is to care for 
the ailing and sick, promote health interests and well-being, and to strive towards healing 
environments, the delivery of health care goes beyond just clinical and technical expertise. 
Health service delivery is also concerned with experiences, feelings and interpretations of 
human beings in often extraordinary moments of fear, anxiety and doubt. 1228 And it is 
professionalism and professional integrity that are central to health service delivery and the 
moral contract between doctor and patient, as the particular qualities associated with 
professionalism enhance this moral contract between them. Such a contract is essentially 
based on trust.1229   
 
However, an excessive focus on patient autonomy and patient-centred bio-ethics,   coupled 
with a total disregard of the traditional moral obligations of physicians towards their 
patients, can lead to the erosion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship.  
 “The language of rights and the language of trust move in opposite directions from 
one another. The scrupulous insistence on observance of one’s rights is an admission 
that one does not trust those at hand to care properly for one’s welfare .”1230 
Such a right’s ethic discounts the psychological realities of trust, vulnerability and illness and 
views trust in normative terms, questioning whether physicians deserve trust.1231 It is for 
this reason that the doctor-patient relationship should rather be described as a moral 
relationship built on trust, equality and respect. Trust in this context is synonymous with 
autonomy and reinforces patients’ confidence in physicians, as well as the authority of the 
medical profession in general. Such trust is the glue that holds the doctor-patient 
relationship together and makes its functional specificity possible, thereby improving the 
quality of both patients’ and physicians’ treatment decisions and the success of medical 
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interventions.1232  Moreover, such trust will empower the consumer-patient in the doctor-
patient relationship. 
 
A new understanding of trust and respect in the doctor-patient relationship is therefore 
necessary built on the following foundations: 
•  There is no single correct decision for how health and illness should be dealt with. 
•  Both physicians and patients bring their own vulnerabilities to the decision-
making process. 
•  Both physicians and patients should relate to one another as equals and unequals 
(physicians have expert medical knowledge and patients know what their specific 
needs and personal beliefs are). 
•  All human conduct is influenced by rational and irrational expectations. 1233 
Emanuel and Dubler support this argument for trust and respect in their theory of the ideal 
physician-patient relationship.1234 According to them trust is the culmination or the 
realisation of these fundamental elements: 
•  patient choice;  
•  the competence of medical practitioners;  
•  effective communication;  
•  true compassion;  
•  continuity of the doctor-patient relationship; and  
•  no conflict of interest.1235  
 
But how to incorporate this concept of trust into medical- and health law? While trust has 
pervasive importance in all kinds of human interactions, medical trust di ffers in critical 
aspects from other types of trust. Medical trust, for instance, is the sole example of trust 
arising from an intimate arena where the primary value of trust is not intrinsic to the 
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relationship; medical trust facilitates a relationship or transaction that achieves other 
purposes.1236 However, trust in the doctor-patient relationship does not merely facilitate 
treatment, it also alters and enhances the benefit derived from treatment. 1237 Hall therefore 
contends that trust is more essential in medical and health law than elsewhere in meeting 
instrumental goals.1238 
 
It has been shown in this dissertation that the law can effectively incorporate these 
psychological realities of trust in the doctor-patient relationship. By regarding the doctor-
patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship, and by the law’s intrinsic and predicated 
stance towards trust, various rights, responsibilities, and rules are, for example, premised on 
the strength and pervasiveness of trust in medical relationships.1239 In other words, the law 
fashions rules, rights and regulations consistent with the presence of trust. An example of 
this can be found in the doctrine of informed consent. In other instances, the law views trust 
in the doctor-patient relationship as a virtue and actively seeks  to promote it with legal rules 
intended to maintain or increase trust where it already exists or to restore trust where it is 
threatened or has been breached. An example of such a supportive legal stance on trust in 
the doctor-patient relationship can be found in the recognition of confidentiality of doctor-
patient communications.1240 
  
8.3. Concluding remarks 
Despite the revolutionary changes in health service delivery, and the evolution of medical 
practice from a cottage vocation to the present multi-complex industry, the unique doctor-
patient relationship in medical practice has remained a constant in health service 
delivery.1241 The primary purposes of medical practice, as described in this dissertation, and 
the function of the doctor-patient relationship in fulfilling its objectives, have also remained 
                                                 
1236
 Hall, Mark A Law, Medicine and Trust Stanford Law Review Vol 55, No 2 (2002) 463 – 527, 483. 
1237
 Hall, Mark A Law, Medicine and Trust Stanford Law Review Vol 55, No 2 (2002) 463 – 527, 483. 
1238
 Hall, Mark A Law, Medicine and Trust Stanford Law Review Vol 55, No 2 (2002) 463 – 527, 483 - 484. 
1239
 See Chapter Five; Hall, Mark A Law, Medicine and Trust Stanford Law Review  Vol 55, No 2 (2002) 463 – 
527, 472 & 487. 
1240
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unchanged. The doctor-patient relationship can consequently be described as the 
cornerstone for achieving, maintaining and improving health. 1242  
 
The inherent power imbalances in the doctor-patient relationship are, however, critical and 
objectionable from an ethical and legal point of view. A re-conceptualisation of the doctor-
patient relationship to address the power imbalances inherent in the relationship is 
therefore necessary. Such a re-conceptualisation should not focus exclusively on principles 
of autonomy and beneficence as two opposite extremes to the solution. The clinical realities 
and the social context of medical practice, and the numerous influences on and historical 
attributes associated with the doctor-patient relationship should rather be considered in 
context. While patients’ autonomy and self-determination should always form the 
foundation of a medical intervention, a physician’s role can not, for example, be reduced to 
that of a mere technologist.1243   
 
The medical profession has been identified as one of society’s most trusted social 
institutions. Trust is regarded as a vital value in the moral relationship between doctor and 
patient,  dependent on the quality of the said relationship. Protection of this relationship 
will ultimately best preserve those aspects of trust that are most important to the public 
and vital to ensuring quality of care.1244 
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